'9^^'y 


Columbia  (Hnitier^ttp 

mtl)eCttpof3Sfttit0rk 

LIBRARY 


PURCHASED  FROM 
THE 

WILLIAM  C.  SCHERMERHORN 
MEMORIAL  FUND 


Alexander  Campbell's 
Theology 

Its  Sources  and  Historical  Setting 


By 


WiNPRED  Ernest  Garrison,  Ph.  D. 


St.  Louis 

CHRISTIAN  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1900 


>5?- Vm"7? 


Copyrighted,  1900 

by 
W.  E.  GARRISON 


NOTE 

The  studies,  the  results  of  which  are  embodied 
in  this  volume,  were  begun  in  the  preparation  of  a 
thesis  for  a  degree  from  the  University  of  Chicago 
in  1897,  under  the  title,  "The  Sources  of  Alexander 
Campbell's  Theology."  They  have  been  continued, 
and  are  now  published,  in  the  hope  that  those  who 
are  interested  or  may  become  interested  in  the  sub- 
ject, may  derive  from  them  some  aid  in  interpret- 
ing Mr.  Campbell's  work  as  a  theologian  in  the 
light  of  its  historical  setting.  It  is  of  little  conse- 
quence that  a  theologian  is  attacked  by  his  enemies 
and  defended  by  his  friends.  But  it  is  of  much  im- 
portance that  he  be  understood;  and  he  cannot  be 
understood— his  strength  cannot  be  appreciated, 
much  less  can  his  shortcomings  be  reasonably  con- 
doned—without an  acquaintance  with  the  condi- 
tions under  which  he  worked  and  the  influences 
which  worked  upon  him.  It  is  hoped  that  this  at- 
tempt to  view  Alexander  Campbell's  theology  from 
the  historical  standpoint  may  contribute  something 
to  the  understanding  of  it. 
21  April,  1900. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction— The  Historicai.  Method  9 

I.      DEVEIvOPMENT    of  the   PROBI.EM   OF 

Unity  23 

II.    Phii^osophical  Basis  77 

III.  THEOI.OGICAI.  Heritage  117 

IV.  The  Kingdom  of  God  161 
V.     Authority  and  Inspiration  185 

VI.     Faith  And  Repentance  213 

VII.     Baptism  229 
YIII.    The   Holy  Spirit  in    Conversion 

AND  Regeneration  255 

IX.    The  Idea  of  God  285 


TO 

My  First  and  Bkst  Teacher  oe  Theoi^ogy 

and  oe  rewgion 

a  seeker  aeter  truth 

an  encourager  oe  youtheui,  eeeort 

and  a  friend  oe  ai.i,  good  i^earning 

/HbS  ifatber. 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  HISTORICAL  METHOD 

He  who  undertakes  to  estimate  the  in- 
tellectual achievements  of  the  nineteenth 
century  and  to  generalize  upon  the  his- 
tory of  thought  in   this   period,  cannot 
fail  to  admit  that  the  most  fruitful  and 
far-reaching   general   conception   which 
this  age  has  brought  into  prominence  is 
the  idea  of  development.     Based  upon  a 
metaphysics  which  finds  the  essence  of 
reality  to  consist,  not  in  the  changeless 
identity  of  an  unknowable  "substance" 
in  which  all  attributes  inhere,  but  in  the 
process  by  which  functions  are  fulfilled, 
forms    developed   and   new   adaptations 
made  to  changing  conditions,  it  quickly 
passed  beyond  the  limits  of  speculative 
philosophy  and  found   application  in  the 
fields  of  science,   history,  theology,  and 
9 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

every  study  which  seeks  a  knowledge  of 
nature,  man  or  God.  If  the  very  essence 
of  reality  lies  in  development,  growth 
and  adaptation,  then  knowledge  of  any 
portion  of  reality  is  to  be  sought  in  the 
study  of  its  process  of  development;  i. 
e.,  in  its  history.  In  its  most  general 
application,  therefore,  the  idea  of  devel- 
opment gives  rise  to  what  may  be  called 
the  historical  method  of  studying  all 
phenomena. 

According  to  the  historical  method,  it 
is  maintained  that  any  object  of  knowl- 
edge, whether  it  be  an  organic  forma- 
tion, an  idea  or  an  institution,  is  not 
known  as  the  scientific  observer  seeks  to 
know  it  until  one  knows  the  sources 
from  which  it  sprang,  the  processes  by 
which  it  came  into  being,  and  the 
changes  which  it  has  undergone  in  adap- 
tation to  varying  conditions.  The  effect 
of  the  application  of  this  conception  in 
the  various  fields  of  thought  has  been 
little  short  of  revolutionary.  The  gen- 
eral principle  of  evolution  (of  which  the 
Darwinian  theory  of  the  origin  of  species 


INTRODUCTION 

is  a  mere  detail)  is  the  most  notable 
product  of  the  idea  of  development,  or 
the  historical  method,  as  applied  to  the 
understanding  of  the  natural  world.  The 
scientific  study  of  an  organ  of  an  animal 
or  a  plant,  viewed  from  this  standpoint, 
includes  not  only  anatomy,  which  studies 
the  organ  statically  as  a  mere  complex 
of  tissues,  but  morphology,  which  inves- 
tigates the  origin  and  development  of 
the  organ  in  the  species,  and  physiology, 
which  inquires  how  it  performs  its  func- 
tions at  the  present  time.  It  is  not  pos- 
sible to  attain  a  complete  scientific 
knowledge  of  any  organic  formation, 
either  plant  or  animal,  without  these 
three  elements. 

Applied  to  the  study  of  the  phenom- 
ena which  constitute  the  recognized  do- 
main of  history,  the  idea  of  development 
has  produced  what  is  sometimes  called 
the  "new  historical  method. '^  It  is  the 
method  which  treats  history  as  an  organ- 
ism whose  parts  grew  together  and  can 
not  be  understood  separately;  as  a  suc- 
cession of   events    causally  related,   the 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

ultimate  essence  of  whicli  lies  in  their 
causal  connection.  History  is  no  longer 
a  /leaj)  of  facts,  a  collection  of  anecdotes 
wliich  may  be  told  in  any  order  without 
substantial  loss.  It  is  not  viewed  as  a 
mere  row  of  facts,  succeeding  each  other 
in  a  definite  order  but  with  only  a  chro- 
nological sequence,  as  the  old  annalists 
represented  it.  It  is  a  c/iam  of  facts 
logically  linked  together,  and  the  essen- 
tial reality  of  it  all  lies  in  the  fact  that 
it  represents  a  continuous  process  of  de- 
velopment. 

Applied  to  the  study  of  political,  so- 
cial and  religious  institutions  and  ideas, 
there  has  been  produced  what  may  be 
broadly  termed  the  historical  method.  An 
idea  or  an  institution  is  a  growth.  As  a 
plant  grows  out  of  a  seed,  so  an  idea  de- 
velopes  from  earlier  ideas.  Varying  con- 
ditions of  soil,  moisture,  heat  and  light 
influence  the  growth  of  the  plant;  vary- 
ing local  and  temporary  needs,  individual 
abilities  and  personal  adaptations  deter- 
mine the  form  of  the  idea.  Chemical 
and  physical  analyses  of  the  condition  of 


INTRODUCTION 

tlie  plant  at  any  single  moment  give  only 
partial  knowledge  of  it.  To  know  its 
life,  we  mnst  know  how  it  springs  from 
a  seed  of  sucli  a  sort,  is  modified  by  cer- 
tain conditions  and  bears  seed  after  its 
kind.  Similarly,  to  understand  a  politi- 
cal institution,  a  social  custom  or  a  theo- 
logical idea,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  its 
origin  in  sources  already  known,  in  order 
to  give  it  an  organic  connection  with  the 
general  current  of  human  history,  and  to 
study  its  development  under  the  pressure 
of  special  needs  and  impulses.  This  is 
the  historical  method. 

If  this  method  as  heie  described  be  ap- 
plied to  the  study  of  a  system  of  theol- 
ogy, it  will  mean  that  for  the  time  the 
critical  process  is  laid  aside  and  no  attempt 
is  made  to  determine  whether  or  not  the 
development  which  actually  took  place 
ever  ought  to  have  taken  place,  or  to 
judge  whether  it  meets  the  requirement 
and  embodies  the  best  thought  of  a  time 
other  than  that  which  gave  rise  to  it. 
The  study  will  inquire  into  the  philo- 
sophical presuppositions  of  the  system, 
13 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

its  affinity  with  other  systems  preceding 
and  contemporary,  and  the  special  con- 
ditions which  influenced  its  leaders  apart 
from  the  general  current  of  thought 
which  influenced  all  alike;  but,  in  so  far 
as  this  method  is  employed  in  its  purity, 
it  will  not  attempt  to  perform  the  func- 
tion of  an  apologetic  or  a  polemic.  It 
will  orient  the  system  in  the  general  his- 
tory of  Christian  doctrine.  It  will  be  a 
study  of  sources  and  historical  setting 
and  development,  but  it  will  not  profess 
to  be  either  critical  or  constructive,  al- 
though it  is  the  necessary  preparation  for 
a  consideration  of  that  sort. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  pre- 
sent a  study  of  Alexander  Campbell's 
theology  by  the  historical  method.  He 
was  not  a  voice  crying  in  the  wilderness 
and  having  no  connection  with  his  age 
except  to  receive  from  its  degeneracy  an 
impulse  toward  reformation.  Try  as  he 
would,  he  could  not  sweep  aside  all  that 
men  had  thought  during  the  past  eight- 
een centuries,  and  lead  a  religious  move- 
ment or  formulate  a  system  of  Christian 
14 


INTRODUCTION 

doctrine  as  if  a  true  word  had  not  been 
spoken  since  the  death  of  the  Apostles. 
He  was  in  close  relation  with  the  thought 
of  his  time,  and  it  is  that  fact  which 
gives  him  a  definite  place  in  the  general 
development  of  Christian  thought.  There 
were,  to  be  sure,  local  conditions  which 
furnished  the  stimulus  for  his  activity, 
but  an  examination  of  his  work  will 
show  that  it  was  not  simply  a  reaction 
against  these  local  abuses. 

Attention  is  called  to  the  following 
points  which  must  come  up  for  consider- 
ation in  the  course  of  an  historical  and 
genetic  study  of  Mr.  Campbell's  the- 
ology: 

First^  the  problem  of  the  reunion  of 
Christendom,  which  was  prominent  in  all 
of  his  religious  thinking,  was  not  an 
idea  which  was  first  conceived  by  him. 
Although  unknown  in  the  locality  in 
which  Mr.  Campbell  lived  and  worked, 
the  idea  of  Christian  union  was  one 
which  had  seldom  been  without  an  advo- 
cate from  the  time  when  the  Protestant 
revolution  broke  the  external  unity  of 
15 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

mediaeval  Romanism.  But  the  individ- 
ualism which  was  implicit  in  the  Refor- 
mation of  the  sixteenth  century  must 
attain  a  fuller  development  and  a  more 
adequate  statement  before  unity  could  be 
attained  without  a  sacrifice  of  liberty. 
To  understand  the  significance  of  Mr. 
Cambell's  plea  for  union,  therefore,  in 
its  relation  to  the  general  history  of 
thought,  it  will  be  necessary  to  trace  the 
development  of  the  problem  of  Christian 
union  and  the  condition  of  its  solution, 
in  the  development  of  individualism 
through  the  thought  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries. 

Seco7id^  in  working  out  his  views  of 
Christian  doctrine  on  a  basis  as  thor- 
oughly Biblical  as  possible,  he  held  a 
definite  theory  of  the  nature  of  man  and 
the  method  by  which  knowledge  of  both 
natural  and  spiritual  things  must  enter 
his  mind.  It  is  evident  that  this  inher- 
itance of  psychology  and  theory  of 
knowledge,  which  he  received  from  the 
system  of  philosophy  then  current,  could 

not  fail  to  exercise  an  influence  upon  his 
i6 


INTRODUCTION 

formulation  of  Christian  doctrine.  For 
example,  if  he  held  (as  he  did)  that  man 
is  so  constituted  that  all  his  knowledge 
comes  to  him  through  sensation  and  re- 
flection, he  could  not  hold  that  man  is 
born  with  the  idea  of  God  or  that  knowl- 
edge of  divine  things  is  infused  into  him 
in  some  mysterious  manner  independent 
of  all  sensible  means.  At  many  other 
points  there  can  be  seen  the  influence  of 
his  philosophical  presuppositions.  It  is 
necessary,  therefore,  in  studying  the 
sources  and  historical  setting  of  the  sys- 
tem of  theology,  to  state  briefly  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  philosophy  then  current 
in  the  circles  in  which  Mr.  Campbell 
moved — the  philosophy  of  John  lyocke — 
and  to  show,  in  the  consideration  of  the 
several  doctrines,  how  and  where  the  in- 
fluence of  this  philosophy  made  itself 
felt. 

Third^  as  affecting  his  view  and  use  of 
the  Bible,  no  conception  which  Mr. 
Campbell  held  was  more  determinative 
than  his  emphasis  on  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  dispensations  or  covenants.    It 

2  17 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

is  important  to  note  that  this  idea  was 
revived  rather  than  originated  by  him, 
for  it  appeared  as  the  distinguishing  feat- 
ure of  a  theological  movement  which 
oriorinated  in  Holland  in  the  seventeenth 
century  under  the  leadership  of  Cocceius 
and  Witsius,  was  transplanted  into  Scot- 
land in  the  eighteenth,  and  was  adopted, 
in  some  of  its  features,  by  the  Seceder 
Presbyterian  Church,  of  which  Mr. 
Campbell  was  a  member.  We  must  note 
the  influence  of  this  and  other  theolog- 
ical systems  upon  the  one  which  we  have 
under  consideration. 

Fourth^  the  special  conditions  which 
were  presented  by  his  religious  training, 
his  experiences  in  Glasgow  among  the 
Haldanes,  the  condition  in  which  he 
found  popular  religion  in  America  on  his 
arrival,  and  his  experiences  in  fellowship 
and  controversy  with  Baptists  and  Pres- 
byterians, furnished  the  occasion  for  the 
development  of  the  doctrines  and  in  some 
degree  determined  the  form  in  which 
they  were  cast.     This  material,   which 

has  already  been  presented  in  the  form 
i8 


INTRODUCTION 

of  memoirs  and  narrative  history  of  tHe 
Disciples  of  Christ,  need  only  be  touched 
upon  from  time  to  time. 

Fifths  a  statement  must  be  made,  as 
complete  as  may  be,  of  the  substance  of 
Mr.  Campbell's  final  teaching  upon  the 
several  doctrines  to  which  he  attributed 
most  importance.  This  will  represent 
the  outcome  of  the  operation  of  the  pre- 
ceding influences. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  as  a  fur- 
ther warning  against  misconception  that, 
in  speaking  of  the  sources  of  Alexander 
Campbell's  theology,  there  is  no  implica- 
tion of  anything  derogatory  to  his  origi- 
nality, in  so  far  as  originality  is  a  virtue. 
To  say  that  he  had  sources  is  only  to  say 
that  he  was  not  isolated  from  the  cur- 
rents of  the  world's  thought.  We  would 
not  consider  him  condemned,  or  even 
discredited,  if  it  should  appear  that  he 
was  indebted  for  valuable  suggestions  to 
Sandeman,  or  Arminius,  or  Sabellius,  or 
Arius.  The  utterly  ludicrous  *'offshoot- 
of-Sandemanianism"    theory,     which    a 

hostile  critic  promulgated  as  a  novelty 
19 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

something  like  half  a  century  after  it  had 
been  originally  propounded  and  explod- 
ed, not  only  is  an  incomparably  feeble 
piece  of  historical  criticism,  but  mani- 
fests a  complete  failure  to  grasp  the  sig- 
nificance of  sources  in  the  development 
of  doctrine. 

Certainly  it  can  no  longer  be  necessary 
to  defend  the  proposition  that  Alexander 
Campbell  was  a  theologian,  and  that 
therefore  it  is  pertinent  to  make  investi- 
gations into  his  theology.  The  old  alle- 
gation, which  used  to  be  frequently  heard, 
that  Campbell's  "Christian  System'' 
is  the  creed  of  the  Disciples  of  Christ, 
has  fallen  into  disuse.  The  book  is 
merely  a  statement  of  the  author's  pri- 
vate theological  views,  which  are  inter- 
esting as  being  the  opinions  of  one  very 
influential  man.  The  present  work  does 
not  profess  to  deal  with  the  official  and 
authoritative  theology  of  the  Disciples  of 
Christ,  for  they  have  no  such  authorita- 
tive system,  but,  as  its  title  indicates, 
only  with  Alexander  Campbell's 
Theology. 


Chapter  I 

The  Development  of  the  Problem 
of  Unity 


DEVEI.OPMENT  OF  THE  PROBIvEM  OF 
UNITY 

I.  The    Probi^em  —  TO    Combine    Soi^idarity 

AND  Individuai^ism  : 

1.  Both  elements  not  developed  until  end  of 

XVIIIth  century\ 

2.  Solidarity     embodied     in     mediaeval     Ro- 

manism. 

3.  Individualism  implicit  in  the  Reformation. 

II.  Dogmatism  of  First  Reformers  : 

1.  Luther — Augsburg  Confession, 

2.  Calvin — the  Latin  Theology  Protestantized. 

III.  Break-up  of  Protestantism  : 

1.  First  great  revolt — Arminianism. 

2.  Multiplication  of  sects. 

IV.  Reaction  Against  Sectarian  Spirit  : 

1.  Comprehension    schemes  —  Leibnitz,     Bos- 

suet,  Spinola,  Stillingfleet. 

2.  Toleration — Baxter,  Milton,  Locke. 

3.  Latitudinarianism — Cambridge  Platonists. 

V.  INDIVIDUAI.ISM    FUEI.Y    DEVEEOPED  : 

1.  Emotional   and  mystical — Pietism,    IMorav- 

ianism,  Methodism. 

2.  Intellectual — the  "Enlightenment." 

VI.  Nineteenth  Century  Problem — to  Tran- 

scend Individualism. 

VII.  Campbeee's  Solution  of  the  Problem. 


THE  DEVEI.OPMBNT  OF  THE 
PROBI.EM  OF  UNITY. 

During  the  three  centuries  of  Protest- 
antism  prior   to   the   beginning  of   the 
nineteenth,  century  there  had  been  many 
attempts  to  restore  the  unity  of  a  divided 
and  still  dividing  church.     Many  men  of 
large  soul  and  wide  spiritual  vision  had 
reacted  against  the  narrow  partisanism, 
the  hateful  controversies  and  the  bigoted 
exclusiveness  which  marred  the  peace  of 
Christendom.    Some  of  the  most  influen- 
tial men  in  England  and  on  the  Conti- 
nent had  consulted  and  planned  for  the 
restoration  of  unity  among  Christians — 
between  Catholics  and  Protestants,  be- 
tween Lutherans  and  Reformed,  between 
Anglicans  and  Dissenters,  between  Pres- 
byterians and  Independents.     But  none 
of  these  attempts  made  more  than  the 
faintest  and  most  fleeting  impression  on 
the  religious  world.     Not  only  did  they 
fail  of  the  immediate  accomplishment  of 
23 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

their  purpose,  but  they  failed  even  to  in- 
augurate any  important  and  lasting 
movement  in  that  direction. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century  a  young  man  without  reputation, 
living  in  a  remote  district,  far  from  the 
centers  of  the  world's  thought,  made  an 
attempt,  in  many  respects  not  unlike 
those  which  had  preceded,  to  bring 
about  the  union  of  Christians.  The  re- 
sult was  not  a  spasmodic  effort  followed 
by  relapse,  but  the  beginning  of  an  im- 
portant religious  movement  which  has 
had  for  its  chief  mission  the  advocacy  of 
Christian  union.  Whether  or  not  the 
formation  of  another  party  in  the  relig- 
ious world  is  a  legitimate  method  of 
advocating  this  reform,  or  one  which  is 
likely  to  advance  the  cause,  is  a  question 
which  does  not  call  for  discussion  in  this 
connection.  The  significant  fact  is  that, 
whether  effective  or  not,  the  attempt 
aroused  enough  interest  to  make  it  the 
starting-point  of  a  movement  which  has 
continued  and  increased  unto  this  day. 

The  explanation  of  this  phenomenon  can 
24 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

l)e  found  only  in  the  fact  that  the  prob- 
lem of  unity  was  not  fully  developed  and 
ready  for  solution  until  about  the  time  of 
Mr.  Campbell's  attempt. 

The  most  important  problem  which 
confronted  the  religious  world  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
this:  How  is  it  possible  to  reconcile  the 
individual's  liberty  of  conscience  and  in- 
tellect, with  that  degree  of  unity  of  the 
church  in  spirit  and  organization  which 
is  demanded  by  the  will  of  Christ  and 
by  the  practical  requirement  for  efficiency 
in  his  service?  Dispensing  with  the 
idea  of  an  unlimited  ecclesiastical  mon- 
archy exercising  absolute  authority  over 
its  subjects  in  all  matters  of  religious 
faith  and  observance,  what  power  shall 
prevent  the  utter  disintegration  of  Chris- 
tendom into  as  many  warring  parties  as 
there  are  free  individuals? 

Obviously  the  full  significance  of  this 
tension  between  individual  freedom  and 
religious  solidarity  could  not  be  appreci- 
ated until  each  of  the  conditions  had 
been  fully  developed.  It  was  not  until 
25 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  that 
the  conception  of  the  free  individual  was 
completely  developed.  The  philosophy 
of  the  Enlightenment  was  the  most  im- 
portant instrument  in  the  development  of 
this  idea,  and  it  became  therefore  the 
philosophical  basis  for  those  political 
movements  at  the  close  of  the  century 
which  aimed  to  throw  off  all  the  re- 
straints of  organized  government  and 
allow  untrammeled  liberty  to  the  indi- 
vidual. Outbreaks  like  the  French  Rev- 
olution were  necessary  before  govern- 
ments could  know  how  uncompromising 
was  the  demand  for  popular  liberty, 
which  most  modern  governments  have 
learned  how  to  grant  without  precipitat- 
ing themselves  into  anarchy.  Equally 
necessary  was  the  chaotic  condition  into 
which  the  church  fell  as  the  result  of  the 
extreme  development  of  individualism  in 
the  eighteenth  century,  that  it  might  be 
known  that  any  future  unity  of  the 
church  must  be  based  upon  a  recognition 
of  the  freedom  of  the  individual.     Not 

until   near   the   beginning  of  the    nine- 
26 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

teenth  century  was  there  an  adequate 
apprehension  of  these  two  essential  con- 
ditions of  the  problem — solidarity  and 
individualism. 

Mediaeval  Romanism  furnished  a  com- 
plete and  consistent  embodiment  of  the 
principle  of  solidarity.  There  were  reb- 
els, to  be  sure,  who  renounced  the  au- 
thority of  the  church.  There  were  from 
time  to  time  agitators  whose  work  im- 
plied a  demand  for  the  recognition  of  the 
individual.  But  that  demand  was  con- 
sistently ignored,  and  the  church  re- 
mained a  thorough-going  exponent  of 
the  idea  of  unity  through  absolutism. 
The  theological  system  which  had  been 
formulated  by  the  great  Augustine  in  the 
fifth  century  had  given  the  theoretical 
basis  for  this  development.  Man  is 
totally  depraved  by  his  inheritance  of 
original  sin.  He  can  do  nothing  to 
effect  his  own  salvation,  except  to  allow 
himself  to  be  the  passive  recipient  of  di- 
vine saving  grace.  This  grace  is  com- 
mitted to  the  church  for  distribution  and 

is  bestowed  upon  men  through  the  sacra- 
27 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

ments.  All  that  man  has  to  do  is  to  put 
himself  in  communication  with  this  sole 
channel  of  divine  grace — the  Holy  Cath- 
olic Church — and  be  saved.  The  indi- 
vidual, as  defined  by  modern  thought, 
did  not  exist.  The  perfect  unity  which 
that  church  aimed  at  was  not  a  unity  of 
individuals,  but  unity  through  the  sup- 
pression of  individualism.  In  its  period 
of  Scholasticism,  Romanism  departed 
from  the  theology  of  Augustine  at  many 
points,  so  that  a  part  of  the  work  of  the 
Reformers  was  to  restore  some  neglected 
elements  of  Augustinianism.  But  Ro- 
manism never  forgot  that  part  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  great  Bishop  of  Hippo 
which  taught  that  man  is  but  the  incar- 
nation of  an  atom  of  original  sin,  who  is 
indebted  to  the  church  for  all  the  means 
of  his  salvation,  and  is  therefore  subject 
to  the  absolute  authority  of  the  church 
all  the  days  of  his  life. 

The  Protestant  Reformation  of  the  six- 
teenth century  was,  in  the  very  essence 
of  its  method,  a  revolution.     As  a  repu- 
diation of  the  absolute  authority  of  the 
28 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

cHurcli,  which  had  been  the  sole  bond  of 
unity   in   Christendom,  it  could   justify 
itself  only  by  an  appeal  to  the  right  of 
revolution.     The  theory  which  is  always 
implicit    in    revolution,    furnishing    at 
once  its  justification  and  its  method  of 
operation,  is  that  the  individuals  who  are 
governed  are   of  more   value   than   any 
fixed  scheme  of  government.     In  politi- 
cal revolutions  this  normally  takes  the 
form  of  a  declaration  that  the  right  to 
govern   belongs   to   the   people,  but  its 
most  fundamental  principle  is  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  worth  of  individuals.     Revo- 
lution always  marks  the  point  where  the 
value  of  individuals  begins  to  outweigh 
the  value  of  any  arrangement  for  secur- 
ing unity,  either   political  or  religious, 
at  their  expense. 

Two  hypotheses  are  involved,  by  im- 
plication at  least,  in  every  popular  revo- 
lutionary movement:  First,  it  imphes 
that  no  unifying  and  controlling  power 
is  legitimate  which  is  essentially  exter- 
nal to  the  individual;  this  immediately 
justifies  the  destructive  work  of  repudi- 
29 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

ating  the  old  despotic  authority,  thereby 
leaving  the  individual  free  and  uncon- 
trolled. Second,  since  no  revolution 
contemplates  either  the  establishment  of 
a  nev/  despotism  or  the  perpetuation  of 
anarchy,  it  implies  that  there  is  within 
the  individual  the  possibility  of  a  syn- 
thetic and  constructive  force  sufficient 
for  the  control  and  unification  of  the 
social  body.  It  is  this  second  implica- 
tion  which,  though  not  apparent  on  the 
surface,  is  the  real  justification  of  popu- 
lar rebellion  against  unity  through  abso- 
lutism. It  is  safe  to  destroy  the  external 
bulwarks  of  the  established  order,  only 
on  the  supposition  that  there  are,  or 
may  be  developed,  within  the  individ- 
uals themselves,  all  the  restraints  and 
unifying  forces  needed  to  maintain  the 
common  life  of  the  social  body. 

The  Renaissance  in  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tuty  was  the  discovery  of  the  individual 
through  the  media  of  painting,  sculp- 
ture, popular  literature  and  revived  clas- 
sicism. After  being  for  long  centuries 
a  mere  unit  in  the  mass,  the  individual 
30 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

first  came  to  himself  by  feeling  as  an 
individual  in  the  realm  of  art.  The 
aesthetic  sensibilities  first  felt  the  thrill 
of  the  new  life.  The  Reformation  in 
the  sixteenth  century  was  the  process  by 
which  that  newly  discovered  individual 
began  to  assert  himself  as  such  in  the 
sphere  of  religion.  But  the  problem  of 
individualism  had  as  yet  only  been  felt 
and  its  meaning  groped  after.  It  had 
been  implied  as  the  basis  of  important 
movements,  but  it  had  not  yet  been 
thought  through.  Its  two  implications 
mentioned  above  had  not  yet  come  to 
light. 

When  the  Reformers  proceeded  upon 
their  own  responsibility  as  free  men  in 
revolting  from  Rome,  they  acted  upon 
the  principle  that  no  external  ecclesias- 
tical authority  is  necessary.  But  they 
were  not  prepared  to  maintain  this  as  a 
general  principle,  for  they  created  other 
ecclesiastical  authorities  in  place  of  that 
which  they  had  discarded.  Still  less 
did  they  comprehend  an  individualism 
which  contained  within  itself  the  ele- 
31 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

ments  of  order  and  unity.  Therefore 
we  are  justified  in  saying  that  in  the 
Reformation  there  was  involved  an  iiii- 
plicit  iiidividiialis7n.  Because  there  was 
individualism,  there  could  be  a  revolt 
against  established  ecclesiastical  abso- 
lutism. Because  it  was  only  implicit, 
the  revolution  must  be  followed  by  a 
period  of  servitude  under  new  masters 
(the  dogmatism  of  the  Reformation  the- 
ologies), and  that  in  turn  by  a  period  of 
anarchy  and  extreme  disunion. 

Of  the  great  Reformers  of  the  first 
generation,  Zwingli  was  the  only  one 
who  is  free  from  the  charge  of  arrant 
dogmatism.  Both  Luther  and  Calvin 
were  temperamentally  dogmatic,  and  to 
that  fact  is  due  much  of  their  success  in 
welding  their  followers  into  compact 
and  effective  bodies  for  the  necessary 
war  against  Romanism.  The  Saxon 
reformer  was  endowed  by  nature  with 
an  impetuous  spirit  which  could  meet 
fearlessly  the  assaults  of  his  enemies, 
but  could  not   with  equanimity  endure 

opposition  from  his  friends.     He  would 
32 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

not  hold  fellowship  with  those  whose 
interpretations  of  Scripture  differed  from 
his  own.  There  were  three  principles, 
by  no  means  co-ordinate,  which  L^uther 
made  in  different  senses  the  basis  of  his 
movement.  They  were:  the  doctrine  of 
justification  by  faith,  the  sole  authority 
of  Scripture,  and  the  right  of  private 
judgment.  To  the  first  of  these,  which 
furnished  the  immediate  occasion  for  the 
Reformation  and  the  material  content  of 
its  teaching,  he  clung  consistently  and 
tenaciously.  The  second  can  become 
effective  for  the  liberation  of  men  from 
ecclesiastical  authority  only  in  so  far  as 
it  is  accompanied  by  the  third.  This 
third  he  exercised  to  secure  freedom 
from  the  control  of  the  Roman  hierar- 
chy and  its  traditions,  but  did  not  grant 
to  others  who  sought  freedom  from  the 
yoke  of  dogmatic  I^utheranism  by  an 
appeal  to  their  own  interpretation  of 
Scripture.  The  classic  illustration  of 
this  temperament  is  Luther's  refusal  to 
grant  Christian  fellowship  to  Zwingli, 
because  the  latter  interpreted  the  words 
3  Z2> 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

*'hoc  est  meum  corpus"  as  signifying 
the  spiritual  presence  of  the  lyord's  body 
in  the  bread  of  the  communion.  The 
Augsburg  Confession  of  1530  was  the 
first  authoritative  declaration  of  Protes- 
tant belief  upon  a  few  great  doctrines. 
Its  adoption  formally  ushered  in  the  age 
of  Protestant  dogmatism  and  it  became 
as  authoritative  for  Protestantism  in 
Germany  as  the  decrees  of  the  Council 
of  Trent  were  for  Romanism.  When 
religious  peace  was  reached  in  the  Em- 
pire in  1555,  toleration  was  granted, 
under  certain  restrictions,  to  Catholics 
on  the  one  hand  and  to  adherents  of 
the  Augsburg  Confession  on  the  other. 
There  was  no  toleration  for  dissenting 
Protestants. 

Calvin  was  by  birth  a  Frenchman,  by 
training  a  lawyer,  and  by  nature  a  logi- 
cian. With  that  singular  combination 
of  clearness  of  vision  and  limited  range 
of  vision  which  is  the  peculiar  heri- 
tage of  his  race,  he  saw  no  problem  to 
which  he  could  not  see  the  solution, 
and    was    blind    to    every    element    of 

34 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

knowledge  or  experience  which  could 
not  be  incorporated  harmoniously  into 
his  system  of  thought.  This  character- 
istic, united  with  a  genius  for  system- 
atization  which  has  seldom  if  ever  been 
equaled,  produced  a  well-nigh  perfect 
dogmatist.  But  whereas  Luther's  the- 
ology was  not  rigidly  systematized,  and 
left  room  for  a  time  for  individual  differ- 
ences on  points  not  explicitly  defined, 
Calvinism  was  from  the  first  a  com- 
pletely organized  system,  claiming  au- 
thority, it  is  true,  in  the  name  of  the 
Scriptures  rather  than  in  its  own  name, 
but  perfectly  intolerant  of  any  doctrinal 
deviation  and  exercising  over  its  adher- 
ents the  same  intellectual  tyranny  which 
had  been  the  mark  of  the  Roman 
Church.  By  so  much  as  the  burning 
of  Servetus  at  Geneva  by  the  order  of 
Calvin  wa:s  a  more  flagrant  act  of  intol- 
erance than  Luther's  refusal  to  hold 
Christian  fellowship  with  Zwingli,  by  so 
much  was  Calvinism  the  more  rigidly 
dogmatic  and  the  more  inconsistent 
35 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

with   the   principle  of   individualism  to 
which  it  owed  its  existence. 

Henceforth  the  process  of  the  enforce- 
ment of  authority  gradually  lost  its  in- 
quisitorial character,  by  the  abolition  of 
the  ecclesiasitical  machinery  by  which 
submission  to  authority  had  been  en- 
forced. Instead  of  forcing  all  men  to 
accept  the  doctrinal  formularies  as  laid 
down,  Protestant  dogmatism  demanded 
the  acceptance  of  them  by  all  who 
sought  entrance  to  the  particular  com- 
munion which  had  adopted  them. 
Every  man  could  accept  them  and  come 
into  the  church,  or  reject  them  and  stay 
out,  at  his  option.  This  was  true  from 
the  first  of  all  non-established  Protes- 
tant churches,  but  was  arrived  at  by 
the  established  churches  only  through 
a  gradual  development  which  lasted 
through  generations.  The  attainment 
of  this  stage  marks  the  beginning  of 
what  may  be  called  denominationalism 
in  the  modern  sense.  It  is  marked  by 
a  more  or  less  reluctant  acquiescence  in 
the  divided  condition  which  Protestant- 
36 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

ism  begins  to  assume,  and  it  indicates 
that  the  first  half  of  the  implicit  indi- 
vidualism of  the  Reformation  is  becom- 
ing explicit.  The  cessation  of  persecu- 
tion by  Protestant  churches  which  had 
it  in  their  power  to  persecute,  indicates  a 
realization  of  the  fact  that  the  division 
of  the  church  is  preferable  to  a  unity 
maintained  by  the  exercise  of  external 
authority  for  the  coercion  of  the  indi- 
vidual. To  be  sure,  each  division  long 
held  that  salvation  was  impossible  out- 
side of  itself,  but  it  was  something  of 
a  gain  for  individual  liberty  to  allow  a 
man  to  be  comfortably  damned  in  the 
free  exercise  of  his  own  judgment,  rather 
than  to  force  salvation  upon  him  by 
going  into  the  highways  and  byways 
and  compelling  him  to  come  in. 

Almost  immediately  upon  the  formu- 
lation of  the  great  dogmatic  systems  of 
Protestantism,  began  those  movements 
which  led  to  the  break-up  of  Protes- 
tantism into  a  multitude  of  warring  fac- 
tions. Passing  by  the  disputes  between 
the  two  great  parties,  lyUtheran  and  Re- 

37 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

formed  (Calvinistic) — disputes  which 
were  spared  much  of  the  bitterness 
which  might  have  characterized  them, 
owing  to  the  happy  circumstance  of 
their  geographical  separateness — there 
soon  began  to  arise  dissensions  within 
each  party.  lyUtheranism,  owing  to  the 
comparative  looseness  of  its  organiza- 
tion, was  the  first  to  suffer.  And  as  the 
tendency  to  individual  doctrinal  varia- 
tions became  more  pronounced  after  the 
death  of  the  great  leader  of  the  party, 
orthodox  I^utheranism  itself  was  vitiated 
by  its  attempt  to  brace  itself  against 
impending  dissolution.  In  the  Luther- 
anism  of  the  seventeenth  century  there 
is  seen  a  lack  of  the  nobility  of  spirit, 
the  firmness  of  grasp,  the  practical  earn- 
estness which  had  characterized  Luther, 
with  all  his  dogmatism.  The  Latin 
theology  was  substantially  restored,  the 
fundamental  doctrine  of  justification  by 
faith  obscured,  and  the  right  of  private 
judgment  virtually  abrogated  in  favor  of 

a  narrow  and  legalistic  interpretation  of 

38 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

Scripture  in  accordance  with  traditional 
rules  of  exegesis. 

But  the  influences  which  were  felt  more 
largely  in  England  and  Scotland  came 
from  Calvinism  and  the  systems  which 
sprang  up  within  and  around  and  against 
it.  The  first  great  revolt  against  Cal- 
vinism as  an  authoritative  and  necessary 
compend  of  religious  truth  was  the  sys- 
tem of  Arminianism.  It  was,  to  be  sure, 
a  system  against  a  system,  both  fixed 
and  carefully  defined.  Nevertheless,  the 
rise  of  a  combatant  against  the  dominant 
Calvinism  of  the  Reformed  church, 
marks  the  real  beginning  of  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  Protestant  dissent.  That 
men  should  dare  to  combat  a  system  as 
rigid  in  its  doctrines  and  as  sulphurous 
in  its  maledictions  upon  all  who  rejected 
it  as  was  Calvinism,  was,  without  re- 
spect to  the  doctrinal  merits  of  the  two 
systems,  a  distinct  advance  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  growth  of  individualism.  It 
was  Arminianism,  says  Tulloch,  which 
''revived  the  suppressed  rational  side  of 
the   original    Protestant   movement  and 

39 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

for  the  first  time  organized  it  into  a  defi- 
nite power  and  assigned  to  it  its  due 
place  both  in  theology  and  in  the 
church."  It  represented,  moreover,  a 
moral,  religious  and  emotional,  as  well 
as  an  intellectual,  reaction,  precipitating 
as  it  did  a  return  to  Bible  study  and  a 
renewed  declaration  of  allegiance  to  the 
Scriptures  as  the  only  source  of  religious 
authority.  Both  Luther  and  Calvin  had 
accepted  the  main  outlines  of  Augustin- 
ianism  as  a  presupposition,  and  it  was 
through  this  medium  that  they  looked 
at  and  interpreted  the  Scriptures.  The 
exigencies  of  the  times,  the  fierce  strug- 
gle against  Romanism,  had  so  urgently 
demanded  the  formation  of  a  system  that 
there  was  no  time  for  a  thoroughly  Bib- 
lical reconstruction  by  the  first  genera- 
tion of  Reformers.  Arminianism  was, 
with  whatever  success,  an  attempt  at  an 
unbiased  Biblical  reconstruction  of  Chris- 
tian doctrine.  But  Arminianism,  as  for- 
mulated in  the  Remonstrance  of  1610, 
though  historically  the  most  important, 

was    not    the    only   theological    protest 
40 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   UNITY 

against  Calvinism.  In  no  factious  spirit 
and  with  no  desire  or  expectation  of  pro- 
ducing schism  in  the  Reformed  Church, 
theologians,  who  found  themselves  un- 
able to  acquiesce  in  the  ethical  and  relig- 
ious implications  of  Calvinism,  exercised 
the  right  of  dissent  and  formulated  other 
statements  of  the  nature  of  God  and  man 
and  the  process  of  man's  salvation.  In 
no  case  were  these  new  systems  drawn 
up  deliberately  as  the  constitutions  of 
new  sects,  and  in  some  cases  they  suc- 
ceeded in  remaining  merely  schools  of 
thought  within  the  church.  Among 
such  may  be  mentioned  that  modifica- 
tion of  Calvinism  which  was  held  by 
several  successive  teachers  of  the  school 
of  Saumur,  in  France.  These  men, 
among  whom  the  best  known  name  is 
that  of  Amy  rant,  taught  predestination 
conditioned  on  the  divine  foreknowledge 
of  each  individual's  faith  or  unbelief. 
This  teaching  remained  a  phase  of  opin- 
ion in  the  Reformed  Church  in  France 
just  as  infralapsarian  and  supralapsarian 
41 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

Calvinism  were  phases  of  opinion  in  the 
same  church. 

Much  more  important  than  the  school 
of  Saumur  is  the  so-called  Federal  or 
Covenant  Theology,  which  sprang  up 
about  one  generation  after  Arminianism. 
It  was,  like  the  latter,  an  embodiment 
of  the  same  ethical  protest  against  the 
rigors  of  Calvinism,  its  fierce  conception 
of  God  and  its  failure  to  recognize  the 
freedom  of  the  human  individual;  and  it 
was,  too,  an  attempt  to  establish  and 
put  in  operation  a  reasonable  method  of 
Biblical  exegesis.  So  conspicuous  was 
this  latter  characteristic  that  Cocceius, 
the  leader  of  this  school,  has  been  called 
^'the  father  of  modern  exegesis."  Of 
this  theology  more  will  be  said  in  a  sub- 
sequent chapter,  but  in  this  connection 
it  is  noteworthy  as  a  manifestation  of 
dissent  from  Calvinism.  No  religious 
party  ever  crystallized  about  this  system 
and  it  remained  free  to  leaven  the 
thought  of  the  Dutch  Reformed  Church 
and  to  influence  the  development  of  doc- 
trine in  Scotland,  whither  its  influence 
42 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

was   carried  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  development  as  traced  thus  far 
exhibits  an  increasing  divergence  of  the- 
ological opinion  within  the  Reformed 
Church,  but  no  fatal  break  in  the  exter- 
nal unity  of  the  body.  But  at  the  same 
time  movements  were  taking  place  which 
led  to  the  separation  of  one  after  another 
sect.  Most  of  these  separating  bodies 
represented  distinct  disruptive  tenden- 
cies which  had  existed  within  Roman- 
ism before  the  Reformation,  and  now, 
feeling  the  loosening  of  the  bond  of 
authority,  became,  by  the  very  law  of 
their  being,  separatists  from  Protestant- 
ism as  well  as  from  Romanism. 

Foremost  among  these  essentially  sep- 
arative movements  was  that  of  the  Ana- 
baptists, who  were  from  the  beginning 
the  representatives  of  a  most  intense  in- 
dividualism. Their  most  fundamental 
characteristic  was  not,  as  the  name  would 
indicate,  opposition  to  infant  baptism 
and  the  practice  of  re-baptizing  those 
who  came  to  them,  but  insistence  on  a 
*  'regenerate  church  membership. ' '     This 

43 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS   THEOLOGY 

phrase  lent  itself  to  various  interpreta- 
tions, as  it  does  to-day,  according  to  the 
meaning  that  is  attached  to  the  term 
regeneration;  but  in  any  case  the  funda- 
mental conception  is  that  the  individ- 
ual's salvation  depends  solely  upon  his 
own  personal  relation  with  God,  and  not 
in  any  degree  upon  his  association  with 
any  body  of  people  who  may  be  called 
the  church.  In  protesting  against  the 
institutionalism  which  they  conceived 
to  be  the  failing  of  Protestantism  even 
in  the  hands  of  the  Reformers,  the  Ana- 
baptists entirely  eliminated  the  idea  of 
solidarity,  the  social  side  of  Christianity, 
and  developed  an  individualism  which 
cheerfully  acquiesced  in  the  dissolution 
of  Christendom  into  a  multitude  of  sects, 
since  they  attached  no  value  to  unity. 
Protestantism,  considered  as  the  restora- 
tion of  the  long-obscured  element  of  in- 
dividualism in  religion,  finds  its  most 
extreme  expression  in  the  position  of 
the  Anabaptists.  That  they  do  not  rep- 
resent the  highest  type  of  Protestantism, 
is  due  not  only  to  the  fact  that  for  a 
44 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

time  they  ran  into  various  sorts  of  fanat- 
icism, but  to  the  much  more  significant 
fact  that  Protestantism,  as  we  interpret 
it,  means  not  the  exclusion  of  the  idea 
of  solidarity,  but  a  proper  distribution  of 
emphasis  in  the  valuation  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  united  body. 

The  Schwenkfeldians,  a  sect  founded 
by  a  contemporary  and  friend  of  Luther, 
illustrated  this  same  tendency  and  that, 
too,  without  obscuring  the  main  issue  by 
laying  special  stress  upon  one  ordinance. 
Schwenkfeld  differed  from  the  Anabap- 
tists in  not  insisting  upon  immersion, 
but  he   contended   that   the   Reformers, 
like  the  Romanists,  made  too  much  of 
the  external  and  objective  means  of  grace 
which  are  associated  with   the  church. 
He  appealed  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
individual   in   a  tone  and   spirit  highly 
suggestive  of  the  plea  of  the  Quakers  for 
reliance  upon  the  "inner  light.'' 

Socinianism,   the    rise   of   which  was 
contemporary  with  the  Protestant  Refor- 
mation,   not    only   involved    an    attack 
upon  the  most  fundamental  doctrines  of 
45 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

the  faith,  as  held  by  both  Romanists 
and  Reformers,  but  exhibited  a  restless 
and  lawless  spirit,  an  impatience  of  all 
restraints  which  seriously  threatened  the 
efficiency  of  the  Protestant  propaganda. 
The  burning  of  the  Socinian  Michael 
Servetus  at  Geneva,  by  Calvin,  has 
already  been  cited  as  the  crowning  ex- 
hibition of  Protestant  intolerance.  Yet 
it  was  not  alone  his  heresy,  as  such, 
which  Calvin  took  such  extreme  meas- 
ures to  restrain.  With  all  his  theologic 
hatred  of  opposition,  it  is  scarcely  con- 
ceivable that  Calvin  would  have  burned 
James  Arminius  under  similar  circum- 
stances. Servetus  as  a  Socinian  repre- 
sented a  disintegrating  tendency  in  the 
ecclesiastico-political  body. 

The  dogmatic,  autocratic  and  inconsist- 
ent unity  which  Calvin  maintained,  car- 
ried the  Reformation  through  its  period  of 
life  and  death  struggle  with  Romanism, 
and  then  disintegrating  individualism, 
which  had  been  in  abeyance  for  a  season, 
resumed  its  work.   A  state  of  war  demands 

union,  and  even  an  army  of  rebels  against 
46 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

constituted  authority  must  place  them- 
selves under  a  new  authority  till  their 
war  for  liberty  is  over.  So  Protestant- 
ism won  its  first  victory  by  the  mainte- 
nance of  dogmatic  unity  under  the  lead- 
ership of  the  great  reformers.  But  often 
the  military  leader  of  a  successful  strug- 
gle for  liberty,  intoxicated  by  the  tem- 
porary authority  which  he  has  exercised, 
seeks  to  make  himself  perpetual  dictator, 
and  a  new  rebellion  is  necessary  to  liber- 
ate the  people  from  the  yoke  of  the  lib- 
erator. So  Protestant  dogmatism  tried 
to  maintain  its  authority  after  the  need 
of  unity  under  it  had  passed.  The  new 
rebellion  which  thus  arose  raged  through 
the  seventeenth  century  and  continued 
with  waning  intensity  through  the 
eighteenth. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  enumerate 
the  sects  which  sprang  up  under  this 
impulse.  Some  of  them  subdivided  so 
readily  that  they  can  scarcely  be  said 
to  exhibit  any  regard  for  unity  of  any 
sort.  In  others,  the  inherited  demand 
for  unity  was  indicated  by  the  constant 

47 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

tendency  to  systematize;  but  it  was  the 
unity  of  those  like-minded  in  all  points 
of  doctrine  and  not  unity  of  all  Chris- 
tians, or  even  all  Protestants,  in  a  single 
church.  The  idea  was  that  there  could 
be  no  ecclesiastical  unity  without  uni- 
formity of  opinions.  Yet  every  man  had 
the  right  to  make  his  opinions,  to  for- 
mulate them  into  a  system  and  to  ex- 
clude from  fellowship  all  those  who 
refused  to  comply  with  them.  It  was 
this  condition,— the  multitude  of  bellig- 
erent Protestant  sects,  each  trying  to 
bring  the  world  within  its  fold  and  yet 
setting  up  its  own  individual  fence  as 
the  boundary  of  the  fold, — which  aided 
in  bringing  to  light  more  clearly  that 
inherent  contradiction  which  w^e  have 
mentioned  as  furnishing  the  problem  of 
Protestantism  from  the  day  when  Luther 
nailed  his  theses  until  the  present  hour. 
In  general  it  may  be  said  that  from 
our  standpoint  it  was  the  function  of  the 
seventeeth  century,  ''that  wretched  cen- 
tury of  strife,'^  as  Herder  calls  it,  to  de- 
velop this  problem  in  its  most  conspicu- 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

ous,  because  most  disagreeable,  form. 
Already,  before  the  end  of  that  century 
there  had  arisen  in  the  more  enlight- 
ened minds  a  loathing  of  the  petty  con- 
troversies about  doctrine  and  polity  be- 
tween the  various  Protestant  parties. 
Bossuet,  in  his  work  on  The  Variations 
of  Protestantism^  had  predicted  that  the 
inherent  tendency  to  division  must  ulti- 
mately lead  to  its  complete  disintegra- 
tion and  disappearance,  and  there 
seemed  to  be  good  ground  for  that  be- 
lief. The  more  thoughtful  Protestants 
became  alarmed,  and  now  there  began  a 
series  of  notable  attempts  to  find  some 
method  by  which  this  strife  of  religious 
parties  could  be  reconciled.  The  vari- 
ous movements  in  this  direction  may  be 
classed  under  the  heads  of  comprehen- 
sion, toleration  and  latitudinarianism. 

Perhaps  the  earliest  form  taken  by 
this  disgust  at  the  pettiness  of  theolog- 
ical controversy  is  seen  in  the  compre- 
hension schemes  which  were  formulated 
and  promulgated  in  considerable  number 
both  iu  England  and  upon  the  continent. 

4  49 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

The  best  and  broadest  minds  of  that  day- 
turned  readily  in  this  direction.  George 
Calixtus,  who  was  a  pioneer  in  the  de- 
partment of  irenics,  suggested  that  all 
Christians  ought  to  be  able  to  unite  in 
the  restoration  of  primitive  Christianity, 
by  which  he,  like  Newman,  meant  the 
New  Testament  plus  the  interpretations 
of  the  first  five  centuries.  Leibnitz  and 
Bossuet  carried  on  a  correspondence  with 
a  view  to  finding  a  possible  reconcilia- 
tion between  the  Catholic  and  Protestant 
bodies  and,  when  this  was  seen  to  be 
impracticable,  Leibnitz  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  the  formulation  of  terms  of  peace 
between  the  Lutheran  and  Reformed 
branches  of  Protestantism  with  equally 
little  avail.  The  Spanish  monk,  Spinola, 
labored  with  the  same  intent,  zealously 
but  ineffectually. 

In  England,  Puritanism  developed 
men  whose  breadth  of  charity  and  cath- 
olicity of  sympathies  present  a  curious 
and  instructive  contrast  to  our  ordinary 
notions  of  Puritan  austerity.  Of  these, 
one  of  the  most  notable  was  Stillingfleet, 
50 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

who,  in  his  Irenicimi^  which  was  first 
published  in  1659  and  reprinted  in  1662, 
uttered  these  sentiments,  which  need 
only  to  be  compared  with  any  theolog- 
ical writing  contemporary  with  them,  in 
order  to  see  how  free  he  was  from  the 
spirit  of  belligerent  sectarianism  which 
confronted  him  in  England  at  the  time 
of  the  Restoration:  "For  the  church 
to  require  more  than  Christ  himself  did, 
or  make  other  conditions  of  her  com- 
munion than  our  Saviour  did  of  disci- 
pleship,  is  wholly  unwarrantable.  What 
possible  reason  can  be  assigned  or  given 
why  such  things  should  not  be  sufficient 
for  the  church  which  are  sufficient  for 
eternal  salvation?  And  certainly  these 
things  are  sufficient  for  that,  which  are 
laid  down  as  necessary  duties  of  Chris- 
tianity by  our  I^ord  and  Saviour  in  his 
Word."  The  answer  to  this  was  the 
Act  of  Uniformity  which  went  into 
effect  in  England  in  that  same  year, 
1662,  by  which  the  Church  of  England 
cut  off  and  cast  out  its  most  vital  ele- 
ment— Puritanism. 
51 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

Richard  Baxter,  who  would  be  St. 
Richard  if  Puritanism  canonized  its 
saints,  preached  and  pleaded  for  unity, 
early  and  late,  in  pulpit  and  pamphlet 
and  prison.  His  treatise  entitled  The 
True  and  Only  Way  of  Concord  of  all 
the  Christian  Churches^  was  only  one 
of  the  many  works  which  he  wrote  in 
similar  vein.  It  was  Baxter  who  gave 
currency  to  that  slogan  of  true  Chris- 
tian unity,  the  phrase  which  had  already 
been  coined  by  Rupertus  Meldenius: 
*'In  essentials  unity,  in  non-essentials 
liberty,  in  all  things  charity."  Natur- 
ally, these  sentiments  could  not  find 
official  acceptation  in  England  under  the 
Stuart  despotism,  for  the  Stuart  theory 
of  church  and  State  was  as  absolutely 
repressive  of  the  individual  as  mediaeval 
Romanism  had  been.  There  could  be 
no  room  for  the  comprehension  of  vary- 
ing individual  opinions  within  a  state 
church  with  a  Stuart  at  its  head.  The 
comprehension  schemes  therefore  failed, 
and  the  next  resort  was  a  plea  for  toler- 
ation. 

52 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

The  development  of  the  idea  of  relig- 
ious toleration  indicates  a  recognition 
of  the  place  of  individualism  in  religion, 
coupled  with  a  scrupulous  regard  for  the 
preservation  of  doctrinal  uniformity 
within  each  sect.  The  established 
churches  were  not  ready  to  take  into 
themselves  all  manner  of  heterogeneous 
elements  which  were  contained  in  the 
various  dissenting  bodies,  but  they  at 
least  came  gradually  to  the  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  these  dissenting  bodies, 
as  the  expression  of  religious  life  of  sin- 
cere men,  had  a  right  to  a  more  or  less 
free  existence. 

Dogmatic  and  divided  Protestantism 
infused  with  the  spirit  of  toleration,  is 
the  last  step  in  the  development  of  indi- 
vidualism considered  purely  as  a  disrup- 
tive force.  Through  the  activity  of  the 
dogmatic  temper  and  the  liberty  of  the 
individual  to  revolt,  there  had  grown 
up  many  warring  parties.  The  compre- 
hension schemes  were  an  attempt  to  re- 
unite the  parties  on  some  simple  basis  of 
common  faith.  The  advocates  of  toler- 
53 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

ation  proposed  to  retain  the  parties  but 
stop  the  strife.  Carried  out  to  its  last 
limits,  to  the  establishment  of  good-will 
and  co-operation  among  the  several  par- 
ties, this  would  have  fallen  little  short 
of  unification.  But  the  early  advocates 
of  toleration  rather  devoted  their  atten- 
tion to  opposing  persecution  and  govern- 
mental oppression  of  one  sect  in  the 
interest  of  another. 

Chillingworth,  with  a  spirit  akin  to 
that  of  Stillingfleet,  pleaded  for  toleration 
under  the  early  Stuarts  in  these  words: 
*'Take  away  this  persecuting,  burning, 
cursing,  damning  of  men  for  not  sub- 
scribing to  the  words  of  men  as  the 
words  of  God;  require  of  Christians  only 
to  believe  Christ  and  to  call  no  man 
master  but  Him  only;  let  those  leave 
claiming  infallibility  who  have  no  title 
to  it,  and  let  them  that  in  their  words 
disclaim  it,  disclaim  it  likewise  in  their 
actions;  take  away  tyranny  and  restore 
Christians  to  the  first  and  full  liberty  of 
captivating     their      understanding      to 

Scripture    only,     and    it    may    well    be 
54 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

hoped,  by  God's  blessing,  that  universal 
liberty,    thus   moderated,    may   quickly 
reduce  Christendom    to  truth  and   uni- 
ty."       Jeremy     Taylor's      Liberty     of 
Prophesying^  carries  its   purport    in  its 
title.     John  Milton,  poet,  statesman  and 
theologian,  was  the  fearless  champion  of 
a  restoration  of  New  Testament  Chris- 
tianity and  of  complete  religious  tolera- 
tion; and  John  Locke,  the  philosopher, 
writing  his  Letters  on    Toleration  from 
Utrecht,  whither  he  had  gone  to  escape 
the   turmoils   which    immediately    pre- 
ceded  and    followed    the    accession    of 
James   II.,  based  his   argument  on  the 
claim  that  ecclesiastical  doctrines  {e.  g., 
the  Thirty-nine  Articles)  were  of  human 
origin,  that  no  man  will  be  damned  for 
disbelieving  them,  even  if  they  are  true, 
and  that  it  is  therefore  ridiculous  to  per- 
secute those  who  deny  them.     As  reason 
is  the  sole  test  of  truth,  so  it  should  be 
the  sole  means  of   conversion.      Under 
the  leadership  of  such  men  as  these,  per- 
secution passed    away,  but  the  theolog- 
ical warfare  continued  with  undiminished 

55 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

acrimony  and  on  more  equal  terms. 
A  third  movement  which  may  be  co- 
ordinated with  the  comprehension  and 
toleration  movements  as  reactions 
against  the  bitterness  of  religious  par- 
tisanship, is  latitudinarianisfn^  as  rep- 
resented by  the  group  of  men  of  the 
latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
who  came  to  be  called  the  Cambridge 
Platonists.  Platonism  emphasizes  the 
universal  element — the  Idea,  as  Plato 
called  it — which  exists  in  all  individuals 
as  their  basis  of  reality.  In  like  man- 
ner, these  men  of  Cambridge  maintained 
that  the  individual  man  possesses,  in  his 
own  reason,  a  manifestation  of  the 
divine  mind  which  puts  his  rational  con- 
clusions beyond  the  reach  of  criticism 
from  any  other  source.  The  voice  of 
reason  is,  even  more  than  the  Bible,  the 
voice  of  God.  Each  man  must,  there- 
fore, in  the  language  of  Archbishop  Til- 
lotson,  an  English  prelate  and  a  Platon- 
ist,  judge  every  doctrine  "by  its  accord- 
ance with  those  ideas  of  the  divine  char- 
acter which  are  implanted  in  man  by 
56 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

nature."  In  its  practical  workings, 
this  led  to  a  liberal  emphasis  on  natural 
theology  and  the  relegation  to  the  back- 
ground of  those  doctrines  of  revealed 
religion  which  are  drawn  from  the  Bible 
and  which,  in  their  various  interpreta- 
tions, are  made  the  ground  of  sectarian 
differences.  Sacrificing  as  it  did  some 
vital  elements  of  Christianity,  by  lack  of 
emphasis  if  not  by  denial,  the  latitudin- 
arian  movement  unfitted  itself  for  mak- 
ing the  strongest  possible  protest  against 
divisive  dogmatism. 

In  view  of  these  movements  to  which 
allusion  has  been  made,  it  may  obviously 
be  said  that  the  seventeenth  century  saw 
developed  many  of  the  painful  effects  of 
Protestant  individualism  and  some  dis- 
tinct reactions  in  the  direction  either  of 
restoring  unity  or  of  removing  the  most 
objectionable  features  of  division.  But 
it  remained  for  the  eighteenth  century  to 
furnish  a  fully  developed  philosophical 
conception  of  the  individual  and  to  ap- 
ply this  in  a  thorough-going  manner  to 
the  task  of  forming  a  consistent  view  of 

57 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

the  world.  There  were  two  movements ^ 
begun  in  the  seventeenth  century  and 
culminating  in  the  eighteenth,  which 
may  be  considered  as  developing  the 
theory  of  individualism  to  the  last  de- 
gree and  as  attempting,  along  two  oppo- 
site lines,  to  find  in  the  individual  so 
defined  a  basis  for  social  and  religious 
unity.  The  first  was  the  series  of 
mystical  movements  including  Pietism, 
Moravianism  and  Wesley anism;  the  sec- 
ond was  the  philosophy  of  the  Enlight- 
enment in  its  application  to  the  problems 
of  society,  government  and  religion. 

As  a  result  of  the  persecutions  and 
strifes  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the 
church  found  itself  at  the  beginning  of 
the  eighteenth  at  a  low  ebb  of  spiritual 
vitality.  Too  weary  with  its  struggles 
of  party  against  party  to  continue  the 
fight  with  any  spirit,  too  much  perturbed 
by  attacks  from  without  upon  the  very 
foundations  of  religion  to  derive  much 
satisfaction  from  disputing  about  details, 
forced  by  the  development  of  constitu- 
tional liberty  to  grant  a  governmental 
58 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

toleration  which  was  accompanied  by  no 
charity  in  the  heart,  too  much  exhausted 
to  fight  and  too  stubborn  to  make  peace, 
the  church  sank  from  a  condition  of  dis- 
graceful internecine  warfare  into  a  still 
more  disgraceful  lethargy.  The  crown- 
ing characteristic  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury was  a  lack  of  enthusiasm. 

The  most  sincerely  religious  reaction 
against  this  state  of  affairs,  which  had 
been  brought  about  by  the  divisive  in- 
fluence of  Protestant  dogmatism,  was 
seen  in  a  general  movement  turning 
away  from  all  dogmatism  and  substitu- 
ting for  it  a  religion  of  pure  feeling. 
Within  the  lyUtheran  communion  there 
arose  mystics  like  Arndt  and  Jacob 
Boehme,  whose  spirit  was  not  unlike 
that  of  Tauler  and  Thomas  a  Kempis.  In 
France  the  same  motive  animated  Mad- 
ame Guyon  and  Fenelon,  to  whose  Cath- 
olic adherents  the  name  of  Quietists  was 
applied.  Following  in  the  train  of  these, 
there  arose  many  mystical  sects  within 
both  Romanism  and  Protestantism,  their 
limits  being  geographical  rather  than 
59 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

dogmatic.  They  made  little  of  churcli 
dogmas  and  insisted  on  the  feeling  of 
the  individual  as  the  sole  criterion  of 
the  religious  life.  Many  of  them  were 
degenerates  in  one  way  or  another  and 
soon  ran  into  fanaticism.  Not  a  few, 
in  revolting  against  legalism  and  arti- 
ficial restraint,  became  antinomians  and 
fell  into  gross  immorality;  but  the  op- 
probrium which  attaches  to  these  must 
by  no  means  be  transferred  to  the  really 
great  movements  which  were  animated 
by  the  same  fundamental  principle,  the 
appeal  to  the  emotional  consciousness  of 
the  individual  as  constituting  the  high- 
est law  and  the  supreme  revelation  of 
God  to  man. 

The  Quakers,  under  the  leadership  of 
George  Fox,  with  their  doctrine  of  the 
* 'inner  light";  Pietism,  which  roused 
the  IvUtheran  Church  from  its  stupor  and 
led  in  a  great  revival  of  vital  religion 
and  good  works;  Moravianism,  which, 
under  the  wise  guidance  of  Count  Zin- 
zendorf,  gave   to   the   cause    of   foreign 

missions  such  an  impulse  as  it  had  not 
60    • 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

received  since  the  days  of  the  apostles; 
Methodism,  which  arose  in  the  Church 
of  England  and  left  that  communion 
only  when  it  showed  itself  unwilling 
longer  to  contain  the  fervid  evangelism 
of  Wesley  and  Whitefield; — all  of  these 
movements  owed  their  origin  and  their 
strength  to  the  reaction  which  set  in 
against  that  dogmatic  sectarianism  which 
had  divided  the  religious  world,  and  they 
were  in  a  large  measure  successful  in  de- 
veloping a  side  of  religion  which,  before 
their  time,  had  been  too  little  empha- 
sized. They  all  alike  disregarded  (rather 
than  denied)  the  established  dogmas, 
which  represented  the  inherited  opposi- 
tion to  individualism,  and  made  their 
appeal  to  feeling,  which  is  something 
essentially  individualistic.  Behind  them 
all  there  lay  the  implicit  assumption 
that  feeling  is  not  only  the  most  individ- 
ual but  the  most  universal  element  of 
human  life,  and  they  attempted  there- 
fore to  get  down  to  the  bed-rock  of 
essential  religion  by  effecting  a  synthesis 

6i 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

of    the    common   elements   of    religious 
emotional  experience. 

The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment 
and  its  religious  phase,  Deism,  gain  a 
new  significance  when  they  are  consid- 
ered as  the  opposite  movement  to  that 
just  mentioned  as  regards  the  methods 
which  they  employed,  but  identical  with 
it  in  the  end  to  be  realized.  Deism 
aimed  to  establish  a  universal  Chris- 
tianity through  the  agency  of  the  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Enlightenment.  The 
warfare  of  religious  parties,  it  said,  is 
based  upon  differences  of  opinion  in  re- 
gard to  mysteries  whereof  the  mind  of 
man  can  have  no  certain  knowledge. 
Therefore  let  us  cease  to  speak  of  these 
mysteries  and  dwell  only  upon  those 
fundamental  matters  in  regard  to  which 
we  can  have  knowledge.  Christianity 
is  accordingly  reduced  to  a  religion  of 
pure  reason  unassisted  by  revelation, 
natural  religion  takes  the  place  of  re- 
vealed religion,  and  all  elements  are 
excluded  which  are  not  common  to  all 

religious    systems.     Thus   the   essential 
62 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

and  true  element  in  Christianity  is 
reached  by  an  appeal  to  the  consensus 
of  the  purely  intellectual  judgment  of 
men,  and  the  dogmas  and  alleged  his- 
torical revelations  are  at  best  adventi- 
tious and  doubtful  and  must  be  elimi- 
nated from  reasonable  religion.  As 
Pietism,  Wesley anism,  etc.,  had  aimed 
at  unity  upon  a  common  emotional  ele- 
ment, so  the  Enlightenment  aimed  at 
unity  through  the  universal  reason  of 
mankind. 

But  the  philosophical  basis  upon 
which  the  Enlightenment  attempted  to 
found  its  religion  of  reason  was  singu- 
larly inadequate  for  that  purpose.  Its 
theory  of  knowledge  was  sensationalism; 
i.  e.,  that  the  raw  material  for  all  our 
knowledge  enters  the  mind  in  the  form 
of  simple  ideas  through  the  avenue  of 
the  senses.  The  development  of  this 
philosophy  from  the  standpoint  of  relig- 
ion is  a  familiar  story.  It  was,  wher- 
ever it  was  logically  followed  out,  the 
temporary  destruction  of  all  religion. 
Aiming  at  a  reduction  of  Christianity  to 
63 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

its  essentials  through  a  purely  intellec- 
tual process,  it  eliminated  the  mysteri- 
ous element  and  ended  by  eliminating 
religion. 

In  England,  the  movement  was  not 
carried  to  its  logical  conclusion.  There 
Deism,  through  the  accompanying  study 
of  nature  and  through  the  corresponding 
use  of  the  physico-theological  argument 
for  the  existence  of  God,  kept  a  firm 
grip  on  the  conception  of  God  as  a  per- 
sonal creative  intelligence.  But  in 
France  the  more  logical  development 
was  followed,  leading  through  panthe- 
ism (seen  even  as  early  as  Toland  in 
England),  to  hylozoism,  and  then  by 
the  final  plunge  into  sheer  materialism 
and  atheism.  The  demand  for  a  com- 
pletely clear  and  distinct  view  of  the 
world  and  the  determination  to  refuse  to 
consider  anything  as  true  in  nature  or 
reliofion  which  was  not  clear  and  dis- 
tinct,  led,  not  to  a  reduction  of  Chris- 
tianity to  its  essentials,  which  could 
then  be  made  the  basis  for  a  united 
64 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

churcli,   but   to   the   destruction   of    all 
Christianity  and  of  all  religion. 

The  Enlightenment  was  par  excel- 
lence the  philosophy  of  individualism. 
Disastrous  as  were  its  immediate  results 
in  the  Deism  of  England  and  the  natural- 
ism of  France,  it  served  the  purpose  of 
bringing  to  consciousness,  as  had  never 
been  done  before,  the  fact  of  the  tre- 
mendous significance  of  the  individual 
in  every  sphere  of  life.  In  its  practical 
applications  it  took  the  form  of  revolt 
against  organizations  and  institutions. 
It  would  not  tolerate  the  church  because 
the  church  brought  down  traditions  from 
the  past  and  tried  to  impose  them  upon 
the  individual  of  the  present.  It  fur- 
nished the  animating  thought  of  the 
French  Revolution  and  of  the  succeed- 
ing revolutionary  movements  which  oc- 
curred in  the  last  decade  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  and  the  first  decade  of  the 
nineteenth.  It  was  productive  of  a  dis- 
integrated and  atomic  condition  of  soci- 
ety. It  therefore  prepared  the  way  for 
a  reconstruction  and  furnished  the  com- 

5  65 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

plete    development   of    the   problem    of 
unity. 

The  problem  of  Protestantism,  the 
contradiction  between  the  disintegrating 
tendency  of  its  individualism  and  the 
unity  which  is  required  for  effectiveness 
and  for  the  preservation  of  its  very  ex- 
istence, has  now  come  clearly  to  light. 
Through  the  long  development  which 
we  have  traced,  the  individual  has  been 
brought  to  light  out  of  the  darkness  of 
mediaeval  solidarity  and  has  developed 
into  an  irrepressible  factor  of  all  life 
and  an  essential  element  in  every  living 
organization.  Simultaneous  with  this 
process,  has  developed  the  series  of  at- 
tempts to  bring  this  young  giant  under 
laws  and  make  him  subject  to  the  re- 
strictions of  organization.  The  attempts 
have  not  been  completely  successful. 
This  young  giant,  the  modern  Individ- 
ual, stands  forth  in  all  his  might,  free, 
uncontrolled,  and  his  power  in  large 
measure  wasted  for  lack  of  effective  or- 
ganization.    It  becomes  the  problem  of 

the  nineteenth  century  to  effect  a  syn- 
66 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

thesis  between  these  two  apparently  con- 
tradictory principles, — to  preserve  the 
freedom  of  the  individual  untrammeled 
by  useless  machinery  and  unoppressed 
by  musty  traditions  inherited  from  an 
outlived  past;  and  at  the  same  time  to 
bring  this  individual  into  such  working 
relations  with  his  fellows  as  to  make 
him  most  efficient. 

The  task  of  philosophy  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  may  be  described  in  the 
most  general  terms  as  an  attempt  to 
transcend  the  individualism  which  was 
developed  by  the  eighteenth;  i.  e.^  to  use 
it,  to  control  it,  to  pass  beyond  it  to  a 
unity  which  shall  embody  but  shall  not 
crush  it. 

The  problem  of  the  religious  world  at 
the  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century 
was  a  similar  one.  Protestant  individ- 
ualism had  been  fully  developed  on  the 
side  of  division  and  separation.  That 
this  could  not  be  endured  as  a  perma- 
nent condition  was  evidenced  by  the 
many   unsuccessful    attempts   to  restore 

unity.     The  conditions  of   the  problem 
67 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

and  the  need  of  a  solution  have  now 
been  brought  clearly  to  light.  The 
need  of  the  hour  was  for  the  discovery 
of  a  principle  of  synthesis  by  which, 
without  restricting  the  liberty  of  any 
man,  a  practical  and  effective  union  of 
religious  forces  might  be  obtained.  The 
problem  was  to  transcend  religious  indi- 
vidualism by  finding  a  basis  for  religious 
solidarity. 

The  whole  history  of  Protestantism 
had  been  a  continual  demonstration  of 
the  impossibility  of  uniting  on  the  basis 
of  a  complete  theology,  even  a  profess- 
edly Biblical  theology.  The  exercise  of 
the  right  of  private  judgment  is  a  guar- 
antee that  there  will  always  be  many 
differences  of  opinion  as  to  what  the 
Bible  teaches  upon  certain  points  of 
doctrine.  The  attempt  to  reduce  Chris- 
tianity to  its  simplest  and  purest  form 
by  emphasis  upon  the  feeling  of  the  in- 
dividual as  the  criterion  of  religion,  had 
quickened  and  enthused  the  church  but 
had  contributed  little  to  the  solution  of 
the  problem  of   unity.     Equally  unsuc- 

68 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

cessful,  and  far  more  disastrous,  had  been 
the  opposite  attempt  to  get  at  the  essen- 
tials of  Christianity  by  a  process  of  pure 
reason,  based  on  a  theory  of  knowledge 
the  foundation  of  which  was  the  sense 
perception  of  the  individual.  The  sig- 
nificance of  Alexander  Campbell's  con- 
tribution to  the  question  of  Christian 
nnion  is  that  he  took  the  matter  up  just 
at  this  point  and  proposed  another  prin- 
ciple of  union.  The  unity  of  the  church 
is  to  be  based,  not  upon  a  complete  sys- 
tem of  Biblical  or  dogmatic  theology, 
nor  upon  anything  which  is  to  be  found 
within  the  individual  himself;  but  upon 
the  authority  of  Christ  and  the  terms 
which  he  has  laid  down  as  the  condi- 
tions of  salvation. 

Mr.  Campbell  frequently  spoke  of  his 
movement  as  an  attempt  to  secure  union 
''upon  the  Bible,"  but  it  was  evident 
from  the  whole  course  of  his  thought 
that  this  did  not  mean  union  upon  his 
interpretation  of  the  teaching  of  the 
Bible  on  every  point  of  Christian  doc- 
trine. The  latter  would  have  been  sim- 
69 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL  S  THEOLOGY 

ply  a  reaffirmation  of  the  old  dictum 
that  'Hhe  Bible  and  the  Bible  alone  is 
the  religion  of  Protestants."  It  was 
rather  Mr.  Campbell's  idea  that  the  Bible 
is  to  be  taken  as  the  authority  for  deter- 
mining what  is  essential  in  Christianity. 
But  the  whole  Bible  is  not  taken  up 
with  depicting  original  and  essential 
Christianity.  Therefore  the  real  basis 
of  unity  is  not  the  entire  Biblical  teach- 
ing upon  all  points,  about  many  of 
which  there  would  be  differences  of  in- 
terpretation, but  the  practice  of  the 
early  church  under  the  guidance  of  the 
apostles,  as  representing  the  authority 
of  Christ.  The  question  to  be  answered 
is.  What  did  the  apostles,  taught  by 
Christ,  consider  the  essentials  of  a 
church? 

This  distinction  between  union  on  the 
Bible,  in  the  sense  of  union  on  all  the 
doctrines  which  each  individual  con- 
ceives to  be  taught  in  the  Bible,  and 
union  on  the  Bible,  in  the  sense  of  union 
on  the  Biblical  statements  regarding  the 

essentials  of  Christianity,  is  an   impor- 
70 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

tant  one  to  bear  in  mind,  as  it  helps  to 
define  the  position  which  Mr.  Camp- 
bell's theology  occupied  in  his  general 
scheme  of  thought.  His  theology  was 
his  interpretation  of  the  teaching  of 
Scripture  on  a  great  many  points,  and  it 
shows  the  influence  of  some  contem- 
porary systems  of  theology  and  philoso- 
phy. But  he  did  not  make  his  theology 
his  basis  for  union.  For  example,  he 
conceived  that  faith,  repentance  and 
baptism  were  essentials  of  Christianity, 
and  were  therefore  included  in  the  basis 
of  union.  But  his  interpretation  of  the 
nature  of  faith,  the  manner  in  which  the 
Holy  Spirit  operates  in  conversion,  and 
the  design  of  baptism  in  the  scheme  of 
redemption,  were  parts  of  his  theology 
which  he  taught  as  truths  but  did  not 
erect  into  tests  of  fellowship. 

While  his  whole  movement  was  a  re- 
volt against  the  results  of  eighteenth 
century  individualism,  as  manifested  in 
the  condition  of  Christendom  as  divided 
into  innumerable  sects,  Mr.  Campbell 
revolted  also  no  less  against  its  method, 
71 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

namely,  the  self-dependence  of  the  indi- 
vidual in  matters  of  religion.  He  con- 
curred with  the  general  movement  of  the 
eighteenth  century  in  desiring  a  reduc- 
tion of  Christianity  to  its  essential  ele- 
ments, but  he  differed  from  it  in  assert- 
ing that  Christianity  could  never  be 
reduced  to  its  essential  elements  through 
the  exercise  of  the  unaided  human  rea- 
son, or  through  dependence  upon  the 
emotions  of  man.  There  must  be  nec- 
essarily a  return  to  authority  for  the 
establishment  of  the  essential  basis  of 
religion.  The  unity,  therefore,  comes 
not  from  within,  but  from  without. 
Given  the  individual  as  defined  accord- 
ing to  Ivocke's  philosophy,  and  there 
can  be  within  him  no  universal  element 
to  serve  as  a  basis  of  unity  or  as  a  means 
of  attaining  such  a  basis. 

Stated  in  his  own  terms  then,  Mr. 
Campbell's  movement  would  be  defined 
as  an  attempt  to  unite  Christendom  by  a 
restoration  of  the  essential  elements  of 
primitive  Christianity  as  defined  by  the 

Scriptures.        He   was   strongly    of    the 
72 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNITY 

Opinion  tliat  nobody  before  bad  ever 
seriously  attempted  sucb  a  restoration  on 
such  a  basis.  All  previous  sects  and  dis- 
senting bodies  had  been  built  on  creeds 
and  confessions  with  only  a  nominal,  or, 
if  real,  a  short-lived,  return  to  the 
authority  of  Scripture.  He  recognized 
the  fact,  it  is  true,  that  there  had  been 
a  few  scattered  individuals,  through  the 
two  centuries  which  preceded  his  work, 
who  had  grasped  this  idea,  but  there  had 
never  yet  been  any  serious  attempt  to 
apply  the  principle  to  the  solution  of 
the  problem.  *'Not  until  within  the 
present  generation,"  says  Mr.  Campbell, 
*'did  any  sect  or  party  in  Christendom 
unite  and  build  upon  the  Bible  alone. 
Since  that  time  the  first  effort  known  to 
us,  to  abandon  the  whole  controversy 
about  creeds  and  reformations  and  to  re- 
store primitive  Christianity,  or  to  build 
alone  upon  the  apostles  and  prophets, 
Jesus  Christ  himself  the  chief  corner 
stone,  has  been  made."  Attempts  had 
been  made,  to  be  sure,  to  deduce  from 
the  Scriptures  complete  systems  of  the- 

73 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

ology,  and  to  make  these  the  bases  of 
successive  reformations  of  the  church. 
But  his  own  movement  differed  from 
these  in  seeking  for  the  authoritatively 
given  conditions  of  salvation  and  mak- 
ing these  alone,  as  the  essentials  of 
Christianity,  the  basis  for  the  unity  of 
the  Church.  There  may  be  differences 
of  theory  about  the  facts  of  the  Gospel, 
but  the  facts  themselves  are  sure. 
There  may  be  differences  of  interpre- 
tation in  regard  to  many  doctrines 
taught  in  the  Bible,  but,  when  all  preju- 
dices and  preconceived  opinions  have 
been  set  aside,  there  is  little  room  for 
differences  in  regard  to  the  few  simple 
commands,  obedience  to  which  was  the 
only  condition  of  entrance  to  the  church 
in  the  days  of  the  apostles. 

Stated  in  a  word,  his  method  of  effect- 
ing the  reconciliation  between  the  liber- 
ty  of  the  individual  and  the  unity  of  the 
whole  body,  was  a  return  to  authority 
for  essentials  and  the  admission  of  indi- 
vidual differences  in  non-essentials. 
74 


Chapter  II 
The  Philosophical  Basis 


THE    PHILOSOPHICAL   BASIS. 

I.  Descartes  and  Locke  : 

1.  Descartes — clearness    and    distinctness    as 

criterion  of  truth;  doctrine  of  innate  ideas, 

2.  Locke — no  innate  ideas;  turns  philosophy 

from  metaphysics  to  theory  of  knowledge . 

II.  Locke's   Theory  of  Knowi^edge — Sensa- 

TIONAI^ISM  : 

1.  Ideas  come    only    through    sensation    and 

reflection. 

2.  Simple  and  complex  ideas. 

3.  Primary    qualities    represent    an    objective 

reality    like    the    impression ;    secondary 
do  not. 

4.  Substance  is  unknowable,  since  only  quali- 

ties make  impressions. 

5.  Law  of  causation. 

III.  DEVEI.OPMENT    AND    APPWCATION    OF   SEN- 

SATIONAI^ISM  : 

1.  In    metaphysics,    Berkeley's    idealism  ;    in 

theory    of    knowledge,    Hume's    agnosti- 
cism ;  reaction,  Scottish  philosophy. 

2.  Natural  science  :  mechanical  view  of  nature. 

3.  Religion  :  Deism. 

4.  Kthics  :  hedonism  and  utilitarianism. 

IV.  CaMPBELI^'S     REI.ATION     TO    THE     LOCKIAN 

Phii^osophy. 

76 


THE   PHILOSOPHICAL   BASIS 

The  period  of  philosophy  out  of  which 
Alexander  Campbell's  thought  sprang 
may  be  denominated  as  the  second  pe- 
riod of  modern  philosophy.  Descartes 
had  struck  the  note  of  philosophical  in- 
dividualism which  was  at  once  the  ex- 
pression of  the  Protestant  principle  and 
the  dominant  feature  of  modern  philoso- 
phy from  Descartes  to  Kant.  When,  at 
the  beginning  of  his  Meditations^  Des- 
cartes announced  his  intention  to  cut 
loose  from. all  received  and  established 
beliefs  and,  starting  from  a  doubt  as 
nearly  universal  as  possible,  to  establish 
everything  over  again  for  himself,  or, 
failing  in  this,  to  reject  it,  he  gave  ex- 
pression to  this  vital  essence  of  Protest- 
antism and  modern  philosophy.  ^'Clear- 
ness and  distinctness"  was  the  criterion 
of  truth  which  he  proposed.     What  is 

clear  and  distinct  to  me  I  will  accept  as- 
77 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

truth,  and  no  authority  can  force  me  to 
admit  anything  which  does  not  so  ac- 
credit itself.  But  fearing  that  this  com- 
plete individualism  might  destroy  the 
claim  of  religious  faith  to  universal  val- 
idity, Descartes  maintained  that  there 
are  certain  innate  ideas  which  all  men 
possess  in  common.  These  form  the 
bond  of  unity  between  individuals  which, 
as  defined  by  him,  have  nothing  else  to 
hold  them  together. 

It  was  this  sort  of  an  isolated  individ- 
ual, resolved  that  his  world  of  knowl- 
edge should  stand  or  fall  according  to 
the  power  or  impotence  of  his  own  un- 
aided faculties,  in  whom  Locke  tried  to 
find  the  basis  for  relations  between  men. 
But  since  much  that  Locke  called  "met- 
aphysical rubbish"  had  justified  itself  by 
appealing  to  Descartes's  "innate  ideas," 
Locke  resolved  to  sweep  these  away  and 
go  to  the  last  extreme  of  individualism 
by  adding  pure  empiricism  to  the  crite- 
rion of  "clearness  and  distinctness." 

From  the  time  of  Locke,  philosophy 

became  introspective.     It    not    only  re- 
78 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

jected  everything  which  could  not  be 
made  clear  and  distinct  to  the  individual 
mind,  but  it  turned  its  attention  to  the 
consideration  of  this  individual  mind  as 
a  knowing  organ.  I^ocke's  starting 
point  was  his  discovery,  which  seems  to 
have  come  to  him  like  a  rising  sun,  that, 
before  questions  of  metaphysics,  princi- 
ples of  morality  or  revealed  religion 
could  be  rightly  investigated,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  discuss  the  nature  and 
limitations  of  human  knowledge.  It  was 
to  this  task  that  he  set  himself  in  his 
chief  work,  and  it  was  this  which  struck 
the  key-note  for  the  philosophy  of  the 
following  century.  The  dominant  prob- 
lems of  that  philosophy  are,  "How  does 
knowledge  arise?''  "What  is  its  possible 
extent?"  and  "What  are  its  necessary 
limitations?" 

The  theory  of  knowledge  which  was 
developed  in  answer  to  these  questions 
determined  the  metaphysics,  ethics  and 
philosophy  of  religion  for  the  period. 
Not  infrequently  does  a  poet  of  keen  in- 
sight express  the  leading  thought  of  the 

79 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

contemporary  philosophy,  and  Alexander 
Pope  summed  up  this  tendency  of  eight- 
eenth century  thought  very  accurately  in 
the  couplet: 

"  Know  then  thyself;  presume  not  God  to  scan. 
The  proper  study  of  mankind  is  man." 

Only  by  the  study  of  man  can  the  ex- 
tent and  validity  of  his  knowing  proc- 
esses be  determined  and  the  means 
discovered  by  which  knowledge  can  de- 
fend itself  against  the  attacks  of  skepti- 
cism. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  study  of 
man's  knowing  processes  by  Locke  and 
his  followers  did  not  succeed  in  proving 
the  validity  of  knowledge  or  in  warding 
off  the  assaults  of  skepticism.  Its  failure 
to  do  this  characterizes  it  as  a  destructive 
period,  but,  as  destructive,  it  was  also 
preparatory.  For  in  showing  the  inade- 
quacy of  the  old  conception  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  his  relations  to  the  world,  it 
opened  the  way  for  a  higher  conception 
which  would  admit  the  possibility  of  the 
completer    synthesis     for    which    these 

thinkers  sought  in  vain. 
80 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

In  consideration  of  the  immense  im- 
portance of  the  thought  of  Locke  in 
connection  with  the  theology  which  we 
are  discussing,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
give  a  brief  survey  of  the  chief  features 
of  his  philosophy. 

In  the  preface  to  his  Essay  on  the  Hu- 
man Understandings  Locke  gives  an 
account  of  the  circumstances  which  led 
him  to  the  consideration  of  the  problems 
which  he  there  discusses.  In  consider- 
ing, with  a  party  of  friends,  the  standard 
and  sanctions  of  morality,  he  found  him- 
self brought  to  a  stand  by  his  inadequate 
apprehension  of  the  power  of  the  human 
intellect  to  know  the  truth.  He  there- 
fore turned  to  the  study  of  the  mind  as 
an  instrument  of  knowledge.  The  prac- 
tical impulse  which  led  to  this  discussion 
must  be  kept  in  mind  as  indicating  one 
characteristic  of  Locke's  thought,  name- 
ly, its  practical  character  and  the  imme- 
diacy of  its  application  to  questions  of 
morals  and  religion. 

The  most  conspicuous  and  familiar 
feature  of  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge. 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

is  his  doctrine  of  the  source  of  ideas.  All 
knowledge  comes  from  sensation  and  re- 
flection. There  are  no  ideas  innate  in 
the  human  mind,  not  even  the  ideas  of 
God,  or  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  or 
the  axioms  of  mathematics.  Things  ex- 
ist external  to  us;  man  has  a  capacity 
for  receiving  impressions  and  a  faculty 
of  combining  and  comparing  these  im- 
pressions, and  he  has  nothing  more. 
All  knowledge  comes  from  the  reception 
of  images  of  these  external  objects  upon 
the  blank  tablet  of  the  mind.  The 
standard  of  truth  is  therefore  entirely 
external.  We  know  objects  if  the  ideas 
of  them  which  we  receive  through  sen- 
sation correspond  to  the  external  reality 
which  is  the  cause  of  the  impression. 
The  impressions  which  we  receive,  just 
in  the  form  in  which  we  receive  them, 
give  us  simple  ideas  in  which  there  is  no 
admixture  of  anything  but  sensation. 
But  by  comparing,  repeating  and  con- 
trasting these,  we  may  form  complex 
ideas;  yet  at  the  end  of  the  process  we 

have  no  more  than  we  started  with,  so 
82 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

far  as  the  material  of  knowledge  goes, 
for  the  product  contains  only  what  was 
given  in  the  original  impression.  The 
validity  of  knowledge  is  therefore  directly 
dependent  upon  the  trustworthiness  of 
the  report  which  the  senses  bring  to  us 
regarding  the  external  objects  which 
stimulate  them. 

Yet  Locke  admits  that  the  senses  in  a 
measure  deceive  us.  The  greater  part 
of  our  sensations  are  not  copies  at  all  of 
externally  existing  realities.  The  quali- 
ties which  we  know  through  sensation, 
are  divided  into  two  classes.  There  are 
primary  qualities,  such  as  extension, 
form,  solidity,  mobility,  which  are  nec- 
essarily connected  with  the  conception 
of  an  object  and  which  really  exist  in 
external  things  just  as  we  perceive  them. 
But  secondary  qualities,  like  color,  sound, 
smell,  are  only  the  ways  in  which  cor- 
responding external  conditions  affect  us. 
The  redness,  for  example,  is  not  in  the 
object,  but  in  the  perceiving  subject. 
There  is  in  the  object  only  a  certain 
condition  which  produces  in  the  subject 
83 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

the  sensation  of  redness,  but  which  is 
by  no  means  like  it.  Secondary  quali- 
ties are,  therefore,  not  really  qualities  at 
all,  but  sensations.  In  this  doctrine  of 
the  subjective  character  of  secondary 
qualities,  we  have  the  first  premonitory 
hint  of  the  skepticism  which  would  later 
be  developed  out  of  the  system;  but 
Locke  did  not  so  interpret  it.  We  get 
our  knowledge  only  from  sensations,  but 
sensation  does  not  always  tell  us  a 
straight  story  about  our  experiences.  It 
produces  the  impression  that  certain 
(secondary)  qualities  exist  without  and 
independent  of  us,  whereas  these  so- 
called  qualities  are  only  the  way  in 
which  we  are  affected  by  the  object. 
Locke's  successors  ask,  ''How  do  you 
know  that  primary  qualities  exist  just  as 
your  sensations  say  they  do,  if  you  ad- 
mit that  secondary  qualities  do  not  so 
exist?"  The  system  of  Locke  contains 
no  answer  for  this  dilemma,  but  Locke 
guards  himself  by  carefully  maintaining 
the  distinction  between  the  two  classes 

of  qualities. 

84 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

Again  in  his  idea  of  substance,  I<ocke 
opens  another  door  to  the  wave  of  skep- 
ticism which  was  only  too  ready  to 
sweep  in  and  overwhelm  the  confiding 
philosopher  in  the  citadel  of  his  own 
system.  Since  our  knowledge  comes 
only  through  impressions,  we  cannot 
have  any  direct  knowledge  of  substance, 
but  only  of  qualities,  for  substance  it- 
self, apart  from  qualities,  cannot  make 
any  impression  upon  our  organs  of  sense. 
The  idea  of  substance,  therefore,  is  sim- 
ply a  combination  of  various  simple 
ideas  which  we  habitually  receive  to- 
gether. For  example,  the  substance  of 
the  object  which  we  call  a  table,  is  just 
a  combination  of  the  particular  qualities 
which  are  represented  to  us  through  cer- 
tain sensations  of  hardness,  form,  color, 
etc.  When  metaphysics  tries  to  get  be- 
low these  and  inquire  for  the  substrate 
in  which  these  qualities  inhere,  the 
human  understanding  has  transgressed 
its  limits.  Thus,  again,  the  outer  world 
is  rendered  apparently  less  substantial 
than  it  appears  to  the  naive  mind,  or 
85 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

than  it  was  according  to  the  metaphys- 
ics of  the  scholastics  or  of  Descartes. 

Cause  is  also  a  complex  idea  which 
comes  from  the  observation  of  repeated 
changes  of  things  owing  to  the  action  of 
other  things  upon  them.  We  observe  re- 
peatedly that  a  certain  act  or  occurrence 
is  followed  or  accompanied  by  another 
certain  occurrence,  and  we  assume  that 
the  first  produces  the  second.  For  ex- 
ample, if  you  drop  a  book,  a  noise  fol- 
lows; if  you  pinch  your  arm,  there  is  a 
feeling  of  pain.  We  assume  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect  to  account  for  phenom- 
ena, which  are  presented  to  our  senses 
only  as  unvarying  coincidences.  This 
was  the  ground  from  which  Hume 
started  for  the  development  of  his  skep- 
ticism by  perfectly  logical  steps. 

On  this  purely  sensational  theory  of 
knowledge,  evidently  all  our  knowledge 
must  be  of  particular  things.  The  uni- 
versal, species,  genus,  etc.,  are  the  pro- 
duct of  our  mental  activity,  abstracting 
the  distinctive  qualities  of  each  object, 

and  generalizing  the   qualities  common 

86 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

to  a  number  of  objects.  It  follows  also 
that  our  knowledge  really  reaches  only 
to  the  perception  of  the  relation  of  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  between  our  ideas. 
We  take  our  simple  ideas  as  valid  repre- 
sentatives of  some  sort  of  external  real- 
ity because  they  come  to  us  independent 
of  our  activity,  and  hence  we  may  as- 
sume that  they  are  caused  from  without, 
but  this  involves  an  assumption  which  is 
not  susceptible  of  proof.  But  we  know 
our  own  existence  immediately,  says 
Locke,  though  we  have  no  metaphysical 
knowledge  of  the  essence  of  the  soul, 
and  we  have  a  demonstrable  knowledge 
of  the  existence  of  God,  proven  by  a 
modified  form  of  the  cosmological  argu- 
ment, although  we  cannot  know  His 
essence  any  more  than  our  own.  These 
two  facts  constitute  the  highest  points  of 
our  knowledge. 

The  establishment  of  all  knowledge 
upon  this  basis  of  mere  sensation  and 
the  rejection  of  all  knowledge  which 
cannot  be  so  grounded,  the  removal  of 
innate  ideas  from  the  sphere  of  valid 
87 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

knowledge,  and  especially  from  the 
realm  of  ethics,  were  the  instrument  for 
the  *' clearing  up"  of  ethical  ideas  and 
the  setting  aside  of  all  those  fanatical 
and  antinomian  notions  which  had  been 
supported  by  the  undemonstrable  but 
irrefutable  argument:  "I  feel  it  so  with- 
in me;  I  have  it  as  an  innate  idea." 
All  ideas,  whether  ethical  or  religious, 
must  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  under- 
standing operating  through  sensation  or 
reflection.  This  is  the  starting-point 
for  the  Atifklarimg^  or  Enlightenment, 
in  the  realm  of  ethics,  and  it  was  this 
which  furnished  the  practical  motive  for 
Locke's  formulation  of  his  theory  of 
knowledge. 

The  outcome  of  this  limitation  of 
knowledge  to  the  materials  received 
through  sensation  was,  as  we  have  seen, 
and  as  is  perfectly  well  known  in  the 
history  of  philosophy,  the  theory  of 
knowledge  known  as  sensationalism,  an 
empirical  theory,  according  to  which 
knowledge  cannot  logically  be  extended 
beyond  the  cognition  of  particular  im- 

88 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

pressions  derived  from  particular  phe- 
nomena. In  Locke's  own  mind,  this 
system  was  without  serious  revolution- 
ary consequences.  With  him  it  was 
merely  an  altogether  admirable  means 
of  ridding  the  realm  of  philosophy  of  a 
series  of  problems  with  which  it  was  not 
competent  to  deal,  and  of  clearing  up 
our  ideas  about  such  objects  as  we  could 
really  know.  For  him  there  was  in  it 
no  subversion  of  existing  and  orthodox 
theories  of  morals  or  religion.  It  was 
only  in  the  hands  of  his  successors,  who 
adopted  the  principles  which  he  had  an- 
nounced and  carried  them  out  to  a  more 
logical  conclusion,  that  the  serious  re- 
sults of  the  system  are  seen.  There 
are  four  lines  of  development  which 
may  be  traced  from  Locke's  thought  in 
regard  to  the  source  and  nature  of  knowl- 
edge. These  were  found  in  the  appli- 
cation of  his  principles  to  a  further 
development  of  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, to  natural  science,  to  religion,  and 
to  ethics.     In  each  one  of   these  fields 

the  results  reached  were  of  an  extreme 

89 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

and  revolutionary  character,  such  as 
would  have  startled  and  shocked  the  de- 
vout philosopher  who  was  really  respon- 
sible for  their  origination. 

I.  The  first  development  of  the  the- 
ory of  knowledge  beyond  the  point  at 
which  Locke  left  it,  came  through  the 
thought  of  Berkeley.  Taking  up 
Locke's  conception  of  secondary  quali- 
ties, which  are  not  objective  but  which 
represent  the  way  in  which  certain  ex- 
ternal conditions  affect  our  sensibilities^ 
and  the  corresponding  idea  that  sub- 
stance is  something  beyond  the  reach  of 
our  knowing  faculties,  Berkeley  asked 
the  very  natural  question.  How  can  we 
tell  that  the  case  is  not  the  same  with 
regard  to  the  primary  qualities  as  with 
the  secondary?  And  since  we  cannot 
perceive  substance  through  impressions, 
what  is  our  guarantee  for  the  real  exist- 
ence of  substance?  And  if  primary 
qualities,  secondary  qualities,  and  sub- 
stance are  all  made  merely  subjective 
affections,  what   is  there  left   of  reality 

outside  of  us?     Berkeley  answered  these 
90 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

questions  by  denying  that  there  is  any 
guarantee  for  any  such  objective  mate- 
rial existence.  But  the  idea  of  cause 
still  holds  good  with  Berkeley,  and  there 
must  be  something  to  explain  the  rise  of 
the  ideas  in  our  minds.  This  is  done  by 
referring  them  to  the  direct  activity  of 
God.  There  is  no  external  reality  ex- 
cept the  Deity.  The  result  is  a  system 
of  absolute  idealism,  or  spiritual 
monism. 

One-half  of  the  external  universe  was 
therefore  annihilated  by  Berkeley;  the 
other  half  was  annihilated  by  Hume, 
who  attacked  the  conception  of  causa- 
tion as  without  real  validity,  and  conse- 
quently left  no  more  ground  for  the  ac- 
ceptance of  an  external  spiritual  reality 
as  cause  for  our  ideas,  than  Berkely  had 
seen  for  an  external  material  reality. 
Hume's  aim,  like  I^ocke's,  has  been  "a 
serious  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  human 
understanding"  to  clear  away  the  rub- 
bish of  old  metaphysics.  He  calls  him- 
self a  skeptic,  and  it  is  by  this  name 
that  he  has  been  generally  characterized. 
91 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

But  his  conclusions  were  simply  a  log- 
ical development  from  the  philosophical 
basis  which  Locke  gave  in  his  empiri- 
cism and  sensationalism.  If  we  have 
no  knowledge  except  such  as  comes  to 
us  through  sensuous  impressions,  cer- 
tainly we  have  no  demonstrable  knowl- 
edge of  any  cause  for  these  impressions, 
either  material  or  spiritual.  If  the  out- 
come of  this  is  not  palatable,  we  must 
not  blame  Hume  but  the  originator  of 
the  principles  which  Hume  developed. 
As  the  strictly  philosophical  reaction 
against  the  extreme  conclusions  which 
Hume  reached  in  his  skeptical  philoso- 
phy came  the  so-called  Scottish  philoso- 
phy, led  by  Reid.  It  was  the  anti- 
religious  and  anti-theological  aspect  of 
Hume's  results  which  aroused  Reid  to 
his  revolt.  Hume's  conclusion  had 
been  that,  since  we  know  only  our  im- 
pressions and  have  neither  a  guarantee 
for  the  validity  of  these  as  relating  to 
external  realities,  nor  any  valid  principle 
for  connecting  them,  knowledge  of  real- 
ity vanishes.  Reid  admitted  skepticism 
92 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

as  the  logical  outcome  from  I^ocke's  psy- 
chological principle,  sensationalism.  It 
was  in  the  field  of  psychology,  therefore, 
that  he  found  the  battle,  audit  was  there 
that  he  fought  it  out.  He  adopted  as 
his  principle  a  thorough  inductive  study 
of  the  facts  of  the  mental  life.  All  that 
is  found  to  be  the  actual  product  of  the 
mind's  activity  is  considered  self-evident 
and  necessarily  true.  For  example,  since 
the  idea  of  causation  actually  exists  in 
the  human  mind,  it  must  be  objectively 
valid.  This  is  one  of  the  axioms  which 
cannot  be  proven,  but  the  validity  of 
which  is  testified  to  by  the  universal 
consciousness  of  mankind.  It  is  the 
''common-sense"  of  men — the  consensus 
gentium — which  constitutes  the  sole  cri- 
terion of  the  validity  of  knowledge,  and 
which  furnishes  the  connecting  link  be- 
tween our  subjective  states  and  the  exter- 
nal reality  which  gives  value  to  them. 
The  introduction  of  this  momentous 
assumption,  without  proof,  is  what  Kant 
calls  "dogmatism."  Before  beginning 
his  answer  to  Hume,  Reid  goes  over  the 

93 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'  S  THEOLOGY 

whole  development  of  the  system  which 
he  intends  to  oppose  from  Descartes  to 
Hume,  summing  it  all  up  under  the 
name  of  Cartesianism.  He  treats  of  it 
as  the  ''ideal  system"  or  "theory  of 
ideas,"  because  it  makes  ideas,  instead 
of  reality  itself,  the  object  of  our  knowl- 
edge, and  furnishes  no  satisfactory  way 
of  getting  over  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
Reid's  opposition  to  this  system  was  the 
expression  of  a  devout  conservatism 
which  shrank  from  allowing  the  highest 
realities  of  life  to  be  swallowed  up  in  a 
maze  of  mere  impressions  without  reality 
and  without  connection.  Its  impulse 
was  good,  but  it  rested  upon  a  feeble  and 
tottering  philosophical  basis,  as  was  soon 
shown  by  Kant.  Nevertheless,  it  was 
useful  in  tiding  over  the  period  of  nega- 
tion which  resulted  from  the  development 
of  skepticism,  and  it  further  furnished 
valuable  contributions  to  ethics  and  to 
empirical  psychology. 

2.  The  same  principles  upon  which 
Berkeley  developed  his  idealistic  meta- 
physics and  Hume  his  skeptical  theory 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

of  knowledge,  were  applied  directly  to 
natural  science  and  to  the  phenomena  of 
the  mind,  by  Newton  and  Hartley  re- 
spectively. It  is  Newton  who  ushers  in 
the  modern  era  of  science,  the  character- 
istic of  which  is  the  study  of  nature  as 
a  system  of  forces.  His  great  principle 
was:  '^Abandon  substantial  forms  and 
occult  qualities  and  reduce  natural  phe- 
nomena to  mathematical  laws.'^  This 
idea  of  rejecting  the  consideration  of 
substance  or  substrate  and  observing  only 
qualities,  is  plainly  lyockian.  The  only 
thing  to  be  considered  in  nature  is  the 
perceivable  things  as  they  affect  our 
senses,  and  these  are  to  be  estimated 
with  mathematical  exactness  and  re- 
duced to  law  and  rule.  The  outcome  of 
this  was  a  purely  mechanical  view  of 
nature.  Although  a  profoundly  devout 
man  himself,  Newton  saw  no  place  for 
God  within  his  mechanically  constructed 
and  perfectly  running  universe.  The 
only  possible  place  for  God  in  such  a 
world  is  at  the  beginning.  Newton  de- 
rives a  physico-theological  argument  for 
95 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

the  existence  and  perfection  of  God,  from 
the  fact  that  the  universe  is  so  perfectly 
constructed  that  it  now  runs,  and  has 
been  running  ever  since  its  creation, 
without  any  interference  from  God  and 
without  the  introduction  of  any  forces 
other  than  those  which  he  describes  and 
estimates  as  natural  laws. 

This  mechanical  theory,  which  worked 
with  such  beautiful  perfection,  especially 
in  an  age  when  science  took  little  ac- 
count of  the  more  intricate  problems  of 
biology,  was  naturally  transferred  from 
the  science  of  nature  to  the  science  of 
mind.  Mental  as  well  as  material  phe- 
nomena were  considered  as  being  ex- 
plicable according  to  laws  which  could 
be  mathematically  determined.  Here 
again  it  was  the  pious  conviction  of 
those  who  carried  out  this  line  of 
thought,  that  religion  would  be  not  only 
not  interfered  with  by  it,  but  even  as- 
sisted, for  faith  in  God  being  an  actual 
fact  in  the  mind,  would  thereby  receive 
the  support  of   positive   demonstration. 

But,  in   spite   of   their   excellent  inten- 
96 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

tions,  the  purport  of  their  system  is  very 
obvious.  It  was  a  long  stride  in  the 
direction  of  absolute  materialism  and 
needed  only  another  application  of  rig- 
orous logic,  which  it  took  a  Frenchman 
to  give,  to  bring  it  to  that  conclusion. 

3.  The  application  of  the  princi- 
ples of  the  Enlightenment,  that  is,  of 
Locke's  philosophy,  to  religion^  pro- 
duced Deism.  It  was  a  rationalistic, 
naturalistic,  critical  attempt  to  get  at 
the  essence  of  religion,  and  especially  of 
Christianity,  by  reducing  it  to  a  system 
which  the  human  intellect,  as  defined 
by  lyocke,  could  grasp  in  its  entirety 
and  in  all  its  details.  It  would  tolerate 
no  mystery.  It  would  permit  no  dark 
place  to  remain  unillumined,  and  no 
difi&culty  unsolved.  All  must  be  "clear 
and  distinct";  otherwise  it  could  not  be 
known  to  be  true.  Locke,  as  the  apos- 
tle of  clearness  and  the  founder  of  the 
English  Enlightenment,  became  thus 
unintentionally  the  corner-stone  of  De- 
ism. The  inquiry  into  the  limits  and 
extent  of  knowledge,  which  started  with 
7  97 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

a  view  to  clearing  away  the  tottering' 
yet  dogmatically  affirmed  speculations  of 
pseudo-knowledge  and  ended  by  clear- 
ing away  everything  which  did  not 
attest  its  validity  by  the  testimony  of 
the  senses,  was,  if  the  premises  were 
granted,  the  legitimate  basis  for  a  clear- 
ing away  of  all  positive  religion.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  Deists  set  out  to  uproot 
every  tenet,  dogmatic  or  historical, 
which  did  not  agree  with  reason  so 
defined. 

It  was  only  gradually  that  the  signifi- 
cance of  this  attempt  and  the  principles 
upon  which  it  rested  came  to  light.  As 
the  passion  for  clearness  and  distinctness 
of  knowledge  increased,  permitting  noth- 
ing to  be  accepted  which  could  not  be 
proved  to  reason;  and,  as  the  develop- 
ment of  the  theory  of  knowledge  by 
Berkeley  and  Hume  showed  more  and 
more  the  impotence  of  the  human  rea- 
son to  know  reality  of  any  sort.  Deism 
became  more  and  more  destructive  of  all 
that  had  been  held  religiously  sacred. 
At   first    accepting   the    possibility  and 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

actuality  of  divine  revelation,  they  soon 
rejected  those  parts  of  revealed  religion 
which  seemed  unreasonable  according  to 
their  sensational  empiricism.  Soon  re- 
ligion became  purely  ethical,  with  the 
single  article  of  faith,  *' Believe  in  God," 
and  the  single  precept,  ^' Do  your  duty." 
Kverything  more  than  this  in  religion 
is  false  and  harmful. 

A  variety  of  causes  which  had  been 
long  in  operation  produced  a  conception 
of  God  as  a  transcendent  and  supramun- 
dane  Being  who  set  the  universe  going 
in  the  beginning  and  then  left  it.  The 
operation  of  natural  forces  was  interpre- 
ted as  evidence  of  God's  absence,  rather 
than  his  presence.  God  could  come  into 
the  world  again  only  by  breaking  in  as 
an  intruder,  defying  natural  law  and 
throwing  the  universe  into  temporary 
disorder.  When  revealed  religion  was 
conceived  to  be  dependent  upon  mira- 
cles, which  were  interpreted  as  divine 
incursions  into  a  world  which  had  no 
place  for  God  in  its  normal  order,  it  was 
but   natural    that    those   who    attached 

99 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

great  importance  to  the  mechanical  the- 
ory of  the  universe  and  the  perfect  order- 
liness of  its  workings,  should  find  them- 
selves inclined  to  discredit  revealed 
religion.  The  Enlightenment  favored 
rather  ''natural  religion"  and  "natural 
theology,"  which  argued  glibly  from  the 
constitution  of  nature  to  the  existence  of 
God,  but  realized  no  present  and  vital 
connection  between  God  and  the  world. 
This  is  the  stage  of  the  development  to 
which  the  name  Deism  most  accurately 
applies.  This  was  the  stage  at  which 
in  general  English  deistic  thought 
stopped,  but  it  stopped  only  when  it  be- 
came evident  that  to  go  farther  involved 
the  final  plunge  into  atheism. 

It  was  Hume,  skeptic  though  he  was, 
and  by  the  very  fact  of  his  skepticism, 
who  brought  Deism  to  its  culmination 
and  thereby  wrought  its  overthrow. 
The  destruction  of  the  rational  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God  as  con- 
ceived by  all  thinkers  of  this  time,  on 
the  lyockian  basis,  left  no  stopping  point 
short  of  rejection  of  belief  in  God,  which 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

might  be  atheism  or  might  be  only 
agnosticism.  I^ogical  rigidity  is  not  the 
prevailing  characteristic  of  English  phi- 
losophy in  general,  and  in  this  case 
practical  considerations  outweighed  the 
desire  for  consistency.  It  had  been 
shown  through  the  development  of 
I,ocke's  theory  of  knowledge  into  skep- 
ticism, and  through  the  application  of 
this  to  science  and  to  religion,  that  upon 
this  philosophical  basis  there  could  be 
no  outcome  except  a  purely  negative 
one.  There  seemed  to  be  no  other  basis 
to  fall  back  upon.  But,  whether  logical 
or  not,  the  English  mind  refuses  to  rest 
in  negation.  There  must  be  a  recon- 
struction of  some  sort  to  meet  the  prac- 
tical demands  of  life.  The  Scottish 
philosophy  of  Reid  and  his  successors 
had  been  an  attempt  at  this,  practically 
useful  in  many  ways  but  theoretically  a 
failure.  The  other  attempt  to  avoid  the 
issue  in  pure  negation  came  through  the 
ethical  thought  of  the  century. 

4.     The  development  of  moral  philoso- 
phy  in  the   eighteenth   ce;itury   was   a 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

struggle  for  the  independence  of  ethics, 
as  Deism  was  a  struggle  for  independ- 
ence of  religion.  Hobbes  had  aimed  to 
emancipate  morals  from  ecclesiastical 
domination  by  giving  Right  a  different 
definition  than  that  which  had  been 
commonly  accepted,  namely,  the  will  of 
God.  But  he  effected  merely  an  ex- 
change of  masters,  for  in  freeing  ethics 
from  the  control  of  religion,  he  subjected 
it  to  the  state.  The  individual  has  sur- 
rendered his  rights  to  the  sovereign,  and 
henceforth  the  will  of  the  sovereign  con- 
stitutes the  right  and  disobedience  to  the 
sovereign  constitutes  wrong.  Even  here 
there  is  an  implicit  ethical  individual- 
ism, for  the  original  source  for  the  sover- 
eign's authority  to  declare  what  is  right 
is  in  the  individuals  who  have  surren- 
dered their  rights  to  him.  The  course 
of  ethical  thought  during  the  century 
had  for  its  aim  the  discovery  of  a  system 
in  which  the  individual  man  would  be 
not  only  the  source  but  the  unit  of  all 
moral  judgments. 

lyocke  himself  laid  strong  emphasis  on 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

the  conception  of  law  as  constituting  the 
authority  in  morals,  but  the  enforcement 
of  the  law,  whether  of  God,  the  state,  or 
public  opinion,  depends  on  the  individ- 
ual's anticipation  of  pleasure  or  pain  to 
be  derived  from  the  contemplated  course 
of  action.  A  sensational  theory  of 
knowledge  is  naturally  and  logically  ac- 
companied by  a  hedonistic  theory  of  eth- 
ics, and  in  so  far  I^ocke's  ethical  theory 
was  the  logical  outcome  of  his  philoso- 
phy. The  same  feature  is  seen  through- 
out the  century  in  varying  forms  in 
various  ethical  systems.  The  return  is 
always  to  the  individual.  His  pains  and 
his  pleasures  are  the  ultimate  source  of 
ethical  control.  With  Shaftesbury,  this 
individualism  appears  in  its  least  objec- 
tionable form,  disguised  by  a  halo  of 
*  ^enthusiasm  for  society";  but  even  here 
there  is  still  an  individualistic  reference 
in  the  final  insistence  upon  this  enthusi- 
asm for  society  as  not  really  an  end  in 
itself,  but  as  a  means  whereby  the  indi- 
vidual will  attain  his  highest  happiness. 

At  the  same  time,  Shaftesbury  criticises 
103 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

positive  Christianity  on  the  ground  that 
it  degrades  virtue  by  making  it  the  price 
of  future  eternal  happiness.  Yet  his  own 
system,  when  rigidly  interpreted,  simply 
substitutes  present  and  immediate  hap- 
piness for  a  far-away  state  of  eternal 
bliss  as  the  reward  for  virtue.  Hume 
was  a  thorough  and  outspoken  empiricist 
in  morals,  making  all  conduct  depend 
upon  the  passions,  which  operate  me- 
chanically under  the  stimuli  of  pleasure 
and  pain.  Passing  over  the  numerous 
other  representatives  of  this  classical 
period  of  English  ethical  theory,  who, 
in  varying  degree  and  in  various  forms, 
give  expression  to  these  same  principles 
of  hedonism  as  the  motive  and  sensation- 
alism as  the  means  of  apprehending  eth- 
ical ideas,  all  of  which  is  traceable  back 
to  lyocke — we  may  mention,  finally, 
Paley  as  the  culmination  of  the  whole 
movement. 

Paley 's  ethical  system  can  be  con- 
densed into  a  single  sentence.  It  is:  to 
do  good  to  one's  neighbor,  in  obedience 

to  the  will  of  God,   in  the  hope  of  an 
104 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

eternal  reward.  The  elements  of  this 
are  so  apparent  that  it  scarcely  needs 
analysis:  the  revealed  will  of  God  as  au- 
thority in  ethics,  and  a  thorough  utilitari- 
anism, the  content  of  which  is  benevo- 
lent action,  but  the  motive  to  which  is 
unadulterated  egoism.  Such  a  system  as 
this  might  satisfy  the  practical  demands 
for  some  sort  of  control  of  conduct.  In 
a  transition  stage,  when  the  philosoph- 
ical basis  was  being  proved  adequate, 
this  might  be  useful  as  an  expression  of 
the  common-sense  of  mankind  as  applied 
to  the  problems  of  conduct.  It  is  an 
ethics  of  good  order,  good  citizenship 
and  general  respectability,  and  is  such  a 
system  as  might  naturally  be  formulated 
by  a  man  of  the  world  intent  only  on 
laying  down  practical  rules  for  the  con- 
trol of  overt  acts.  The  trouble  with  it 
was  that  the  element  of  morality  was 
lacking,  just  as  the  element  of  religion 
was  lacking  in  the  final  outcome  of 
deistic  thought  which  had  started  in  to 
reduce  religion  to  its  essential  elements. 

In  both  cases,  the  most  essential  element, 
105 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

the  very  essence  itself,  had  been  elimi- 
nated. 

The  difference  between  the  two  was 
that  while  irreligious  deism  obviously 
led  the  way  to  all  kinds  of  negative  and 
destructive  thought,  the  non-moral  ethics 
of  egoistic  hedonism  appeared  to  lead  to 
nothing  worse  than  itself,  and  to  be  in 
itself  a  system  which,  if  not  theoret- 
ically admirable,  was  at  least  practically 
workable.  It  was  the  ethics  of  Paley 
which  was  dominant  in  all  English  and 
American  universities  at  the  beginning 
of  the  present  century,  and  which  is 
most  thoroughly  representative  of  the 
condition  of  ethical  theory  at  that  time. 

These  are  the  general  features  of  the 
philosophical  movements  of  the  eight- 
eenth century;  a  theory  of  knowledge, 
at  the  beginning  individualistic  and  sen- 
sationalist ic,  and  at  the  end  skeptical, 
not  to  say  agnostic;  an  application  of 
this  to  natural  science  resulting  in  a 
rigidly  mechanical  explanation  of  all 
phenomena,    both  material  and  mental; 

an  application  to  religion,  ending  in  the 
1 06 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

destruction  of  religion  upon  the  accepted 
presuppositions;   an  application  to  ethics 
to  solve  the  problem — given  an  individ- 
ual as  defined  by  I^ocke,  how  can  you 
get   him    into    working   relations    with 
others   so   as  to  form  society,  and   how 
explain   and    validate   the   laws    which 
govern  his  conduct  as  a  member  of  so- 
ciety ? — ending  in  an  egoistic  utilitarian- 
ism from  which  the  element  of  morality 
was  excluded.       The  general  aspect   of 
the  field  is  not  a  pleasing  one,  and  the 
positive  results  seem   to   be   slight  and 
valueless.     They  are  to  be  valued  rather 
as  a  process  of  clearing  the  ground  and 
of  getting  the  problem  more  definitely 
present    in   consciousness.       Obviously, 
the  philosophical   need   was  for   a   new 
conception    of     the    individual    which 
might  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  ethics,  religion  and  science,  such 
as   was   impossible   upon   the    basis    of 
lyocke's  philosophy. 

It    may  be   proper  here  to   consider 
briefly  the  points  of  contact  which  ap- 
pear between   Mr.    Campbell's   thought 
107 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

and  the  philosophy  of  the  Enlighten- 
ment as  we  have  here  outlined  it.  It  is 
important  to  observe  in  the  first  place, 
that  he  read  lyocke's  works  early  in  life, 
adopted  his  system  of  philosophy,  and 
ever  afterward  continued  to  hold  it.  His 
biographer,  Richardson,  says  that  even 
before  he  entered  the  University,  ^'he 
learned  greatly  to  admire  the  character 
and  works  of  John  Locke,  whose  lyctters 
on  Toleration  seem  to  have  fixed  his 
ideas  of  religious  and  of  civil  liberty." 
At  the  same  time  he  studied  also  the 
Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  and 
made  the  theory  which  it  presents  the 
basis  of  all  his  future  philosophizing. 

As  for  Mr.  Campbell's  relation  to  the 
philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
we  can  say  that  he  reacted  against  the 
results  which  it  developed,  but  accepted 
in  the  main  the  principles  upon  which 
it  was  based.  His  method,  therefore, 
in  so  far  as  he  had  a  philosophical 
method  in  his  thinking,  was  the  method 
of  the  Enlightenment.  This  character- 
istic he  had  in  common  with  most  of 
1 08 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

the  theologians  and  apologists  of  His 
time  and  of  the  generation  or  two  pre- 
ceding, who  tried  to  stem  the  tide  of  in- 
fidelity and  skepticism  which  came  with 
the  development  of  Deism.  This  double 
attitude,  the  rejection  of  the  results  and 
the  acceptance  of  the  method,  is  shown 
in  his  attitude  toward  Deism  and  the 
criticisms  which  he  passes  upon  it. 
Speaking  of  the  reliance  of  the  deists 
upon  pure  reason,  and  their  considera- 
tion of  this  as  sufficient  to  account  for 
natural  religion,  he  refers  to  ^'the  ac- 
knowledged principles  of  lyocke'^  as 
contradicting  them.  Again  he  says: 
**Are  not  all  of  our  ideas  the  result  of 
sensation  and  reflection?"  (^Christian 
Baptist^  p.  271). 

It  was  the  inconsistency  of  the  deists, 
in  accepting  lyocke's  theory  of  knowl- 
edge and  then  claiming  to  be  able  to 
know  God  by  the  reason,  which  especial- 
ly called  forth  his  criticism.  "These 
truths,  then,  (God,  human  soul,  heaven, 
etc.,)  however  deists  may  boast,  are  all 

borrowed  from  the  Bible,  hence  there  is 
109 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

not  a  rational  deist  in  the  universe.  .  . 
They  are  the  poorest,  driveling  philoso- 
phers that  ever  assumed  the  name." 
Again:  "Either  unqualified  atheism,  or 
faith  in  Jesus  as  the  Son  of  God  {i.  e.^ 
knowledge  of  spiritual  things  through 
revelation)  are  the  legitimate  stopping 
places  on  principles  of  sound  reasoning 
and  good  logic.  All  that  halt  between 
these  extremes  are  besotted  with  brutish 
stupidity.  The  ox  and  the  ass  are  their 
reprovers." 

This  is  precisely  in  line  with  what 
Hume  and  the  French  exponents  of  nat- 
uralism had  shown,  that,  given  such  a 
reason  as  lay  at  the  basis  of  lyocke's 
system,  and  the  principles  of  sound  rea- 
soning and  good  logic  will  not  allow  one 
to  stop  short  of  the  final  abyss  of  athe- 
ism. This  result,  which  had  been  ac- 
cepted as  final  by  such  Frenchmen  as 
Diderot  and  D'Alembert,  was  for  Camp- 
bell only  a  reditctio  ad  absurdum^  so  a 
fresh  start  must  be  taken  to  avoid  this 
downward  path.  The  start  is  made 
again  with     Locke,  but    the    principles 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

which  lyocke  laid  down  as  to  the  limita- 
tion of  knowledge  are  now  applied  sub- 
ject to  an  important  condition.  It  is  not 
all  knowledge  that  comes  from  sensation 
and  reflection,  but  only  knowledge  of 
natural  or  material  things.  It  is  seen, 
therefore,  that  there  is  a  division  in  the 
field  of  knowledge.  Natural  things, 
such  as  have  impressions  corresponding 
to  them,  are  known  through  ordinary 
sensation;  spiritual  things  are  known 
only  by  divine  revelation.  Revelation, 
to  be  sure,  operates  through  the  senses, 
but  it  opens  up  to  the  senses  a  field 
which  is  entirely  closed  to  the  natural 
reason. 

In  general,  on  the  application  of  phil- 
osophical method  in  religion  and  theol- 
ogy, Campbell  was  averse  to  speculation, 
just  as  the  philosophy  of  the  Knlighten- 
ment  had  been  averse  to  speculation  and 
had  rather  pinned  its  faith  to  the  ob- 
servation of  fact  and  the  noting  of  the 
items  of  sensuous  experience.  He  says: 
* 'Speculation  in  philosophy  has  been 
widely  discarded  from  approved  systems. 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

Since  the  days  of  Bacon,  our  scientific 
men  have  adopted  the  practical  and  truly 
scientific  mode — that  is,  they  have 
stopped  where  human  intellect  found  a 
bound  over  which  it  could  not  pass,  and 
have  been  content  to  go  no  farther  than 
material  objects,  analyzed,  gave  out 
their  qualities  and  left  the  manner  of 
their  existence  as  beyond  the  bounds  of 
created  intellect.  We  plead  for  the 
same  principle  in  the  contemplation  of 
religious  truth.  .  .  So  religious  truth 
is  to  be  deduced  from  the  revelations 
which  the  Deity  has  been  pleased  to  give 
toman."  Here  it  will  be  observed  that 
it  is  taken  for  granted  that  the  inductive 
method  of  Bacon  and  the  lyockian  theo- 
ry of  knowledge  are  the  end  and  con- 
summation of  philosophical  method. 

Closely  connected  with  this  horror  of 
speculation  is  Mr.  Campbell's  conviction 
of  the  worthlessness  of  creeds  for  relig- 
ious and  ecclesiastical  life,  since  they  are 
concerned,  not  with  the  actual  and  vital 
facts  of  religion,  but  with  the  deduction 
of  theories  about  those  facts.     This,  he 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

says,  is  an  intrusion  of  the  puny  powers 
of  man's  intellect  into  a  realm  which  it 
is  not  competent  to  handle,  and  concern- 
ing which  it  has  not  pleased  God  to  re- 
veal to  us  the  reality. 

So  much  for  the  similarity  of  Mr. 
Campbell's  general  point  of  view  and 
method  to  the  method  of  I^ocke's  philos- 
ophy. When  we  come  to  the  consider- 
ation of  his  particular  doctrines,  it  will 
appear  that  the  influence  of  the  I^ockian 
philosophy  is  no  less  marked  in  the  de- 
tails than  in  the  general  character  of  his 
thought.  Aside  from  the  points  of  con- 
tact which  have  already  been  noted, 
there  may  be  mentioned  here  in  a  pre- 
liminary way,  three  particulars  in  which 
this  influence  of  the  philosophical  pre- 
supposition is  especially  apparent :  i . 
The  limitation  of  man's  natural  knowl- 
edge to  sensuous  things  and  the  entire 
dependence  upon  revelation  for  knowl- 
edge of  God  and  spiritual  things  gener- 
ally, with  which  is  connected  his  view 
of   inspiration   and   authority,    and    the 

,way   in    which    these    act   upon    men. 
8  113 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

2.  The  nature  of  faith  and  its  relation  to 
repentance,  involving  the  general  ques- 
tion of  the  relation  of  the  intellect  to 
the  will.  3.  The  nature  and  instruments 
of  conversion,  especially  the  doctrine  of 
the   influence   of   the   Holy  Spirit  only 

through  the  written  Word. 
114 


Chapter  III 
Theological  Heritage 


THEOIvOGICAI.  HERITAGE. 

I.    Theoi^ogy  of  the;  Eni.ightenmknt: 

1.  Deism  and  orthodox  apologetics. 

2.  Character  of  triumphant  orthodoxy. 

II.    Defects  of  Scholastic  Cai^vinism: 

1.  lyacked  idea  of  development. 

2.  Used  the  Bible  unintelligently. 

3.  Failed  to  recognize  individual  responsibility, 

III.  Covenant    Theology    Supplied     These 

Defects: 

1.  Distinction  between  dispensations. 

2.  New  method  of  exegesis. 

3.  Covenant  idea — man's  part  in  salvation. 

IV.  Influence  of  Covenant  Theology: 

1.  In  Holland — never  became  a  sect. 

2.  In     England — Neonomians     and     Antino- 

mians. 

3.  In   Scotland — relaxation   of    Calvinism    in 

established     church ;     dispensation     idea 
among  Seceders. 

V.    Influence  on  Campbell: 

1.  His  contact  with  it. 

2.  Points  of  similarity. 

3.  His  attitude  toward  his  sources. 

VI.    Summary  of   Philosophical   and  Theo- 
logical Influences. 

ii6 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE. 

Two  streams  of  influence  united  to 
determine  the  theology  of  the  latter  part 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  First,  the 
theology  of  the  English  Enlightenment, 
based  directly  on  the  principles  of 
Locke's  philosophy  and  finding  its  chief 
activity  in  defending  Christianity  against 
the  assaults  of  Deism;  a  theology  which 
ran  largely  to  apologetics,  which  had  at 
its  core  the  Puritan  conception  of  a 
transcendent  God,  which  laid  emphasis 
chiefly  upon  God's  activity  as  a  creative 
intelligence  who  made  the  universe  in 
the  beginning  and  whose  existence  can 
be  demonstrated  by  arguments  drawn 
from  the  constitution  of  nature;  a  the- 
ology which,  while  it  held  the  Bible  in 
almost  superstitious  reverence,  gloried 
especially  in  its  ability  to  prove,  by  the 
arguments  of  natural  theology,  the  rea- 
sonableness of  Christianity  as  delivered 
117 


ALEXAXDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

in  the  Scriptures.  Second,  a  line  of 
theological  development  which  had  its 
origin  on  the  continent,  partly  in  the 
warfare  of  Scholastic  Protestantism  in 
the  attack  and  defense  of  Calvinism,  and 
partly  in  the  reaction  against  the  condi- 
tions which  that  warfare  produced. 

The  philosophy  of  Locke  was  as 
determinative  for  English  theology  in 
the  eighteenth  century  as  it  was  for  the 
strictly  philosophical  thought  of  the 
same  period.  The  emancipation  of  phi- 
losophy from  its  mediaeval  bondage  to 
the  church  and  to  theology  had  made, 
with  Descartes,  the  beginning  of  a  new 
epoch  in  philosophy.  Casting  aside  the 
mass  of  traditions,  ecclesiastical  dogmas 
and  received  beliefs  with  which  every 
speculator  was  supposed  to  begin,  Des- 
cartes proposed  to  start  from  the  stand- 
point of  a  doubt  as  nearl}^  universal  as 
possible.  Naturally  the  doubt  extended 
itself  to  the  sphere  of  theology  and  to 
the  fundamental  truths  of  religion,  and 
the  individual    doubter   did  not    ahvays 

mount   up  from  the  depths  of  his  doubt 
iiS 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

on  the  wings  of  a  higher  certainty,  with 
as  great  facility  as  the  originator  of  the 
method  had  done.  The  relation  of 
dependence  between  philosophy  and 
theology  was  reversed,  and  "rational 
theology"  came  into  favor. 

lyocke's  philosophy  was  epoch  mak- 
ing, as  we  have  seen,  because  it  sowed 
the  seeds  for  a  negative  development  in 
all  the  departments  of  thought  to  which 
it  was  applied.  As  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  metaphysics  and  ethics,  so  in 
theology.  The  deistic  movement,  which 
was  noticed  in  the  preceding  chapter 
on  the  eighteenth  century  philosophy, 
might,  with  equal  appropriateness  have 
been  classed  here,  for  Deism  was  one 
side  of  the  theology  of  the  Enlight- 
enment. It  was  that  side  which  pro- 
fessed to  find  in  the  current  philosophy 
a  basis  for  rational  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  God  and  the  moral  order  of  the 
world,  entirely  apart  from  any  super- 
natural revelation,  but  did  not  find  any 
rational  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  Chris- 
tian revelation. 

no 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

The  other  side  of  the  theology  of  the 
Enlightenment  was  represented  by  the 
apologists  for  positive  Christianity. 
Both  the  deists  and  the  apologists  pro- 
ceeded upon  the  principles  of  the  Az(f- 
klarimg^  the  yearning  after  clearness  and 
exactness  of  knowledge,  proofs,  demon- 
strations and  explanations.  Both  made 
their  appeal  to  the  constitution  of  nature 
as  the  foundation  of  man's  knowledge 
of  God,  and  both  based  their  knowledge 
of  nature  upon  the  testimony  of  the 
senses.  The  idea  of  God,  which  is  the 
real  measure  of  any  theology,  was  much 
the  same  with  both  deists  and  apolo- 
gists. Both  conceived  of  God  as  a  crea- 
tive intelligence  who  had  been  present 
and  active  at  the  formation  of  the 
world,  and  had  then  turned  it  over  to 
the  operation  of  natural  law  and  had 
retired  into  infinite  space.  Any  subse- 
quent return  of  God  to  reveal  himself  or 
control  the  course  of  affairs  on  earth,  is 
really  an  interruption  of  the  normal 
and  orderly  operation  of  natural  laws. 
The  deists  maintained  that  it  could  not 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

be  proved  that  such,  interruptions  had 
ever  occurred;  the  apologists  maintained 
that  it  could. 

The  struggle  which  ensued  between 
these  two  positions  was  a  battle  of 
giants.  It  dwarfed  into  significance 
every  other  theological  controversy  of 
the  time.  The  deists  were  at  the  ob- 
vious disadvantage  of  being  attacked  in 
both  front  and  rear.  The  apologists  as- 
serted that  more  could  be  proved  than 
they  were  willing  to  admit,  while  the 
followers  of  Hume  and  the  representa- 
tives of  French  Naturalism  maintained 
that  not  even  the  existence  of  God  could 
be  established  on  the  basis  of  sensation- 
alism which  they  all  occupied.  The 
deists  were  on  a  slippery  incline,  the 
tendency  of  which  was  constantly  to 
precipitate  them  to  lower  depths.  In 
the  heat  of  the  conflict  they  were  forced 
to  occupy  lower  and  lower  ground,  i,  e.^ 
to  carry  their  own  presuppositions  nearer 
to  their  logical  conclusion  to  get  firm 
ground  beneath  their  feet,  and  their 
position  thereby  became  the  more  repul- 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

sive  to  the  conservative  English  mind, 
which  cares  more  for  results  than  for 
logic.  Yet  there  was  an  important 
branch  of  Deism  in  England  which  long 
continued  to  be  the  supporter  of  prac- 
tical righteousness.  Even  after  the  re- 
diictio  ad  absurdiun  in  sheer  atheism,  it 
shared  the  conservatism  of  its  opponents 
who  were  willing  to  sacrifice  logical 
consistency  to  the  interests  of  religion 
and  morality.  So  its  adherents  clung 
to  their  shadowy  idea  of  a  far-away  God 
who  will  in  some  undefined  way  be  hon- 
ored by  a  virtuous  life,  and  will  by  some 
equally  mysterious  means  reward  right- 
eousness and  punish  sin.  It  reduced  it- 
self practically  to  the  teaching  of  pure 
morality.  So  considered,  it  compared 
favorably  with  the  intolerance  of  self- 
styled  orthodoxy  and  the  war  of  creeds 
and  confessions  which  went  on  about 
it  with  no  more  of  either  ethics  or  relig- 
ion than  it  had  itself.  The  cause  of  tol- 
eration and  the  movements  of  philan- 
thropy were  advanced  through  its  minis- 
trations more  than  through  those  of  the 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

orthodox.  But  with  all  its  virtues  it 
was  not  religion.  It  had  lost  the  depth 
of  religious  life  and  had  become  a  pol- 
ished, urbane,  cultured,  humane,  ethical 
system.  It  was  a  credit  to  the  society 
and  the  civilization  which  produced  it, 
but  it  was  not  a  religion. 

When  the  apologists  had  done  their 
work,  when  Butler  had  hurled  the  thun- 
derbolts of  his  Analogy  of  Religion  and 
Paley  his  Evidences  of  Christianity 
against  Deism,  it  was  generally  con- 
ceded that  the  victory  rested  with  the 
orthodox,  by  the  combined  force  of 
scholarship,  conservatism  and  piety. 
The  apologists  had  started  out  to  prove 
that  it  is  more  reasonable  to  believe  in  a 
God  who  comes  into  his  world  occasion- 
ally to  direct  events  and  provide  for  the 
future  happiness  of  the  faithful,  than  to 
believe  in  a  God  who  has  had  nothingf  to 
do  with  the  world  since  its  creation  ex- 
cept to  sit  afar  off  and  watch  it  go.  The 
consensus  of  opinion  was  that  they  had 
proved  it,  and  that  phase  of  unbelief 
was  thenceforth  not  to  be  feared. 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

But,  as  is  shown  by  the  history  of  all 
doctrinal  controversies,  and  nowhere 
more  clearly  than  here,  the  hand  of 
the  theologian,  like  that  of  the  dyer, 
is  subdued  to  what  it  works  in.  When 
Deism  had  been  overthrown,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  orthodoxy,  in  overthrowing 
it,  had  become  like  it.  Its  God  was  far 
off.  It  found  the  sanctions  of  religion 
and  morality  alike  in  egoistic  utilitari- 
anism. It  was  cold,  hard,  rigid  and 
dead.  The  established  church  was  in 
an  especially  unhappy  condition.  There 
was  need  for  a  revival  of  both  religion 
and  theology.  The  revival  of  religion 
came  with  the  Wesleyan  and  Evangel- 
ical revival.  The  renaissance  of  the- 
ology did  not  come  until  much  later, 
and  English  theologians  faced  the  nine- 
teenth century  with  a  system  of  doctrine 
which  had  done  honorable  service  but 
had  already  exhibited  its  defects. 

Turning  to  the  continent  to  trace  the 
genesis  of  the  second  general  line  of 
theological  influence,  it  is  necessary  to 

go  back   to  the  period   immediately  fol- 

124 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

lowing  the  Reformation,  the  period 
which  has  been  designated  as  the  age  of 
Protestant  Scholasticism,  and  which 
might  be  called  the  age  of  scholastic 
Calvinism.  Certain  characteristics  which 
were  inherent  in  the  nature  of  Calvinism 
constituted  the  need  for  the  introduction 
of  a  new  principle  in  theology.  Fore- 
most among  these  may  be  mentioned  the 
lack  of  the  historic  sense.  There  was, 
even  in  the  mind  of  Calvin  himself,  and 
still  more  conspicuously  in  his  immediate 
successors,  a  total  failure  to  grasp  the 
idea  of  development,  whereby  it  may  be 
possible  for  God  to  change  his  methods 
of  dealing  with  men  as  the  needs  of  men 
change.  The  lack  of  this  simple  con- 
ception (which  has  been  absent  much 
more  than  it  has  been  present  in  the  his- 
tory of  Christian  thought)  made  it  nec- 
essary to  insist  upon  the  immutability 
of  the  divine  decrees,  upon  the  prede- 
termination of  every  individual's  salva- 
tion or  damnation  from  all  eternity, 
upon   the    substantial   identity    of     the 

method  of  salvation  and  of  the  revela- 
125 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'  S  THEOLOGY 

tion  of  God  as  set  forth  in  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments.  For  God  to  deter- 
mine upon  the  salvation  of  a  righteous 
man  without  having  determined  it  be- 
fore all  ages,  would  be  for  God  to  change 
his  mind;  and  that  would  be  inconsist- 
ent with  his  character  as  the  Eternal 
One.  For  God  to  establish  one  method 
of  salvation  for  one  age,  and  another 
for  a  later  age,  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  changelessness  which  must 
mark  the  divine  character. 

Growing  immediately  out  of  this  ab- 
sence of  the  idea  of  development,  was  a 
forced  and  mechanical  use  of  Scripture. 
The  war  among  Protestant  dogmatists 
had  quickly  driven  them  to  the  assertion 
of  the  verbal  inspiration  and  absolute 
inerrancy  of  Scripture.  This  was  an  in- 
creased emphasis  upon  the  formal  prin- 
ciple of  I^rotestantism — the  authority  of 
the  Bible — and  it  was  accompanied  by 
a  grossly  mechanical  view  of  the  nature 
of  the  Scriptures  and  the.  sort  of  author- 
ity which  they  are  to  exercise.     Since 

no  distinction  was  made  between  differ- 
126 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

ent  periods  of  God's  dealings  with  men, 
or  different  dispensations,  all   books  of 
the  Bible  were  used  indiscriminately  as 
**arsenalsof  proof-texts'*  from  whicb  to 
draw  weapons  for  the  war  against  theo- 
logical  adversaries.      One   of   the   very 
first  effects  of  the  rise  of  doctrinal  differ- 
ences in  Protestantism  was  this  abuse  of 
the  Bible  under  the  plea  of  exalting  it 
as  the  sole   authority.       The   theory  of 
verbal  inspiration  was  the  last  resource 
of  dogmatic  and  divided  Protestantism, 
when   each    sect   was    trying   to    unite 
Christendom  on  the  basis  of  its  own  com- 
plete  theological   system.     The  misuse 
of  Scripture   was  most   flagrant   among 
Calvinistic   champions    of    the    second 
generation. 

As  a  third  defect  of  Calvinism  may  be 
mentioned  the  fact  that  its  most  essen- 
tial doctrines  were  based  on  a  conception 
of  man  which  was  being  undermined  by 
the  development  of  individualism.  As 
the  sense  of  race  unity  became  weaker 
and   the   worth   of    the   individual  was 

more  distinctly  affirmed,  such  doctrines 

127 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

as  that  of  inherited  original  sin,  in  all 
its  Calvinistic  rigors,  became  difficult  to 
explain  and  defend  satisfactorily.  Even 
where  the  far-reaching  consequences  of 
Adam's  sin  were  not  categorically  de- 
nied, it  was  impossible  for  the  Fall  and 
the  inherited  sin  of  the  race  to  occupy 
such  an  important  place  in  the  thought 
of  those  who  were  imbued  with  the  mod- 
ern idea  of  the  freedom  and  responsibil- 
ity of  the  individual.  The  demand  was 
for  an  anthropology  and  a  soteriology 
which  would  leave  more  scope  for  each 
man  to  work  out  his  own  salvation. 
Romanism  had  proposed  to  save  men  en 
masse  in  the  church.  Calvinism  re- 
sponded to  the  individualizing  tendency 
of  the  age  so  far  as  to  propose  to  save  a 
few  men  in  detail,  but  without  their 
active  co-operation.  The  doctrines  of 
the  fall  of  all  men  in  Adam  and  the 
atonement  by  the  death  of  Christ  were 
too  firmly  fixed  to  be  removed,  but  there 
was  a  need  for  an  interpretation  of  them 
which  would  be  more  defensible  by  giving 

fuller  recognition  to  the  worth  of  the  in- 
128 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

dividual  and  the  importance  of  the  part 
which  he  must  play  in  the  process  of 
his  own  salvation.  In  other  words,  the 
spirit  of  the  times  demanded  a  doctrine 
of  salvation  which  would  tell  each  man 
what  to  do  to  be  saved.  Calvinism  did 
not  do  that. 

The  various  defections  from  strict  Cal- 
vinism in  the  sixteenth  century  and  the 
early  part  of  the  seventeenth,  were  in 
part  attempts  to  remedy  these  defects. 
Arminianism,  the  most  formidable  of 
these  revolts,  was  fairly  successful  in 
emphasizing  the  man-ward  side  of  the 
process  of  salvation  and  gave  some  stim- 
ulus to  a  more  reasonable  method  of 
using  the  Bible,  but  it  contributed  little 
toward  the  idea  of  development,  with- 
out which  there  could  be  no  rational 
method  of  exegesis  and  no  satisfactory 
escape  from  the  rigors  of  Calvinism. 

Of  the  several  movements  having  this 
end  more  or  less  consciously  in  view,  the 
one  which  most  completely  met  the  re- 
quirements, and  the  one  which,   by  its 

subsequent  line  of  influence,  is  most  im- 
9  129 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

portant  for  the  present  consideration,  is 
the  Covenant  or  Federal  Theology  under 
the  leadership  of  the  Dutch  theologians, 
Cocceius  and  Witsius.  Cocceius  was  a 
professor  of  theology  at  the  University 
of  Leyden,  where  he  died  in  1669.  In 
the  system  which  he  formulated  there 
were  valuable  contributions  to  each  of 
these  three  points  in  which  Calvinism 
was  defective :  the  idea  of  development, 
or  the  history  of  the  plan  of  salvation;  a 
more  satisfactory,  and  fruitful  method  of 
exegesis,  growing  out  of  the  application 
of  the  distinction  between  the  dispensa- 
tions to  the  Bible;  and  a  view  of  the  re- 
lation between  God  and  man  which  at- 
tached much  importance  to  human  ac- 
tivity in  salvation. 

The  idea  of  develop7neitt  of  the  plan 
of  salvation  was  simply  the  conception 
which  the  apostle  Paul  had  in  mind 
when  he  maintained  that  the  Old  Testa- 
ment law  was  from  God  and  had  been 
binding,  but  was  now  done  away.  Sim- 
ple as  this  idea  appears,  it  was  lost  sight 

of  almost  immediately  in  the  post-apos- 

130 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

tolic  age.  For  lack  of  this  idea,  Jews 
and  some  Jewish  Christians  (Ebionites) 
insisted  that  the  law  must  be  perpetually 
binding,  since  it  is  from  God.  Gnostics 
found  it  necessary  to  deny  that  the  Old 
Testament  had  ever  been  binding,  in 
order  to  escape  the  obligation  to  keep 
the  ritual  law  now.  The  orthodox, 
equally  in  the  dark  as  to  how  they  be- 
came free  from  the  law,  excused  their 
disregard  of  it  by  elaborately  allegoriz- 
ing it.  The  Reformation  theologians, 
as  already  pointed  ont,  were  equally 
destitute  of  the  conception.  For  I^uther, 
justification  by  faith  was  a  doctrine  of 
such  overwhelming  importance  that  he 
quite  neglected  to  note  the  process  by 
which  man  had  been  educated  up  to  the 
point  where  justification  by  faith  was 
possible.  This  one  doctrine  was,  for 
him,  the  everlasting  expression  of  the 
attitude  of  God  toward  men.  The  doc- 
trine of  predestination  represented  Cal- 
vin's conception  of  the  relation  between 
God  and  men, — a  timeless  and  eternal 
relation  which  has  existed  in  all  ages. 
131 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

Both  IvUther  and  Calvin  read  their  cen- 
tral doctrines  into  the  Old  Testament  by 
any  method  of  exegesis  which  the  neces- 
sities of  the  case  seemed  to  demand. 
Since  there  were  no  Jewish  Christians 
then,  as  there  had  been  in  the  second 
century,  they  could  take  what  they 
wanted  from  the  Old  Testament  and 
there  was  no  one  to  raise  embarrassing 
questions  about  the  perpetuity  of  the 
ritual  law. 

The  first  deliberate  recognition  of  the 
truth  that  God  has  dealt  with  men  differ- 
ently at  different  times,  and  that  He  can 
give  a  command  for  a  limited  time  with- 
out compromising  the  eternity  of  His 
nature,  is  found  in  the  work  of  Hype- 
rius,  Olevianus  and  Raphael  Eglin,  all 
sixteenth  century  Calvinists  of  strict 
type.  But  this,  in  their  minds,  amounted 
to  no  more  than  a  discrimination  be- 
tween different  stages  in  the  operation 
and  ministration  of  a  divine  grace 
which  was  always  absolute  and  irresist- 
ible. It  was  Cocceius  who  first  at 
tempted  to  construct  a  complete  history 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

of  the  process  of  salvation  by  fitting  all 
the  divine  commands  and  promises  as 
contained  in  the  Scriptures,  into  a 
framework  of  successive  covenants  or 
dispensations.  On  this  basis  he  aimed 
to  construct  a  systematic,  Biblical  theol- 
ogy which  would  embrace,  not  only  the 
present  conditions  of  salvation,  but  also 
a  statement  of  the  steps  by  which  these 
conditions  were  developed. 

The  effect  of  this  conception  of  devel- 
opment upon  his  method  of  exegesis  and 
general  attitude  toward  the  Bible  was 
immediate  and  salutary.  Dornersays  of 
Cocceius  and  his  associates  that  "simple 
piety  and  an  ardent  attachment  to  Script- 
ure" were  their  leading  characteristics. 
Such  common-sense  principles  of  inter- 
pretation as  these  were  adopted:  That 
the  plain  and  obvious  meaning  of  the 
passage  is  to  be  taken;  that  words  are  to 
be  taken  in  their  ordinary  sense  in  con- 
nection with  the  context,  without  run- 
ning into  allegory  or  symbolism;  that 
books  of  the  Bible  are  to  be  considered 
in  their  historical  setting  as  connected 
133 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

wholes;  that  the  whole  Bible,  even,  is  to 
be  considered  as  a  connected  account  of 
God's  dealings  with  men,  and  can  be  in- 
terpreted only  as  the  relations  of  its  parts 
are  understood  and  observed.  The  sin- 
gle principle  which  gives  unity  to  the 
Scriptures  is  the  idea  of  the  history  of 
the  process  of  salvation  for  the  human 
race,  in  successive  dispensations,  which 
runs  through  it  all. 

These  rules  of  interpretation  seem 
commonplace  and  obvious  now.  They 
did  not  seem  so  a  century  ago,  and  in 
the  days  of  Cocceius  they  were  revolu- 
tionary. They  meant  that  the  com- 
mands of  the  Old  Testament  could  not 
be  quoted  to  sustain  any  doctrine  as  to 
the  present  means  of  salvation.  They 
meant  that  proof-texts  could  not  be 
drawn  from  I^eviticus,  Daniel  and  the 
Song  of  Songs,  and  used  on  a  par  with 
quotations  from  the  Gospel  of  John  and 
the  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  to  enforce  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity.  The  distinc- 
tion between  the  dispensations  thus  be- 
came, even  with  Cocceius,  the  key  to  a 
134 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

more  intelligent  and  discriminating  use 
of  the  Scriptures,  and  he  thus  earned  the 
title,   ^'the  father  of  modern  exegesis.'^ 

Yet  even  Cocceius  underestimated  the 
distinction  between  the  Old  and  New 
Testaments.  In  his  view,  the  great  line 
of  cleavage  was  at  the  Fall.  Before  this 
was  the  Covenant  of  Works;  after  it,  the 
various  stages  of  the  Covenant  of  Grace, 
including  the  Patriarchal,  Jewish  and 
Christian  dispensations.  But  in  spite 
of  his  making  the  abolition  of  the  law 
and  the  transition  from  the  Jewish  to  the 
Christian  dispensation  a  minor  division 
within  the  Covenant  of  Grace,  he  was 
accused  by  his  contemporaries  of  paying 
too  little  respect  to  the  Old  Testament. 
It  is  easy  to  see  how,  from  the  stand- 
point of  strict  Calvinism,  devoid  of  the 
historical  sense  which  he  possessed,  this 
criticism  might  readily  be  made. 

The  third  point  at  which  this  Cove- 
nant Theology  departed  from  Calvinism 
and  supplied  one  of  its  defects,  was  in 
conceiving  of  the  j^elation  betiveen  God 
and  man  in  a  form  which  gave  some 
135 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

adequate  scope  to  the  activity  of  man, 
without  falling  into  the  opposite  ex- 
treme of  justification  by  works.  The 
feature  of  the  theology  of  Cocceius 
which  gave  its  name  to  the  whole 
school,  was  the  conception  of  the  relation 
between  God  and  man  as  a  covenant.  It 
is  of  the  essence  of  a  covenant  that  it 
involves  the  co-operation  of  at  least  two 
parties.  A  command  which  must  be 
obeyed  simply  because  it  is  commanded 
is  not  a  covenant;  a  divine,  irresistible 
decree  is  not  a  covenant.  A  covenant 
is  an  agreement  with  two  sides. 

But  the  covenant  between  God  and 
man  is  not  in  all  respects  the  same  as  a 
covenant  between  men,  in  which  case 
the  stipulations  would  be  agreed  upon 
by  common  consent.  Here  Cocceius 
guards  against  any  infringement  of  the 
sovereignty  of  God.  Since  God  is  the 
supreme  ruler,  it  is  in  his  power  to  for- 
mulate the  conditions  of  the  covenant 
and  to  offer  it  to  men  to  be  accepted  or 
rejected. 

The  fundamental  character  of  this 
13^ 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

idea  of  covenants  with  writers  of  this 
school  may  be  judged  from  the  titles  of 
a  few  of  the  principal  works  represent- 
ing this  theology: 

Cocceius:  Summa  Doctrinae  de  Foedere  et  Tes- 
tamentis  Dei. 

Burmann:  Synopsis  Theologise  et  CEconomice 
Foederum  Dei. 

Witsiiis:  Economy  of  the  Covenants  Between 
God  and  Man. 

Moma:  De  Varia  Conditione  et  Statu  Ecclesiee 
Dei  sub  Triplici  CEconomia  Foederum  Dei. 

Braun:     Doctrina  Foederum. 

The  conception  of  a  covenant,  of  God 
and  man  entering  into  an  agreement 
with  each  other,  involves  the  idea  that 
man  has  a  definite  and  active  part  to 
perform  in  the  relationship.  The  idea 
of  pardon  and  salvation  as  offered  and 
accepted  on  certain  conditions  is  substi- 
tuted for  the  conception  of  the  absolute 
power  of  divine  grace  operating  on  a 
man  who  is  impotent  either  to  accept 
or  repel  its  advances.  Hence  it  may  be 
said  that  the  covenant  theology  lays 
stress  on  the  practical  question  regard- 
ing the  conditions  of  salvation,  the 
137 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

terms  of  the  covenant  as  viewed  from 
the  man-ward  side.  The  question, 
*'What  must  I  do  to  be  saved?"  is  not 
foreign  to  this  theology,  as  it  is  to  Cal- 
vinism. Man's  part  of  the  agreement 
constitutes  the  conditions  of  salvation; 
God's  part  constitutes  the  motives  which 
impel  men  to  enter  into  the  covenant. 

The  very  fact  of  the  practical  charac- 
ter of  this  system,  its  clear  statement  of 
what  man  must  do  and  what  he  has  a 
right  to  expect  when  he  has  done  it, 
opens  the  way  to  a  bargain-and-sale 
conception  of  religion  which  loses  the 
essential  spirit  of  true  religion.  It 
shares  this  danger  in  common  with 
every  view  of  religion  which  departs 
from  the  idea  of  sovereign  and  irresisti- 
ble divine  grace  as  the  beginning  and 
end  of  the  process  of  salvation.  If  there 
is  anything  for  man  to  do  in  the  matter, 
there  must  be  a  motive  to  lead  him  to 
do  it.  The  danger  is  that  this  motive 
will  be  expressed  in  terms  \vhich  are 
essentially  utilitarian.      It  is  possible  to 

disguise  egoistic  hedonism  in  the  pious. 
i:,8 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

garb  of  desire  for  eternal  life,  and  so  de- 
grade religion  into  a  shrewd  transaction 
on  man's  part,  whereby,  in  exchange 
for  the  surrender  of  his  present  freedom 
for  a  short  period,  he  gains  eternal  hap- 
piness. It  is  obvious  that  the  concep- 
tion of  the  relation  between  God  and 
man  as  a  covenant,  has  a  certain  affinity 
with  the  utilitarian  ethics  which  was 
developed  in  England  in  the  eighteenth 
century. 

The  idea  of  man's  relation  to  God 
as  a  covenant  may  be  considered  as  an 
application  of  the  "social  contract"  the- 
ory to  theology.  The  theory  of  the  ori- 
gin of  government  by  the  social  contract, 
starts  with  the  hypothesis  not  only  that 
the  individual  man  is  the  unit  of  value 
in  government,  but  also  that  there  was 
actually  a  time  when  men  existed  as 
unsocial  individuals  with  no  govern- 
mental bonds,  and  that  human  govern- 
ment arose  by  the  formation  of  a  con- 
tract, whereby  each  individual  surren- 
dered some  of  his  rights  in  return  for  the 
benefits  of  association.  When  this  the- 
139 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

ory  was  used  for  the  defense  of  mon- 
archy, it  was  said  that  the  contract  had 
been  between  the  subjects  and  the  ruler, 
whereby  the  subjects  conferred  upon  the 
ruler  the  right  which  each  man  had 
had  to  control  himself.  This  was  the 
form  which  it  took  with  Hobbes. 
When  it  was  used  to  support  democracy, 
it  was  maintained,  as  by  Rosseau,  that 
the  contract  was  primarily  between  the 
various  individuals  who  composed  the 
state,  and  that  they  could  recall  their 
concessions  and  destroy  the  authority  of 
the  government  whenever  it  ceased  to 
operate  to  their  satisfaction.  Thus  the 
social  contract  theory  was  made  to  up- 
hold the  divine  right  of  kings  or  the 
right  of  revolution,  according  as  it  was 
interpreted. 

In  its  application  to  the  relation  be- 
tween God  and  man,  the  tendency  was 
of  necessity  toward  the  former  interpre- 
tation. Since  the  parties  to  the  con- 
tract are  not  on  an  equal  footing,  God 
lays  down  the  terms  of  association  and  it 

is    for   man   to    accept    or   reject   them. 
140 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

The  advocates  of  the  governmental  so- 
cial contract  theory  made  the  unsocial 
individual  the  unit  of  the  whole  system. 
Some,  like  Hobbes,  maintained  that 
there  was  no  law  of  rigrht  and  wrono-  be- 
fore  the  contract,  and  that  therefore  all 
law  and  all  right  after  the  contract  de- 
pended on  the  will  of  the  sovereign. 
Others,  like  Hugo  Grotius,  maintained  a 
distinction  between  two  kinds  of  law. 
Natural  law  exists  from  the  beginning 
in  the  very  nature  of  man  and  is  depend- 
ent upon  no  contract;  positive  or  statu- 
tory law  comes  into  being  with  the  rise 
of  government  through  the  social  con- 
tract. Grotius  was  not  only  the  great- 
est jurist  of  his  age,  but  an  Arminian 
theologian  who  adhered  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  covenants  as  strongly  as  to  the 
social  contract  theory.  Accordingly,  he 
recognized  two  kinds  of  divine  law  for 
men  who  are  under  the  covenant,  just  as 
there  are  two  kinds  of  human  law  for 
men  who  are  under  the  social  contract. 
There  are  7Jioral  precepts  which  are  de- 
termined by  the  nature  of  God  and 
141 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

could  not  conceivably  be  other  than 
they  are;  and  there  are  positive  precepts 
which  represent  the  requirements  which 
God  has  arbitrarily  imposed  as  the  con- 
ditions of  the  covenant.  This  distinc- 
tion between  positive  and  moral  pre- 
cepts, which  is  found  also  in  Mr. 
Campbell's  writings,  has  its  origin  here 
in  the  analogy  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
covenants  with  the  social  contract 
theory. 

The  relation  of  the  covenant  theology 
to  Calvinism  was  not  at  first  one  of 
open  opposition.  It  was  stimulated  by 
the  conditions  which  Calvinism  had 
brought  about,  and  it  aimed  at  first  to 
interpret  some  of  the  Calvinistic  doc- 
trines in  a  more  liberal  spirit,  so  that  it 
would  not  lay  itself  open  to  such  sweep- 
ing denials  as  that  contained  in  Armin- 
ianism.  Its  implications  were  antagon- 
istic to  Calvinism,  but  this  fact  did  not 
appear  to  the  earliest  advocates  of  the 
system.  In  the  stress  of  theological 
controversy,  the  contradiction  soon  came 

to    light  and  the    Reformed   Church   in 
142 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

Holland    was   threatened   witli    schism. 
A  timely  compromise  averted  the  divi- 
sion  of   the    church,  and    the  covenant 
theology  continued  to  be  only  a  school 
of    theological    thought.     It   never   be- 
came the  basis  of  a  sect.     To  this  fact  is 
due  the  wide  dissemination  of  its  influ- 
ence   among    religious    thinkers    of    all 
parties;  and  for  the  same  reason  this  in- 
fluence has    gained   inadequate  recogni- 
tion in  the  history  of  Protestant  thought. 
It   has  spread   abroad    in  the  minds    of 
men   who    knew   scarcely    so    much    as 
the    names  of    its    originators.      Conse- 
quently it    is   not  to  be    expected    that 
the  historical  connections  between  this 
school  and  later  thinkers  who  were  in- 
fluenced by  it  can  be  traced  with  accu- 
racy   and    completeness.     We    shall    be 
content   to   consider   this   as   a   part  of 
Mr.  Campbell's  theological  heritage,  if 
it  can  be  shown  that  there  are  in  his 
system  important  ideas  which  were  in- 
troduced   to    the    Protestant    world   by 
Cocceius  and  his  associates.     The  influ- 
ence of  the  covenant  theology  can,  hcw- 
143 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

ever,  be  traced  to  some  extent  not  only 
in  Holland,  but  also  in  England  and 
Scotland. 

Soon  after  tlie  Synod  of  Dort,  England 
began  to  be  invaded  by  Arminianism 
and  by  influences  traceable  to  the  cove- 
nant theology,  and  from  that  time 
pure  Calvinism  can  scarcely  be  said  to 
have  existed  in  the  Church  of  England. 
The  Westminster  Confession  distin- 
guished, as  Cocceius  had  done,  between 
the  Covenant  of  Works  and  the  Cove- 
nant of  Grace,  with  the  dividing  line  at 
the  Fall,  and  its  statement  of  the  doc- 
trine of  the  atonement  was  cast  in  the 
mold  of  the  covenants.  There  arose 
during  the  seventeenth  century,  a  con- 
troversy which  was  of  little  consequence 
except  for  its  influence  on  the  church  in 
Scotland  during  the  following  century. 
It  was  between  the  so-called  Antino- 
mians  and  Neonomians,  and  it  will  be 
seen  that  each  party  emphasized  one  side 
of  the  teaching  of  Cocceius.  The  Anti- 
nomians,    emphasizing    the     distinction 

between  the   Jewish  and  Christian   dis- 
144 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

pensations,   maintained  that    we  aie  no 
longer  under  law  in  any  sense,  but  pure- 
ly under  grace;  t.  e,,  that  salvation  does 
not  depend  upon  obedience  to  any  com- 
mands, as  under  the  Jewish  dispensation, 
but  is  the  free  gift  of  God  to  whom  he 
pleases.     This  was  the   old  doctrine  of 
predestination,    defended    by   the    argu- 
ment   which    had    formerly    been    used 
against  it.     On    the    other    hand,     the 
Neonomians,   laying  stress  upon  the  re- 
quirement of    individual    responsibility, 
held    that    the     Christian    dispensation 
leaves  us  still  under  a  law,  but  a  new 
law,  since  it  requires   each  man  to  obey 
certain  commands  in  order  to  be  saved, 
but  not  the  commands  given  under  the 
Jewish  regime. 

The  direct  and  indirect  influence  of 
these  Dutch  theologians  was  much  more 
marked  in  Scotland  than  in  England. 
Several  causes  combined  to  weaken  the 
Calvinism  of  the  Church  of  Scotland 
about  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century. 
When  prelacy  was  forced  upon  Scotland 

by  Charles  II. ,  many  Presbyterian  minis- 
lo  145 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

ters  were  banished,  and  most  of  them 
spent  the  years  of  their  exile  in  Holland, 
where,  in  spite  of  its  condemnation  by 
the  Synod  of  Dort,  Arminianism  was 
rife  and  the  Covenant  Theology  was  at 
the  height  of  its  influence.  Even  after 
this  period  of  exile  was  passed,  it  was 
customary,  for  a  time,  to  send  theolog- 
ical students  to  Holland  to  be  educated. 
When  episcopacy  was  finally  withdrawn 
from  Scotland,  the  taint  of  Arminianism 
was  not  withdrawn  with  it,  and  the  con- 
troversy between  Antinomians  and  Neo- 
nomians  was  transplanted  from  England. 
When  the  age  of  persecution  ceased, 
with  the  Revolution  of  1688,  and  the 
Church  of  Scotland  was  at  peace  with 
its  enemies  without,  there  began  a  long 
series  of  theological  controversies  within 
the  church  which  made  the  eighteenth 
century  a  dreary  and  disruptive  period 
for  Scotch  Presbyterianism. 

As  the  result  of  these  influences,  a 
majority  of  the  General  Assembly  em- 
braced the  freer  views,  and  a  proposition 

representing  the  strictest  variety  of  Cal- 
146 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

vinism  was  voted  down  by  the  Assembly. 
Following  this  there  came  a  popular 
conservative  revolt.  The  Secession  of 
1733  was,  on  its  theological  side,  a  coun- 
ter-reformation of  Calvinism,  a  recon- 
struction and  re-affirmation  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Predestination  as  interpreted  by 
the  English  Antinomians.  This  contro- 
versy was  well  under  way  when  there 
was  discovered  an  old  book  which  gave 
to  it  its  name.  "The  Marrow  of  Modern 
Divinity,"  the  work  of  an  English  "an- 
tinomian,"  was  nearly  a  century  old  and 
had  long  been  forgotten,  when  Thomas 
Boston  brought  it  to  light  and  made  it 
the  theological  text-book  of  the  Seces- 
sion. The  book  represented  a  combina- 
tion of  the  general  position  of  the  Cove- 
nant Theology  on  the  dispensations, 
with  the  strict  Calvinistic  doctrine  of 
irresistible  grace  and  human  impotence. 
Two  of  the  three  points  at  which  the 
Covenant  Theology  had  departed  from 
Calvinism  were  therefore  represented  in 
Scotland  at  this  time.     The  established 

church  maintained,   in   a   rather  feeble 
147 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

and  wavering  fashion,  the  necessity  of 
man's  meeting  certain  established  condi- 
tions of  salvation.  The  Secession  main- 
tained the  distinction  between  the  dis- 
pensations. But  neither  followed  the 
method  of  exegesis  which  Cocceius  had 
inaugurated,  though  both  claimed  to  be 
intensely  Biblical.  The  Secession  move- 
ment is,  in  some  respects,  comparable  to 
the  Wesleyan  revival  which  was  contem- 
porary with  it  in  England.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  two,  as  regards  their 
view  of  the  Scriptures,  was  exhibited  in 
a  conference  between  Whitefield  and 
Moncrieff,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Secession,  during  an  evangelistic  tour 
by  the  former  in  Scotland.  In  discuss- 
ing a  point  of  church  polity,  Whitefield 
dissented  from  an  opinion  which  had 
been  expressed.  Laying  his  hand  over 
his  heart,  he  said  with  emotion,  "I  do 
not  find  it  here."  Moncrieff  replied,  as 
he  slapped  the  Bible  that  lay  before  him, 
*'But,  sir,  I  find  it  here!" 

Religious  thought  in  Scotland  during 

the  eighteenth  century  was,  as  has  been 
148 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

shown,  thoroughly  permeated  with  the 
principles  of  the  Covenant  Theology. 
The  established  church  felt  it  only  as  a 
softening  of  the  rigors  of  Calvinism. 
The  Seceders  cast  their  whole  theoloo-v 
in  the  mold  of  the  dispensations  as  repre- 
senting different  stages  of  the  operation 
of  divine  grace.  The  ''Marrozv  of  Mod- 
ern Divi7iity''  and  Boston's  ''Fotcrfold 
State,''  which  became  as  popular  as 
' 'Pilgrim's  Progress,"  embodied  this 
conception.  In  the  lethargy  in  which 
the  church  was  steeped  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  most  of 
the  positive  virtues,  which  had  marked 
the  system  of  Cocceius  and  Witsius,  dis- 
appeared; but  the  framework  was  still 
there,  albeit  much  obscured,  and  it  was 
natural  that  any  reformatory  work, 
especially  one  which  made  its  appeal 
to  Scripture,  should  proceed  on  that 
basis. 

The    development   of    the    Covenant 
Theology  and  its  influence  in  England 
and  Scotland  has  been  dwelt  upon  be- 
cause it  is  believed  that  this   theology 
149 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

exercised  an  important  influence  upon 
Mr.  Campbell's  thought.  The  proof  of 
this  proposition  does  not  demand  that 
it  shall  be  shown  that  he  read  the  orig- 
inal Latin  works  of  the  originators  of 
that  movement,  but  only  that  his 
thought  contains  elements  strikingly 
similar  to  the  earlier  system,  and  that 
the  chain  of  influences  from  it  to  him — 
the  historic  continuity,  so  to  speak — is 
reasonably  complete. 

Mr.  Campbell  refers  occasionally  in 
his  works  to  the  writings  of  both  Coc- 
ceius  and  Witsius,  in  one  case  quoting 
page  and  particular  edition  in  a  manner 
which  would  indicate  that  the  quotation 
was  made  at  first  hand  from  the  original 
work.  Boston's  ^^  Fourfold  State  ^ ' '  which 
represented  the  influence  of  the  Cove- 
nant Theology  on  the  Seceder  Presby- 
terian Church,  of  which  Mr.  Campbell 
was  a  member,  was  read  during  the  voy- 
age which  ended  in  the  shipwreck  and 
the  sojourn  at  Glasgow.     The  ^''Marrozv 

oj  Modern  Divinity^  ^  could  scarcely  have 
150 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

been  unknown  to  either  Thomas  or  Alex- 
ander Campbell. 

But  aside  from  these  particular  con- 
siderations, and  more  conclusive  than 
these  scanty  proofs  of  his  acquaintance 
with  this  or  that  book,  is  the  fact  that, 
as  already  shown,  the  Covenant  Theol- 
ogy thoroughly  permeated  the  theolog- 
ical thought  of  Scotland  in  the  eight- 
eenth century  and  found  most  note- 
worthy expression  in  the  position  of  the 
Seceders.  It  was  in  the  air  that  he 
breathed.  Thomas  Campbell  was  edu- 
cated in  the  theological  seminary  of  the 
Seceders  and  his  son  was  well  read  in 
the  theological  literature  of  the  time. 
To  suppose  that  he  was  not  acquainted 
with  this  phase  of  thought,  would  be  to 
suppose  that  he  was  ignorant  of  some- 
thing which  was  the  common  property 
of  the  denomination  with  which  he  was 
connected.  Undoubtedly  Mr.  Campbell 
knew  the  Covenant  Theology  as  in- 
terpreted by  the  Seceders.  Probably  he 
knew  it  as  it  was  taught  by  its  Dutch 
originators. 

151 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

The  claim  that  Alexander  Campbell 
received  a  valuable  heritage  of  sugges- 
tion from  the  Covenant  Theology  is 
supported  by  a  consideration  of  the 
points  of  similiarity  between  the  two. 

1.  Both  are  intensely  Biblical  sys- 
tems. Of  Cocceius,  Heppe  {^Dogmen  des 
deidschen  Protestantismus)  says:  "The 
fruit  of  his  influence  on  the  Reformed 
systematic  theology,  was  to  lead  theo- 
logians back  to  the  word  of  God,  deliv- 
ering it  from  the  bondage  of  traditional 
scholasticism.'*  The  same  can  be  said 
of  Mr.  Campbell.  Even  his  opponents 
admitted  that  he  was  learned  in  the 
Scriptures,  and  found  fault  only  with  his 
interpretations. 

2.  Applying  the  idea  of  development, 
or  of  successive  dispensations,  to  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  Bible,  they  hold  in 
common  the  view  that  the  Old  Testa- 
ment belongs  to  a  former  covenant 
which  has  passed  away.  It  is  valuable 
as  a  record  of  God's  dealing  with  men, 
but  its  commands  are  no  longer  binding. 

3.  Both  were  reactions  against   simi- 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

lar  conditions.  The  Protestant  scholas- 
ticism which  characterized  the  second 
generation  of  Reformers,  finds  a  close 
parallel  in  the  state  of  religion  in  Scot- 
land and  still  more  in  the  United  States, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  present  century. 

4.  Both  opposed  the  doctrine  of  pre- 
destination and  sovereign,  irresistible 
grace,  as  tending  to  discourage  human 
effort  and  nullify  the  influence  of  the 
appeal  of  the  Gospel  to  men's  accept- 
ance. 

5.  Both  were  practical  movements, 
laying  stress  on  the  conditions  which 
man  must  meet  to  put  himself  in  right 
relations  with  God.  They  aimed  to  re- 
lieve penitent  sinners  of  the  uncertainty 
and  agony  of  "waiting"  and  "seeking," 
and  gave  prominence  to  the  answer  to 
the  question,  "What  shall  we  do?" — the 
terms  of  admission  to  the  kingdom  of 
God. 

5.     The    two   kinds    of    law,    which 

Grotius  had  derived  from  the  theory  of 

the    social    contract,   and  which    had    a 

place  in  the  analogous  conception  of  re- 

153 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

ligion  under  the  form  of  a  covenant 
between  God  and  man,  find  expression 
in  Campbell's  distinction  between  posi- 
tive and  moral  precepts, — a  distinction 
whicb  was  of  importance  in  his  teach- 
ing in  regard  to  baptism. 

A  word  must  be  said  about  Mr.  Camp- 
bell's attitude  toward  his  own  sources. 
It  was  characteristic  of  him  that  he  at- 
tached little  importance  to  the  historical 
development  of  ideas.  Although  he  gave 
much  emphasis  to  the  thought  of  the 
development  of  the  plan  of  salvation  in 
successive  dispensations,  the  continuity 
of  Christian  thought  made  but  slight  ap- 
peal to  him.  There  are  no  successive  dis- 
pensations of  truth  within  the  Christian 
economy.  What  is  true,  is  true;  and 
what  is  not  true,  is  false.  That  an  idea, 
though  not  absolutely  true  in  itself,  may 
aid  in  the  advancement  of  truth  in  other 
than  a  purely  negative  fashion,  he  did 
not  admit.  In  writing  of  his  indebted- 
ness to  others  for  religious  and  theolog- 
ical ideas,  he  says  that  he  was  more  in- 
debted to  their  failures  than  to  their  suc- 
154 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

cesses.  As  the  wreck  of  one  ship  may 
warn  another  from  a  dangerous  coast,  so 
he  admitted  he  had  been  helped  by  the 
mistakes  of  earlier  theologians.  He 
does  not  admit  a  large  indebtedness  to 
Sandeman,  or  Mcl^ean,  or  the  Haldanes, 
from  all  of  whom  he  was  supposed  to 
have  derived  much.  (^Christian  Baptist^ 
pp.  228,  399.)  And  yet  again,  when  he 
was  accused  of  lacking  originality,  he 
disclaimed  any  effort  at  originality,  and 
said  that  he  would  be  poor  indeed  if 
there  were  taken  from  him  all  that  he 
had  borrowed  from  his  predecessors. 

In  truth,  Mr.  Campbell  was  a  man  sin- 
gularly free  from  prejudice  and  from 
slavish  dependence  upon  masters.  He 
was  committed  to  no  fixed  system.  He 
was  therefore  free  to  take  up  any  cur- 
rent idea  which  seemed  to  him  true  and 
useful.  The  conclusions  of  earlier  think- 
ers came  to  him  not  as  authorities,  but  as 
suggestions.  He  did  not  always  appre- 
ciate how  impossible  it  would  have 
been  for  him  to  have  gotten  on  without 
these  suggestions.  He  says:  ''I  have 
155 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S   THEOLOGY 

endeavored  to  read  the  Scriptures  as 
though  no  one  had  ever  read  them  be- 
fore me;  and  I  am  as  much  on  my  guard 
against  reading  them  to-day  through  the 
medium  of  my  views  yesterday  or  a 
week  ago,  as  I  am  against  being  influ- 
enced by  any  foreign  name,  authority, 
or  system  whatever. ' '  To  say  that  he  did 
not  construct  his  system  as  though  no 
one  had  ever  constructed  a  system  before 
him,  is  only  to  say  that  he  was  a  man 
and  subject  to  the  limitations  of  human 
thought. 


The  consideration  of  the  philosoph- 
ical and  theological  conditions  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  in  the  atmosphere  of 
which  Mr.  Campbell  received  his  train- 
ing, has  led  to  the  conclusion  that, 
among  the  influences  which  determined 
the  mold  in  which  his  thought  was  cast, 
two  are  pre-eminently  important: 

First^    the    philosophical    system    of 
John  Ivocke,  which,  in  spite  of  the  objec- 
tionable and  untenable  extremes  to  which 
156 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

it  liad  been  developed,  was  still  the  only 
philosophical  instrument  at  hand,  deter- 
mined Mr.  CampbelPs  view  of  the  nature 
of  man,  the  manner  in  which  human 
knowledge  originates  and  the  channels 
through  which  any  communication  from 
God  must  be  made  to  man.  The  next 
phase  of  modern  philosophy,  which  Kant 
had  already  inaugurated  as  a  basis,  not  for 
agnosticism,  but  for  a  positive  reconstruc- 
tion after  the  destructive  issue  of  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment,  had 
been  introduced  into  England  by  Cole- 
ridge, but  had  as  yet  made  little  impres- 
sion on  theology. 

Second^  the  Dutch  theologians,  Coc- 
ceius  and  Witsius,  in  the  Covenant  The- 
ology, had  developed  the  idea  of  suc- 
cessive dispensations,  which  idea  had 
been  received  into  Scotland  and  was 
there  current  at  the  time  when  Mr. 
Campbell  was  receiving  suggestions  from 
that  source.  This  conception  assisted 
him  materially  in  arriving  at  a  reason- 
able method  of  using  the  Scriptures  and 
in  the  formulation  of  several  doctrines. 
157 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

It  remains  to  be  shown,  by  an  exam- 
ination of  his  statement  of  particular 
doctrines,  in  what  respects  and  to  what 
degree  these  two  influences  entered  into 

his  theological  system. 
158 


Chapter  IV 
The  Kingdom  of  God 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD. 

I.    ImpIvICations  of  Doctrine:  of  Covenants: 

1.  Successive  dispensations  in  the  Kingdom. 

2.  A  contract  with  two  sides. 

II.     Sf.rmon  on  thf  Law: 

1.  All  law  done  away,  but  morality  remains. 

2.  Gospel  does  w^hat  law  could  not  do. 

3.  Use  of  Old  Testament  now. 

III.  ElvFMENTS  OF  THE  KINGDOM. 

IV.  Connection  of  the  Dispensations. 

V.    Four  Stages  of  Kingdom  of  God: 

1.  Edenic — God  known  by  sense  perception. 

2.  Patriarchal — Fall  limits  perception. 

3.  Jewish — Decalogue,  the  constitution  or  ba- 

sis of  a  verbal  agreement. 

4.  Christian — government  by  principles;   law 

delivered  at  Pentecost;  positive  and  moral 
laws;  laws  of  naturalization  and  laws  for 
citizens. 

VI.    Happiness  the  Supreme  Motive. 

VII.    Consequences  of  Distinction  Between 
Dispensations. 

l6o 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD. 

In  the  systematizing  of  Mr.  Camp- 
bell's doctrinal  ideas,  the  central  place 
must  be  given  to  his  idea  of  the  King- 
dom of  God.  Around  this  the  other 
doctrines  group  themselves,  and  their 
relations  to  it  determine  the  form  which 
they  are  to  take.  This  is  necessarily  so 
from  the  character  of  his  problem  and 
the  means  which  he  adopted  for  its  so- 
lution. The  unity  of  the  church  is  to 
be  found  by  making  the  terms  of  eccle- 
siastical fellowship  as  nearly  as  possible 
coincident  with  the  conditions  of  citi- 
zenship in  the  Kingdom  of  God.  The 
latter  are  to  be  determined  by  an  appeal 
to  Scripture.  The  idea  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God  thus  became  the  center  for  the 
reconstruction,  and  the  practical  problem 
of  unity  compelled  him  to  emphasize 
especially  one  phase  of  the  Kingdom  of 

II  i6i 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

God,  viz.,  the  terms  of  admission,  or  the 
conditions  of  citizenship. 

In  the  formulation  of  this  doctrine,  the 
influence  of  the  Dutch  theologians  is 
most  strikingly  apparent.  There  are 
two  implications  which  go  with  a  doc- 
trine of  the  covenants:  y?/'-?/,  the  idea 
of  successive  dispensations,  as  being  the 
stages  in  the  history  of  the  process  of 
salvation,  and  therewith  the  sharp  dis- 
tinction between  the  present  Christian 
dispensation  and  the  Covenant  of  the  I^aw 
which  has  been  transcended;  second^  the 
conception  of  the  relation  between  man 
and  God  as  one  of  covenant  or  agree- 
ment, into  which  man  enters  voluntarily, 
by  the  acceptance  of  certain  specified 
conditions  on  the  basis  of  definite  prom- 
ises. 

The   first  expression   of    this   line  of 

thought   which   we   meet  with   in    Mr. 

Campbell's  work,  was  in  his  celebrated 

sermon  on  the  I^aw,  which  was  preached 

before  the  Redstone  Baptist  Association 

in  Virginia,  in  1816.     It  was  this,  more 

than  anything  else,  which  brought  about 
162 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

the  charges  of  heresy  against  him  from 
his  Baptist  brethren,  and  which  finally 
led  to  his  separation  from  that  com- 
munion. The  substance  of  the  sermon, 
v/hich  presented  the  fundamental  idea  in 
some  of  its  practical  bearings,  is  as  fol- 
lows: The  lyaw,  which  is  done  av/ay, 
is  the  whole  Mosaic  dispensation,  includ- 
ing judicial  and  moral  as  well  as  cere- 
monial legislation.  The  whole  system 
was  intended  to  subserve  a  temporary 
end  and,  that  end  having  been  accom- 
plished, the  system  has  been  abrogated 
by  the  appearance  of  the  Christian  dis- 
pensation. 

But  by  including  the  moral  law  in  that 
which  was  done  away,  the  basis  of  mor- 
ality is  not  overthrown,  for  morality 
rests  upon  a  deeper  and  more  enduring 
foundation  than  the  Mosaic  Covenant. 
In  the  overthrow  of  the  I^aw,  there  are 
two  commandments  which  stand  fast  be- 
cause they  are  constitutive  principles  of 
all  morals  and  all  religion:  ''Thou  shalt 
love  the  Ivord  thy  God,  with  all  thy 
heart,  soul,  mind  and  strength:  and  thy 
163 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

neighbor  as  thyself."  These  are  per- 
manent, while  all  the  rest  are  transient. 
There  are  certain  things  which  the 
Law  was  not  able  to  do.  It  could  not 
give  righteousness,  and  therefore  it  could 
not  give  life;  it  could  not  show  the  enor- 
mity of  sin,  in  all  its  fulness;  it  could 
not  give  a  suitable  rule  of  life  for  im- 
perfect humanity,  so  it  gave  a  partial 
rule  to  a  part  of  humanity — the  Jewish 
race.  These  defects  are  remedied  under 
the  Gospel,  which  completely  took  the 
place  of  the  Law.  From  this  relation  of 
the  two  dispensations,  there  follow  cer- 
tain conclusions:  (a)  The  essential  dif- 
ference between  Law  and  Gospel,  (b) 
That  Christians  are  not  under  the  Law 
or  any  part  of  it,  and  that  the  removal 
of  the  binding  force  of  the  moral  portion 
of  the  Mosaic  code  does  not  leave  us 
Antinomians.  (c)  That  it  is  useless  to 
preach  the  Law  to  prepare  people  for 
the  Gospel,  (d)  That  arguments  can- 
not be  drawn  from  the  Old  Testament, 
in   support  of    any    forms,    practices  or 

ordinances  in  the  Christian  Church. 
164 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

This  sermon  gave  a  practical  and  pop- 
ular presentation  of  his  view  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  Covenants  in  its  bearings  on 
the  religious  life  and  practice  of  the 
times.  The  subject  is  treated  more  elab- 
orately and  more  systematically  in  a 
series  of  articles  in  the  Christian  Bap- 
tist^ in  the  treatise  on  Christian  Baptism 
and  in  the  Christian  System. 

The  divine  government  in  its  succes- 
sive forms  is  always  a  monarchy,  never 
a  republic.  Monarchy  is  said  to  be  the 
natural  form  of  government,  an  organ- 
ism with  one  head,  whereas  republics 
are  useful  only  because  of  the  degen- 
eracy of  man  and  the  impossibility  of 
getting  a  good  ruler  who  will  not  be 
corrupted  by  power.  Again  monarchy 
is  better  suited  for  efficient  action  in  a 
state  of  war,  and  it  is  a  state  of  war  in 
the  moral  universe  which  the  Kingdom 
of  God  is  designed  to  meet. 

In  a  kingdom  there  are  five  elements: 

constitution,    king,    subjects,   laws    and 

territory.     The    Jewish    and    Christian 

systems   have   all  of    these.     They  are 
165 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

constitutional  monarchies,  because  God's 
relation  with  fallen  man,  whereby  he 
seeks  to  redeem  him,  is  in  the  form 
of  a  compact,  with  mutual  promises. 
This  has  always  been  so  since  man  fell 
and  God  began  to  try  to  reclaim  him. 
The  demands  which  are  made  upon 
man  and  the  promises  which  are  made 
to  him,  vary  with  the  development  of 
his  needs  and  capabilities. 

The  promises  which  were  made  to 
Abraham,  included  the  prophecy  of  the 
two  dispensations  which  were  to  follow. 
*'I  will  make  of  thee  a  great  nation," 
refers  to  the  Jewish  Covenant  whereby 
God  entered  into  special  relations  with 
the  Hebrew  people.  "In  thy  seed  shall 
all  the  nations  of  the  earth  be  blessed," 
points  to  the  Christian  dispensation  and 
its  universal  character.  There  is  seen 
to  be,  therefore,  a  connection  between 
the  covenants,  in  that  one  leads  up  to 
the  others  and  that  the  second  and  third 
are  prophesied  in  the  first.  The  prom- 
ise  which  went    with    the  covenant    to 

Abraham  was   that   the  land  of  Canaan 
i66 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

should  be  given  as  an  inheritance  to  the 
nation  which  was  to  be.  To  fulfill  this 
promise  of  the  land,  the  second  covenant 
became  necessary  when  Israel  as  a  nation 
left  Egypt. 

The  Jewish  dispensation  was  based 
upon  a  political,  moral,  and  religious 
constitution.  Its  institutions,  also,  fore- 
shadowed the  spiritual  truths  of  the 
coming  Christian  dispensation,  and  the 
complete  fulfillment  of  the  promise 
made  to  Abraham  by  blessing  all  the 
nations  of  the  earth  in  his  seed.  ^' Every 
one  who  would  accurately  understand 
the  Christian  institution,  must  approach 
it  through  the  Mosaic;  and  he  who  would 
be  proficient  in  the  Jewish,  must  make 
Paul  his  commentator. ' '  In  view  of  such 
statements  as  these — and  there  are  many 
of  them — it  cannot  be  said  that  Mr. 
Campbell  belittled,  much  less  rejected, 
the  Old  Testament,  as  he  was  frequently 
accused  of  doing. 

The  development  of  the  plan  of  salva- 
tion is  set  forth  in  four  different  stages, 

but  there   are  other  minor  subdivisions, 

167 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

nine  in  all, — as  with  Witsius.  Of  the 
four,  the  first  is  the  primitive  state  of 
Edenic  innocence.  Here  man,  as  yet 
unmarred  by  sin,  sees  and  hears  God 
immediately,  with  no  need  for  a  special 
revelation.  God  and  man  are  inhabit- 
ants of  the  same  world  and  their  rela- 
tions are  too  intimate  to  need  any  spe- 
cial manifestation.  In  the  Fall  occurs 
the  separation.  Man  loses,  in  a  meas- 
ure, his  God-like  image,  can  no  longer 
perceive  God  directly  by  sight  and  hear- 
ing, and  no  longer  has  even  a  correct 
idea  of  Him.  They  now  live  in  sepa- 
rate spheres.  The  first  man  born  after 
the  Fall  was  the  man  of  I^ocke's  psychol- 
ogy, knowing  the  natural  world  through 
sensation  and  nothing  more.  Even  in 
the  paradisiacal  state,  the  knowing 
faculty  of  man  was  constructed  on  Lock- 
ian  principles.  All  knowledge,  even 
then,  was  in  a  sensible  form,  but  the 
senses  were  such  that  they  could  re- 
ceive impressions  from  spiritual  realities. 
The    effect  of   the   Fall   is  to  limit   the 

sphere  in  which  the  senses  can  act,  and 
i68 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

to  limit  man's  knowledge  to  the  natural 
world.  Revelation  now  becomes  neces- 
sary, and  with  that  begins  a  new  chap- 
ter in  the  history  of  man. 

With  the  earlier  exponents  of  the  Cov- 
enant Theology,  the  line  of  cleavage  at 
the  Fall  was  made  the  most  important 
in  the  whole  history  of  salvation,  be- 
cause the  idea  of  original  sin,  as  some- 
thing demanding  an  explanation,  was 
constantly  in  their  minds.  With  Mr. 
Campbell,  on  the  contrary,  this  idea  had 
a  very  unimportant  place,  and  the  Fall 
was  accordingly  relegated  to  a  relatively 
subordinate  place.  Whatever  impor- 
tance it  had,  came  rather  from  the  Lock- 
ian  limitation  of  man's  knowing  powers, 
than  from  the  idea  of  original  sin.  Or 
perhaps  it  might  be  sufficient  to  say  that 
original  sin,  in  its  lyockian  interpreta- 
tion, meant  the  narrowing  of  the  field  of 
sensible  knowledge.  Original  sin  be- 
comes therefore  an  inherited  and  per- 
petual limitation  of  man's  power  of  per- 
ception,   instead    of    an    inherited   and 

perpetual  guilt. 

169 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

The  patriarchal  age,  extending  from 
Adam  to  Moses,  was  the  period  in  which 
the  family  relation  was  conspicuous,  be- 
cause at  this  time  the  family,  or  the 
tribe,  was  the  highest  social  unit.  The 
recognition  of  the  development  of  the 
knowledge  of  God  and  the  growing  in- 
timacy between  man  and  God  through 
successive  revelations  through  this  age, 
makes  it  apparent  that  the  religious  truth 
of  a  single  dispensation  is  not  conceived  to 
be  all  delivered,  necessarily,  as  a  deposit 
at  the  beginning  of  the  dispensation. 
Thus  the  religious  institutions  of  the 
patriarchal  age,  while  suited  to  the  in- 
fancy of  the  race,  show  a  constant  devel- 
opment. The  altar  of  sacrifice  was  the 
most  significant  institution  of  the  ante- 
diluvian world.  Religious  regard  was 
paid  to  the  seventh  day.  The  priest- 
hood developed  as  there  was  need  of  it, 
the  head  of  each  family  acting,  at  first, 
as  his  own  priest.  The  idea  of  the  sep- 
aration between  clean  and  unclean 
beasts,  as  having  significance  for  relig- 
ious rites,  also  "got  abroad  before  the 
170 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

flood."  Tt  is  not  to  be  understood  that 
man  by  natural  processes  develops  these 
ideas,  for  he  is  incapable  of  such  knowl- 
edge, but  that  God  revealed  them  to 
him  gradually.  So  the  covenant  of 
each  succeeding  dispensation  was  of  the 
nature  of  a  codification  of  the  religious 
ideas  which  had  been  revealed,  one  at  a 
time,  during  the  preceding  age.  This 
was  especially  true  during  the  patri- 
archal dispensation.  It  was  less  so  dur- 
ing the  Jewish,  and  in  the  Christian  dis- 
pensation all  is  fixed  and  complete  at 
the  beginning.  The  religion  of  the 
pagan  nations  was  supposed  to  have 
been  derived  from  the  revelations  of 
Jehovah  in  this  age. 

Th^  Jewish  dispensation  is  the  period 
of  national  religion.  Here  God  assumes 
the  relation  of  kingship  over  a  single 
nation  because  the  national  life  was  now 
beginning  to  rise  into  prominence. 
There  is  a  distinct  break  in  the  conti- 
nuity of  the  development  here  when  God 
organizes    and  leads  forth   Israel  out  of 

Egypt    and   becomes   its  national    God. 
171 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

The  kingship  is  distinctly  a  new  rela- 
tion, and  the  preliminaries  of  it  are 
announced  with  many  signs  of  the  pres- 
ence and  power  of  God.  "They  see 
and  hear  what  they  never  heard  or  saw 
before."  The  revelation,  it  will  be  ob- 
served, again  comes  in  the  form  of  see- 
ing and  hearing, — an  extension  of  sense- 
perception  beyond  its  ordinary  limits. 
The  first  requisite  in  the  new  relation 
between  God  and  men,  that  of  king  and 
subject,  was  a  constitution  or  covenant. 
This  was  provided  in  an  agreement  be- 
tween God  and  the  people,  the  terms  of 
which  were  pronounced  by  God  in  words 
audible  to  two  million  people,  and  ac- 
cepted by  them  by  general  vote.  (From 
this  fact  the  universal  right  of  suffrage 
is  deduced  as  a  natural  right.)  This 
contract  was  an  agreement  between  the 
governor  and  the  governed,  analogous  to 
that  whereby,  according  to  the  social 
contract  theory,  the  state  was  origin- 
ated throug^h  an  agfreement  between 
king  and  people.  But  since  God  stands 
in  a  unique  position  as  king,  he   alone 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 


has  the  right  to  determine  the  terms  of 
the  contract  and  to  submit  them  for 
acceptance.  The  constitution  or  cove- 
nant, in  this  case,  was  the  Decalogue, 
which  was  distinguished  accordingly 
from  all  the  other  laws  of  Israel.  God 
agreed  to  protect  them  so  long  as  they 
obeyed  it.  Disobedience  of  the  other 
laws  is  never  punished  so  severely  as 
failure  to  observe  this.  To  transgress 
the  ceremonial  law  is  a  misdemeanor; 
but  to  disregard  this  written  constitu- 
tion, the  Decalogue,  is  considered  equiv- 
alent to  treason. 

The  Jewish  worship  was  symbolic, 
looking  forward  to  the  truths  of  the 
Christian  dispensation.  The  promises 
and  curses  of  the  Jewish  covenant  did 
not  look  beyond  the  present  life. 
* 'Moses,  in  his  five  books,  has  not  a 
word  to  say  about  the  future  life."  The 
blessings  promised  to  those  who  keep 
the  covenant  are  temporal  prosperity, 
lonof  life,  and  national  success.  So  the 
Jewish  dispensation  was  not  intended  so 
much  to  effect  the  eternal  salvation  of 
173 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

those  under  it,  as  to  preserve  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  character  of  God,  to  exhibit 
His  virtues  and  to  show  the  advantages 
of  serving  Him.  The  distinction  be- 
tween the  purpose  of  the  Jewish  system 
and  of  the  Christian  system  is  seen  in 
this  fact,  as  well  as  in  the  fact  that  the 
Jewish  covenant  was  intended  primarily 
only  for  Israel.  It  accepted,  but  did 
not  encourage,  proselytes,  and  its  code 
of  laws  did  not  include  the  command 
*'Go,  preach."  Although  the  develop- 
ment of  religious  truth  and  progressive 
character  of  revelation  within  each  dis- 
pensation is  asserted,  yet  Mr.  Camp- 
bell says  that  the  *' prophets  added 
nothing  to  the  law  of  Moses.''  There 
was,  therefore,  no  real  advance  in  relig- 
ious knowledge,  during  this  period. 

The  Chidstian  dispensation  is  distin- 
guished by  the  idea  of  the  blotting  out 
of  sins,  followed  by  the  joy  and  peace  of 
forgiveness.  The  joy  of  Christian  expe- 
rience is  the  result  which  follows  en- 
trance to  the  kingdom,  and  must  not  be 

regarded  as  the  criterion   of  fitness    for 
174 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

admission.  The  new  dispensation  differs 
from  the  old  in  being  a  government  of 
principles,  not  of  precepts.  The  religion 
of  Israel  was  delivered  in  a  series  of  de- 
tailed and  specific  commands,  includ- 
ing a  catalogue  of  religious,  moral  and 
ceremonial  duties.  In  the  new  dispen- 
sation there  is  no  authoritative  ritual, 
liturgy  or  manual.  Its  supreme  law  is 
love.  The  idea  of  a  covenant,  wherein 
each  party  makes  certain  concessions 
and  secures  certain  privileges,  is  con- 
spicuously present.  The  king,  Christ, 
has  received  these  privileges:  he  is  to  be 
the  Oracle  of  God,  to  have  the  disposal 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  to  be  prophet  and 
high  priest  and  supreme  law-giver  over 
all  the  earth.  The  subjects  of  the  king- 
dom, in  return  for  their  allegiance,  re- 
ceive the  promised  protection  of  their 
constitutional  king.  They  are  pardoned, 
justified,  saved  from  sin,  are  adopted 
into  the  family  of  God,  are  given  the 
means  of  knowing  God,  and  receive  the 
promise  of  resurrection  and  eternal  life 
and  blessedness.  The  laws  of  the  king- 
175 


THEOLOGICAL  HERITAGE 

dom  were  not  delivered  until  the  king- 
dom had  been  set  up,  t.  <?.,  at  Pentecost. 
So  the  laws  must  be  looked  for  in  the 
records  after  that  time,  in  the  Acts  and 
in  the  Epistles,  just  as  the  laws  under 
the  Jewish  covenant  are  to  be  looked  for 
in  the  books  treating  of  the  time  after 
Sinai,  not  in  Genesis. 

The  laws  of  the  kingdom  may  be  di- 
vided into  two  classes,  positive  and 
moral;  or  again,  by  another  two-fold 
division  into  laws  of  naturalization,  and 
laws  for  the  citizens.  The  laws  of  nat- 
uralization constitute  the  conditions  with 
which  aliens  must  comply  in  seeking 
admission.  The  first  step  is  to  submit 
to  them  the  constitution,  i.  e. ,  to  preach 
the  Gospel.  When  they  understand  it, 
believe  and  desire  to  accept,  they  may  be 
admitted  in  the  prescribed  way — by  be- 
ing born  of  water  and  of  the  Spirit. 
These,  together,  constitute  the  condi- 
tion of  entrance  into  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  elsewhere  defined  more  particular- 
ly as  faith,  repentance  and  baptism. 
176 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

Here,  in  Mr.  Campbell's  thought,  the 
chief  emphasis  was  laid. 

Besides  these  positive  laws  touching 
the  requirements  for  admission  to  mem- 
bership, there  are  two  other  positive 
laws  which  apply  to  the  citizens  of  the 
kingdom,  viz.,  the  weekly  celebration  of 
the  death  and  resurrection  of  Christ  in 
the  Lord's  Supper,  and  the  meeting  on 
the  first  day  of  every  week  for  this  cele- 
bration and  for  edification.  All  the 
other  laws  of  the  kingdom  are  moral,  i, 
e. ,  such  as  must  be  approved  by  the  en- 
lightened conscience  of  man. 

Faith  is  the  principle  by  which  the 
believer  comes  into  possession  of  the 
spiritual  blessing,  but  the  necessary 
means  of  spiritual  enjoyment  are  the 
ordinances.  Just  as  nothing  is  known 
or  enjoyed  in  the  natural  world  except 
through  the  senses,  so  nothing  is  enjoyed 
in  the  spiritual  world,  except  through 
faith.  Here  again,  faith  appears  as  an 
extension  of  sensation  in  a  higher 
sphere,  and  the  process  of  spiritual 
knowledge  and  enjoyment  is  interpreted 

12  177 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

on  the  basis  of  the  Lockian  theory  of 
natural  knowledge.  However  much  em- 
phasis may  be  laid  upon  the  terms  of  ad- 
mission into  the  kingdom,  these  are  not 
the  consummation,  but  merely  the  pre- 
paratory steps.  They  constitute  the 
gate  into  the  kingdom  of  favor.  The 
joys  of  that  kingdom  are  received  only 
through  the  ordinances,  such  as  the 
preaching  of  the  Gospel,  the  reading  of 
the  Scriptures,  the  observance  of  the 
Lord's  Day,  the  I^ord's  Supper,  prayer, 
etc. 

As  growing  out  of  this  conception  of 
faith  as  an  extension  of  sensational 
knowledge,  we  have  naturally  a  eudae- 
monistic  philosophy  of  religion.  The 
covenants  are  the  way  by  which  man 
gets  into  relation  to  God.  But  why 
should  man  want  to  get  into  relation 
with  God?  The  motive  assigned  is  that 
his  highest  pleasure  lies  there.  There 
is  a  clear  recognition  of  the  qualitative 
difference  between  various  pleasures,  so 
that  the  pleasures  of  religion  are  not  put 

on  a  par  with  the  pleasures  of  sensual 
178 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

indulgence,  but  the  motive  after  all  is 
pleasure.  "From  the  plan  of  the  Bible, 
as  well  as  from  its  philosophy,  its  claims 
upon  the  faith  and  admiration  of  man- 
kind may  be  strongly  argued:  its  philos- 
ophy is,  that  without  piety  no  man  can 
be  happy;  and  that  with  it,  any  man,  in 
any  outward  circumstances,  may  be 
happy  to  the  full  extent  of  his  capacity 
for  human  enjoyment.  All  human  en- 
joyments are  reduced  to  two  classes;  one 
is  spiritual  and  the  other  is  carnal;  the 
one  is  moral,  social  and  refined,  and  the 
other  is  selfish,  exclusive  and  gross;  the 
one  rises,  the  other  sinks  through  all 
eternity.  The  philosophy  of  the  Bible 
is,  therefore,  the  philosophy  of  human 
happiness,  the  only  philosophy  which 
commends  itself  to  the  cultivated  under- 
standing of  man."  This  idea  of  a  noble, 
unselfish  social  happiness,  from  spiritual 
and  intellectual  sources,  as  the  prime 
motive  to  action,  is  closely  akin  to  the 
thought  of  some  of  the  best  of  the  eth- 
ical   writers  of  the  eighteenth  century, 

especially  Shaftesbury. 
179 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

Among  the  most  important  conse- 
quences of  the  clear  distinction  of  the 
different  dispensations  in  Mr.  Campbell's 
thought,  may  be  mentioned  the  follow- 
ing: 

1 .  Baptism  is  not  a  substitute  for  cir- 
cumcision, and  likewise  the  whole  list 
of  pedobaptist  arguments  derived  from 
the  Old  Testament  are  fallacious  and 
inconsequential. 

2.  The  lyord's  Day  is  not  a  substitute 
for  the  Sabbath,  is  not  to  be  observed  as 
the  Sabbath  was  observed  or  because  it 
is  commanded  in  the  Decalogue. 

3.  The  Christian  ministry  is  in  no 
sense  a  substitute  for  the  Jewish  priest- 
hood, that  function  being  now  per- 
formed by  Christ  as  High  Priest,  and  by 
all  believers  as  priests. 

4.  Morality  is  not  based  on  the  com- 
mands of  the  Decalogue,  but  on  the 
moral  laws  of  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion. 

The  other  doctrines  evidently  fit  into 

this   view  of  the    Kingdom    of    God    as 

a  framework,  somewhat  as  follows:    The 
180 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

aiithonty  of  Scripture  is  the  objective 
source  and  criterion  of  all  our  ideas  con- 
cerning God  and  his  relations  with  men, 
and  therefore  concerninor  the  Kino^dom  of 
God,  its  terms  of  admission  and  duties 
of  membership.  Faith,  repentance  and 
baptism  are  the  naturalization  laws,  by 
conformity  to  which  aliens  are  admitted 
to  enjoy  the  privileges  of  citizenship  in 
the  kingdom.  Conversion  and  regener- 
ation are  the  change  of  state  which 
takes  place  when  the  individual  changes 
his  relationship  to  God  by  entering  the 
kingdom  according  to  these  provisions. 
The  Kingdom  of  God  is  a  perpetual 
institution,  but  its  specific  requirements 
change  with  successive  dispensations. 
God's  purpose  toward  men  is  eternal,  as 
Calvin  had  held,  and  this  is  shown  in 
the  fact  that  there  has  always  been  some 
way  by  which  man  could  come  to  God. 
But  the  history  of  the  process  of  salva- 
tion shows  a  succession  of  covenants 
under  which  the  conditions  of  citizen- 
ship have  varied.     The  protest  made  by 

Mr.   Campbell  upon   this   basis   against 
i8i 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

the  indiscriminate  use  of  the  two  Testa- 
ments as  equally  binding  authorities  for 
Christian  doctrine  and  Christian  prac- 
tice, is  quite  parallel  to  the  protest  made 
by  Cocceius  and  his  followers  against  the 
similar  method  which  was  employed  by 
scholastic  Calvinism  in  his  day.  We 
live  not  only  under  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
but  under  a  particular  dispensation  of 
that  kingdom,  and  our  duties  toward  it 
are  comprised  only  within  the  covenant 
of  our  own  dispensation.  The  records 
of  earlier  covenants  may  be  instructive, 
but  only  those  of  our  own  give  the  con- 
ditions of   salvation — z.  ^.,   of   entrance 

into  the  ]Lmgdom— /or  tis, 
182 


Chapter  V 
Authority  and  Inspiration 


AUTHORITY  AND    INSPIRATION. 
I.    A  BiBLicAi,  Movement. 

II.    The  Seat  of  Authority: 

1.  Knowledge  of  God  only  through  Revelation. 

2.  Revelation  only  through  the  written  Word. 

III.  Method  of  Inspiration: 

1.  Sensationalism  supports  verbal  inspiration. 

2.  Two-fold  division  of  Scripture. 

IV.  Criterion  of  Revei^ation. 

V.    Ruizes  of  Interpretation: 

1.  Distinction  between  covenants. 

2.  Baconian  empiricism. 

VI.  The  Nature  of  the  Authority: 

1.  Bible  as  a  law-book. 

2.  Authority  for  doctrine  and  polity. 

3.  Return  to  external  authority  for   principle 

of  unity, 

4.  Comparison  and  contrast  with  Oxford  Move- 

ment. 

184 


AUTHORITY  AND    INSPIRATION. 

The  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  em- 
bodies the  conception  of  man's  highest 
possible  development  and  most  complete 
happiness  as  consisting  in  relationship 
to  God,  through  citizenship  in  His  king- 
dom. The  first  inquiry  which-  arises 
naturally  relates  to  the  source  from 
which  are  derived  the  ideas  of  God  and 
of  a  relationship  with  him,  /.  ^.,  the 
source  of  religious  ideas  and  the  seat  of 
authority.  With  Alexander  Campbell, 
this  amounts  to  a  study  of  the  authority 
and  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures. 

Theoretically  there  was  nothing  new 
in  the  acceptance  of  the  Scriptures  as 
the  sole  source  and  the  objective  cri- 
terion of  religious  truth.  This  was 
the  principle  of  Protestantism,  formu- 
lated by  Chillingworth  in  his  famous 
motto,  ''The  Bible  and  the  Bible  alone 
is  the  religion  of  Protestants."  Never- 
185 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

theless  this  principle  had  repeatedly 
suffered  obscuration,  when  the  right  of 
private  judgment  in  interpretation  fell 
into  desuetude,  and  from  time  to  time 
needed  to  be  rediscovered  and  given  a 
new  emphasis.  So  it  was  when  Coc- 
ceius  effected  a  Biblical  revival  by  his 
new  method  of  exegesis.  So  Locke,  in 
his  religious  writings,  had  endeavored  to 
bring  about  a  return  to  Biblical  Chris- 
tianity. His  "Reasonableness  of  Chris- 
tianity as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures" 
was  intended  to  clear  away  the  rubbish 
of  the  current  theological  S3^stems  which 
were  inherited  from  the  past  and  could 
not  be  proved  from  the  Word  of  God, 
just  as  his  "Essay  on  the  Human  Un- 
derstanding" aimed  to  clear  away  the 
metaphysical  lumber  of  the  schools.  It 
was  a  somewhat  similar  condition  of 
affairs  which  confronted  i\Ir.  Campbell, 
both  in  Scotland,  where  he  received  his 
first  impulse,  and  in  the  United  States, 
where  the  problem  was  worked  out.  In 
his  mind,  the  revival  of  Biblical  Chris- 
tianity took  the  form  of  a  readjustment 
i86 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

of  the  conditions  of  Church  membership 
to  meet  the  Scriptural  requirements. 

The  pre-eminent  position  given  to  the 
Bible  in  Mr.  Campbell's  thought  is  log- 
ically connected  with  his  conception  of 
human  knowledge  and  man's  absolute 
dependence  upon  revelation  for  knowl- 
edge of  God  and  spiritual  things.  It  is 
absolutely  necessary  that  there  shall  be 
a  revealed  rule  for  religion,  because  man, 
by  himself,  is  completely  incapable  of 
knowing  God.  ''There  is  not  a  spiritual 
idea  in  the  whole  human  race  which  is 
not  drawn  from  the  Bible."  {Christian 
System^  p.  15.)  Again,  in  beginning  a 
discussion  of  the  Holy  Spirit  (  Christian 
Baptist^  p.  82),  he  starts  with  the  prop- 
osition that  all  knowledge  of  God  or  of 
the  invisible  world  of  spirit  is  derived 
immediately  from  the  Spirit  of  God 
which  "dictated"  the  Scriptures.  All 
that  heathen  philosophers  and  pagan 
religionists  have  known  about  God, 
every  idea  of  even  the  existence  of  a 
God,  is  dependent  in  some  way  upon  the 
revelation  in  the  Bible,  and,  if  our  his- 

i87 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

torical  knowledge  were  complete,  could 
be  traced  back,  step  by  step,  to  that 
source.  The  tremendous  historical  as- 
sumption which  this  involves,  is  unhesi- 
tatingly made  for  the  sake  of  maintain- 
ing the  Lockian  limitation  of  natural 
knowledge,  which  was  conceived  as 
magnifying  the  authority  of  the  Bible. 
Skeptics,  likewise,  who  attack  the 
tenets  of  positive  religion,  are  attacking 
something  of  which  they  have  abso- 
lutely no  knowledge  except  through  the 
one  source  which  they  repudiate.  He 
says:  *'Were  it  our  design,  we  could 
easily  prove,  upon  the  principles  of  all 
modern  skeptics,  that,  unaided  by  the 
oracles  of  the  Spirit  they  could  never 
have  known  that  there  is  a  God,  that 
there  was  a  creation  or  a  Creator,  or  that 
there  is  within  them  a  spark  of  life 
superior  to  that  of  a  brute."  It  can  be 
shown  with  "demonstrable  certainty" 
that  "on  the  acknowledged  principles  of 
Locke,  the  Christian  philosopher,  and  of 
Hume,  the  subtle  skeptic,  all  the  boasted 
intelligence  of  the  Deistical  world  is  a 

i88 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

plagiarism  from  the  oracles  of  the  Divine 
One." 

This  point,  the  limitation  of  man's 
natural  knowledge  to  things  of  sense, 
and  his  absolute  dependence  upon  reve- 
lation for  anything  higher,  is  one  of 
Campbell's  most  characteristically  I^ock- 
ian  positions.  But  here  is  an  instance 
of  the  logical  development  of  Locke's 
principles  beyond  the  conclusions  which 
he  himself  derived  from  them.  Locke 
had  held  that  knowledge  of  God  was 
demonstrable.  But  he  accounted  for  it 
only  by  slipping  in  between  the  various 
ideas  from  sensation,  surreptitiously,  as 
it  were,  certain  intuitions  which,  added 
up,  amounted  to  a  demonstration.  These 
intuitions,  as  his  followers  with  their 
more  rigid  logic  soon  saw,  had  no  place 
in  the  sensational  theory  of  knowledge. 
The  logical  character  of  Hume's  agnos- 
tic deduction  is  inexorable. 

Mr.  Campbell  accepts  the  results  of 
this  negative  reasoning  so  far  as  the  un- 
aided human  intellect  is  concerned,  and 
admits,  with  the  most  atheistic,  that  the 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

natural  reason  can  never  know  God,  or 
even  have  any  idea  of  his  existence.  He 
uses  the  Lockian  argument  in  proof  of 
this,  that  children  are  not  born  with  the 
idea  of  God  and  hence  that  idea  cannot 
be  innate.  His  acceptance  of  the  log- 
ical character  of  the  skeptical  reasoning 
was  shown  in  a  correspondence  with  the 
/Veza  Harniojiy  Gazette^  a  paper  pub- 
lished in  the  interests  of  Robert  Owen's 
society  of  communistic  infidels,  at  New 
Harmony,  Ohio.  Mr.  Campbell  pro- 
posed three  questions  in  regard  to  the 
existence  of  God,  the  soul  and  immor- 
tality. The  questions  were  answered 
agnostically:  we  can  know  nothing 
about  such  existences,  because  they 
can  never  be  cognizable  by  the  senses  of 
man.  This  answ^er  Mr.  Campbell  ap- 
proved as  being  sound  philosophy,  so  far 
as  philosophy  can  go.  "There  can  be 
no  stopping  place  between  deism  and 
atheism.  I  give  great  praise  to  the 
New  Harmony  philosophers  for  their 
candor  and  honesty  in  avowing  the  con- 
clusion which  all  the  lights  they  have, 
190 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

authorized  them  to  maintain.  I  say 
they  are  good  philosophers.  They  have 
reasoned  well." 

But  this  line  of  argument  is  made 
only  the  introduction  to  a  further  step. 
Granted  that  we  can  have  no  natural 
knowledge  or  idea  of  God,  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  we  actually  do  have 
such  an  idea.  Our  ideas  of  spiritual 
things  are  facts  to  be  explained.  They 
must  have  a  cause  and  that  cause,  since 
it  cannot  be  the  natural  reason,  must  be 
divine  revelation.  (Compare  Descartes's 
Anthropological  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God,  in  the  Third  Meditation;  to  which 
Campbell  adds  Locke's  sensationalism 
to  make  an  argument  for  the  sole  author- 
ity of  the  Scriptures  in  spiritual  things.) 
"Indeed  it  all  comes  to  this:  if  there  be 
no  innate  ideas,  as  these  philosophers 
teach,  then  the  Bible  is  proved,  from  the 
principles  of  reason  and  from  the  history 
of  the  world,  to  be  what  it  purports,  a 
volume  indited  by  the  Spirit  of  the  in- 
visible    God."     The     same     argument 

which  proves  that  the  Bible  is  a  divine 
191 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

revelation,  because  it  contains  ideas 
whicli  could  come  from  no  other  source, 
proves  also  that  the  Bible  is  the  only 
channel  through  which  we  receive 
knowledge  of  spiritual  things. 

The  same  Lockian  conception  of 
knowledo^e  which  determined  that  man 
must  be  dependent  upon  something  out- 
side of  himself  for  all  ideas  which  be- 
long in  a  sphere  beyond  the  reach  of  his 
sensations,  determines  also  that  revela- 
tion can  come  only  through  the  channels 
of  the  senses.  It  would  not  be  a  reve- 
lation to  man  if  it  were  not  a  revelation 
in  a  form  in  which  it  is  intelligible  to 
man.  Revelation  does  not  revolutionize 
man's  processes  of  knowledge,  but  ex- 
tends them.  So  all  revelation  of  the 
character  and  will  of  God,  makes  its  ap- 
peal to  the  human  understanding,  i.  e. , 
to  the  intellect,  through  the  forms  of 
sense  perception.  This  precludes  the 
idea  of  a  mystical  or  emotional  revela- 
tion which  might  be  independent  of  the 
written   Word.       The   argument  on  the 

Lockian  basis  results,   therefore,  in  the 
192 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

conclusion  of  the  absolute  dependence  of 
man  upon  the  revelation  contained  in 
the  Scriptures  for  all  his  spiritual  ideas, 
and  the  consequent  fallacy  of  natural  re- 
ligion and  the  impotence  and  vanity  of 
human  authority  in  religious  matters. 

Man  gets  truth  through  the  intellect 
just  as  surely  as  light  through  the  eyes, 
and  only  so.  Revelation  is  conceived  of 
as  essentially  and  exclusively  a  matter  of 
knowledge,  not  a  matter  of  emotions, 
impulses,  stimuli.  Hence  we  have  the 
conception  of  communication  between 
God  and  man  defined  and  limited  by 
those  two  Lockian  conceptions.  First^ 
any  communication  addressed  to  man 
must  be  in  terms  of  knowledge  and  must 
make  its  entrance  through  the  gate  of 
the  intellect;  for  ideas  are  with  I^ocke 
the  universal  thing,  and  emotions  can  be 
conveyed  from  man  to  man  only  when 
worked  up  into  the  form  of  intellectual 
concepts.  This  excludes  all  mystical 
ideas  of  communion  between  God  and 
man  on  a  purely  emotional  and  experi- 
ential basis.  Second^  man's  intellect  is 
13  193 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

of  such  a  sort,  being  wholly  dependent 
upon  the  material  supplied  by  the  senses, 
that  it  could  never  attain  to  the  appre- 
hension of  any  spiritual  idea.  Communi- 
cation with  God  being  therefore  limited 
to  intellectual  apprehension,  and  the 
knowing  power  being  limited  by  the 
senses,  it  follows  that  all  communication 
with  God  is  limited  to  the  one  medium, 
the  Book,  which  the  senses  can  grasp  as 
a  concrete  object  of  sensible  experience. 
The  Book  becomes  the  sole  and  absolute 
religious  authority.  Intellectualism  and 
sensationalism  are  therefore  the  philo- 
sophical basis  of  the  view  that  revelation 
is  only  through  the  Word.  Campbell's 
belief  that  knowledge  of  God  comes  to 
man  only  through  the  revelation  con- 
tained in  the  Bible,  is  therefore  a  con- 
sistent conclusion  from  Locke's  theory 
of  knowledge,  but  it  is  far  from  being  in 
agreement  with  Locke's  own  conclusion 
on  the  subject,  as  expressed  in  the  fol- 
lowing words  written  in  1681   (Bourne's 

Liye  of  Locke ^  p.  462): 
194 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

"That  there  is  a  God  and  what  that  God  is,  noth- 
ing can  discover  in  us,  nor  judge  in  us,  but  natural 
reason.  For  whatever  discovery  we  receive  any 
other  way,  must  come  originally  from  inspiration, 
which  is  an  opinion  or  persuasion  of  the  mind 
whereof  a  man  knows  not  the  use  or  reason,  but  is 
received  there  as  a  truth  coming  from  an  unknown 
and  therefore  a  supernatural  cause.  But  no  such 
inspiration  concerning  God,  or  his  worship,  can  be 
admitted  for  truth  by  him  that  thinks  himself  in- 
spired, much  less  by  any  other  whom  he  would  per- 
suade to  believe  him  inspired,  any  further  than  it  is 
conformable  to  reason;  because  where  reason  is  not, 
I  judge  it  is  impossible  for  a  man  himself  to  dis- 
tinguish betwixt  inspiration  and  fancy,  truth  and 
error, — since  nobody  can  doubt,  from  the  contradic- 
tion and  strangeness  of  opinion  concerning  God 
and  religion  in  this  world,  that  men  are  likely  to 
have  more  frenzies  than  inspirations.  Inspiration 
then,  barely  in  itself,  cannot  be  a  ground  to  receive 
any  doctrine  not  conformable  to  reason." 

The  comparison  of  these  statements 
with  the  view  of  Mr.  Campbell  that  man 
by  his  natural  reason  can  not  have  the 
slightest  conception  of  God,  will  free 
him  from  any  suspicion  of  having  taken 
his  views  from  lyocke.  It  is  quite  a  dif- 
ferent thing  to  say  that  their  philosoph- 
ical basis  was  I^ockian.  The  fact  is 
that  Locke's  views  of  the  natural  reason. 
195 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

as  an  instrument  for  knowing  God, 
were  not  consistent  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  his  philosophy.  The  devel- 
opment of  philosophical  thought  from 
Locke  to  Hume  showed  that,  and  Mr. 
Campbell  profited  by  that  history.  In 
his  method  of  accounting  for  man's 
knowledge  of  God,  Campbell  was  a  bet- 
ter Ivockian  than  Locke  himself. 

So  far  the  discussion  has  related  sole- 
ly to  the  means  of  communication  be- 
tween God  and  the  individual  of  to-day, 
and  that  is  found  to  be  entirely  through 
the  Book.  But  the  Book  itself  was  given 
through  human  agency.  It  was  written 
by  human  penmen.  It  remains  to  be 
considered  what  was  the  nature  of  the 
communication  between  God  and  the  in- 
spired men  who  indited  the  sacred 
volume;  in  other  words.  What  was  the 
nature  and  method  of  revelation? 

What  has  preceded  obviously  excludes 
the  assumption  that  the  divine  communi- 
cation to  the  inspired  writers  was  in  any 
way  analogous  to  the  relation  between 

God  and  the  o-^dinary  Christian,  for  the 
196 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

latter  is  solely  through  the  medium 
which  the  former  produced.  It  there- 
fore cannot  be  said  that  the  inspiration 
of  the  writers  was  the  same  in  kind  as 
that  which  may  be  enjoyed  by  Christians 
to-day,  only  more  intense  in  degree.  But 
the  inspired  men  were  still  men, — crea- 
tures who  can  receive  communications 
only  through  the  experience  of  the 
senses.  Again  the  statement  is  signifi- 
cant that  "revelation  does  not  revolu- 
tionize man's  processes  of  knowledge,  but 
only  extends  them,"  /.  ^.,  brings  new 
elements  into  the  world  of  sensible  expe- 
rience. With  the  Christian  of  to-day, 
the  new  element  of  sense  experience  is 
the  Bible.  The  men  who  were  inspired 
to  write  the  Bible  must  have  received 
direct  from  God  some  other  kind  of  rev- 
elation to  the  senses.  Revelation  could 
only  take  place  through  sights  and 
sounds.  Since  revelation  is  essentially 
the  deliverance  of  ideas  to  men,  and 
since  a  word  is  the  sensible  body  of  an 
idea,  it  may  be  said  that  Lockian  sensa- 
tionalism gives  the  philosophical  basis 
197 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

for  the  doctrine  of  verbal  inspiration. 
This  is  the  position,  then,  to  which  Mr. 
Campbell's  philosophical  presupposition 
logically  led.     Did  he  actually  hold  it? 

It  may  be  said  without  doing  him  in- 
justice— in  fact,  it  must  be  said  to  avoid 
doing  him  injustice — that  all  of  his 
declarations  on  the  subject  cannot  be 
combined  into  a  single  systematic  and 
consistent  theory.  There  are  many 
passages  in  Mr.  Campbell's  writings 
which  look  in  the  direction  of  verbal  in- 
spiration, if  indeed  they  do  not  directly 
affirm  it.  He  speaks  of  the  writers  of 
Scripture  as  "penmen"  (^Christian  Bap- 
tist^ p.  200).  He  refers  to  the  Holy 
Spirit  as  having  "dictated"  and  "in- 
dited" the  book.  In  regard  to  the 
means  by  which  God  has  communicated 
with  men  in  times  past,  he  says  that 
God  spoke  vive  voce  with  Adam  in  the 
Garden  and  with  Moses  on  Sinai.  God 
taught  the  first  man  the  use  of  speech 
by  talking  to  him  audibly.  (^Christian 
Baptist^  p.  37.)     The  words  of  New^ton 

are  quoted  approvingly,  "God  gave  man 
198 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

reason  and  religion  by  giving  him  the 
use  of  words."  '^When  God  spoke  to 
man  in  his  own  language,  he  spoke  as 
one  person  converses  with  another, — in 
the  fair,  stipulated  and  well-established 
meaning  of  the  terms. ' '  (  Christian  Sys- 
tem^ p.  i6.)  Word  and  idea  are  con- 
ceived by  Campbell,  as  by  I^ocke,  to  be 
so  inseparably  connected  that  an  idea 
cannot  be  said  to  exist  without  a  word 
to  represent  it;  much  less  can  it  be  com- 
municated without  the  use  of  the  word 
which  is  the  necessary  means  of  making 
the  requisite  impression  on  the  senses  of 
the  recipient.  (^Christian  System^  p.  23.) 
Hence  revelation  could  not  have  come 
to  the  inspired  writers  without  spoken 
words,  any  more  than  it  can  be  com- 
municated to  men  to-day  by  any  other 
means  than  the  written  words  of  the 
record.  The  Spirit,  in  giving  ideas  to 
the  writers,  necessarily  gave  the  words 
corresponding  to  them. 

It  is  characteristic  of  Mr.  Campbell's 
habit  of  mind  that  the  question  of  the 

method  of  inspiration  presented  no  diffi- 

199 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

culties  to  him.  Replying  to  a  question 
as  to  how  far  the  writers  were  indebted 
to  the  Spirit  for  the  very  words  which 
they  used,  he  says:  "The  burden  of 
this  query  has  occasioned  considerable 
discussion  amongst  the  more  learned 
commentators  and  interpreters  of  Sacred 
Scripture.  I  cannot,  however,  discover 
any  real  difHculty  in  deciding  the  con- 
troversy or  in  answering  the  query." 
He  then  makes  a  twofold  classification 
of  Scripture  into:  Jirsf^  accounts  of  things 
purely  supernatural,  including  all  relig- 
ious teaching  and  laws;  and  second^ 
records  of  natural,  historical  occur- 
rences. In  the  first  class,  "the  com- 
munication was  made  in  words."  In 
the  second,  the  Spirit  simply  strength- 
ened the  memory,  guided  in  the  choice 
of  documents  and  sources,  and  guar- 
anteed the  absolute  accuracy  of  the 
account,  but  left  the  choice  of  words  to 
the  writer. 

The  use  of  this  twofold  division  was 
convenient  as  affording  a  way  of  main- 
taining  the    complete  inerrancy  of   the 

200 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

Bible  in  all  its  parts,  without  holding 
the  implausible  theory  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  dictated  accounts  of  events  which 
men  could  write  about  quite  accurately 
on  the  basis  of  their  own  recollections 
and  available  historical  documents.  The 
convenience  of  the  division  had  brought 
it  into  use  soon  after  the  Protestant 
Reformation  and  almost  as  soon  as  em- 
phasis began  to  be  thrown  upon  the 
authority  of  Scripture.  But  it  is  a  diffi- 
cult theory  to  maintain  on  the  basis  of 
Locke's  sensationalism,  for  on  that  the- 
ory of  knowledge  it  is  impossible  for  the 
Spirit  to  exercise  any  general  oversight, 
such  as  * 'strengthening  the  memory," 
guarding  against  errors,  etc.,  without 
conversing  orally  with  the  writer,  which 
would  amount  to  giving  him  a  verbal 
revelation.  Of  course  if  he  preferred  to 
use  his  own  words  instead  of  those  in 
which  the  Spirit  spoke  to  him,  it  would 
be  possible  to  do  so;  but  it  can  scarcely 
be  doubted  that  those  who  have  held 
this  theory,  and  Mr.  Campbell  among 
them,  did  not  conceive  of  the  Spirit  as 

201 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

giving  verbal  suggestions,  warnings,  re- 
minders and  corrections  to  the  writers, 
but  rather  as  exercising  some  undefined 
strengthening  influence.  A  strict  ad- 
herence to  the  logical  outcome  of  sen- 
sationalism would  have  led  to  a  view 
too  rigid  to  have  been  either  plausible  or 
endurable;  so  he  adopted  a  view  which 
had  much  to  recommend  it,  but  which 
was  not  entirely  in  harmony  with  the 
philosophical  basis. 

As  an  off-set  to  the  above  quotations 
which  appear  to  teach  plenary  verbal 
inspiration,  the  following  may  be  cited 
(^Christian  Baptist^  p.  344):  "I  do  not 
believe  that  the  book  commonly  called 
the  Bible  is  properly  denominated  a 
divine  revelation,  or  communication 
from  the  Deity  to  the  human  race.  At 
the  same  time  I  am  convinced  that  in 
this  volume  there  are  revelations  or 
communications  from  the  Deity  to 
man.''  It  will  be  noted  that  this  is  not 
unlike  the  current  phrase  that  *'the 
Bible  is  not  the  Word  of  God,  but  con- 
tains the  Word  of  God." 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

The  question  of  the  criterion  of  reve- 
lation is  well  summed  up  in  a  single 
sentence  (^Christian  Baptist^  p.  546): 
*'We  have  a  right  to  sit  in  judgment 
over  the  credentials  of  Heaven's  ambas- 
sador, but  we  have  no  right  to  sit  in 
judgment  over  the  information  he  gives 
us/'  It  is  the  province  of  human  reason 
to  determine  whether  what  claims  to  be 
divine  revelation  really  bears  the  marks 
of  its  divine  origin.  The  messages  of 
Jesus'and  of  certain  of  the  prophets  were 
proven  to  be  divine  by  their  miracles, 
and  the  well  attested  accounts  of  these 
miracles  are  the  chief  evidence  to-day  of 
the  reality  of  the  revelation  which  ac- 
companied them.  The  criterion  is  based 
entirely  on  the  senses.  The  miracles 
appeal  to  the  senses  and  can  therefore 
have  weight  with  the  reason.  The  rev- 
elation itself  pertains  to  a  realm  of  which 
the  senses  cannot  take  cognizance,  and 
therefore  it  cannot  be  tested  by  its  con- 
formity to  human  reason.  The  test  of 
divine  revelation  is  not  in  its  effects;  it 

is    not   internal   to    man,    but    external. 
203 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

Coleridge  made  the  supreme  test  of  re- 
ligion internal.  "I  accept  the  Bible  as 
divine  because  it  finds  me.  .  .  It  is 
inspired  because  it  inspires." 

The  Rules  for  Interpretation,  which 
Mr.  Campbell  laid  down  (  Christian  Sys- 
tem^ p.  i6),  exhibit  two  influences. 
First^  the  distinction  between  the  cove- 
nants leads  to  a  consequent  discrimina- 
tion in  the  use  of  the  documents  of  the 
different  dispensations.  This  was  per- 
haps his  most  important  exegetical  prin- 
ciple, and  its  connection  with  the  work 
of  Cocceius  has  already  been  pointed 
out.  Second^  the  common-sense  empir- 
ical method,  which  Bacon  applied  to 
science  and  lyocke  to  philosophy,  is 
reflected  in  those  rules  which  look  to 
careful  observation  of  the  original  mean- 
ing of  each  word,  the  noting  of  the 
time,  place,  circumstances,  and  purpose 
of  each  utterance.  These  rules,  simple 
and  obvious  as  they  are,  are  nothing  less 
than  an  application  of  the  Baconian 
method  of  observation  and  deduction  to 

the  interpretation  of  the  Bible.      Every 
204 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

verse,  every  statement  of  fact  in  the 
record,  is  to  be  considered  as  a  scientific 
phenomenon.  It  is  to  be  observed  as 
Bacon  observed  the  facts  of  nature,  and 
from  this  mass  of  particular  instances, 
gathered  by  the  empirical  method,  are 
to  be  deduced  the  general  truths  of  relig- 
ion and  the  laws  of  the  church. 

The  truths  thus  deduced  from  the 
New  Testament  are  the  sole  authority 
for  Christian  doctrine,  and  the  precepts 
of  the  apostles  and  the  precedent  of  the 
Apostolic  church  are  the  authority  for 
polity.  But  all  sects  pretend  to  draw 
their  opposing  views  from  the  Bible. 
The  trouble,  says  Mr.  Campbell,  arises 
because  they  do  not  state  the  doctrines 
in  the  language  of  Scripture.  "Now, 
suppose  that  all  these  would  abandon 
every  word  and  sentence  not  found  in 
the  Bible  and,  without  explanation,  lim- 
itation or  enlargement,  quote  with  equal 
pleasure  and  readiness  and  apply  on 
every  suitable  occasion  every  word  and 
sentence  found  in  the  volume;  how  long 

would  divisions  exist?     It  would  be  im- 
205 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

possible  to  perpetuate  them  on  this 
plan."  And  again:  ^'On  the  subject  of 
religion  I  am  fully  persuaded  that  noth- 
ing but  the  inspired  Scriptures  ought 
ever  to  have  been  published."  {Chris- 
tian Baptist^  p.  259). 

This  language,  if  its  force  were  not 
modified  by  Mr.  Campbell's  own  prac- 
tice, would  indicate  that  the  Bible  is  an 
authority  to  be  quoted  merely  and  not 
interpreted,  and  the  application  of  this 
method  would  lay  an  embargo  upon  all 
theological  thought.  And  this  would 
be  consistent,  too,  with  the  theory  of 
knowledge  which  limits  the  scope  of 
man's  rational  powers  to  things  perceiv- 
able by  the  senses. 

As  the  text  of  the  New  Testament  is 
the  absolute  authority  for  doctrine,  so 
the  precedent  of  the  Apostolic  church  is 
a  law  to  the  church  for  polity  and  wor- 
ship. Since  the  primitive  order  is 
authoritative,  the  need  of  the  church  is 
for  "a  restoration  of  the  Ancient  Order 

of    Things."     The    religion    of    Christ 
206 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION 

cannot  be  reformed;  it  can  only  be 
restored. 

The  great  prominence  into  which,  the 
term  "authority''  is  brought  by  Mr. 
Campbell,  prepares  one  for  the  assertion 
that  the  Bible  is  essentially  a  "law- 
book." Since  it  contains  every  spirit- 
ual idea  known  to  man,  and  presents  a 
perfect  revelation  of  God  and  of  the  will 
of  Christ,  it  is  to  be  conceived  of  as  the 
codified  law  of  an  absolute  monarch;  not 
as  a  record  of  religious  experiences,  but 
as  the  source  of  all  religion.  Those 
who  called  the  first  day  of  the  week 
"Sabbath"  and  cited  the  Fourth  Com- 
mandment as  authority  for  its  observ- 
ance, were  criticised,  not  because  their 
spirit  was  legalistic,  but  because  they 
mixed  two  laws  and  obeyed  neither. 
The  Christian  law  was  expressed  in  the 
apostolic  custom  of  breaking  bread  every 
Lord's  day,  and  this  law  was  as  rigidly 
binding  upon  Christians  as  the  law  of  the 
Sabbath  had  been  upon  the  Jews. 

This   somewhat  legalistic    conception 

-of  Christianity  is  not  to  be  entirely  ac- 
207 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

counted  for  by  any  one  or  two  causes. 
Its  proximate  cause  was  the  urgent  need 
of  an  interpretation  of  religion  which 
could  be  presented  in  a  simple  set  of 
positive  rules.  The  aspect  of  Christian- 
ity which  is  simplest,  most  readily 
grasped  and  most  easily  defended,  is  its 
legal  aspect,  and  it  was  that  phase  ac- 
cordingly which  received  most  imme- 
diate emphasis. 

With  Campbell's  emphasis  upon  the 
will  of  Christ,  expressed  in  the  form  of 
laws  and  codified  in  the  New  Testament 
as  the  ultimate  seat  of  religious  authority, 
it  is  worth  while  to  compare  those  Eng- 
lish ethical  theories  which,  from  the 
time  of  Hobbes,  had  found  the  ultimate 
ethical  authority  to  be  some  form  of  law. 
With  Hobbes,  morality  consisted  in  con- 
formity to  the  will  of  the  sovereign. 
With  Lrocke  it  was  obedience  to  the 
triple  law  of  God,  the  state,  and  public 
opinion.  Butler  and  Paley  emphasized 
the  theological  reference  and  made  the 
will  of  God  the  authority  for  ethics.    Mr. 

Campbell  transferred  the  same  principle 

208 


AUTHORITY  AND  INSPIRATION' 

to  religion,  including  Christian  doctrine 
and  church  polity,  and  considered  the 
Bible  as  the  complete  and  final  expres- 
sion of  the  will  of  God  on  these  topics. 
The  Christia7i  Baptist  rings  with  the  de- 
nunciation of  the  clergy,  because,  by 
assuming  for  themselves  the  sole  right 
of  interpretation,  they  had  virtually 
usurped  the  authority  of  Scripture. 

With  respect  to  the  problem  of  the 
seat  of  authority  in  religion,  Mr.  Camp- 
bell's position  affords  an  instructive 
comparison  and  contrast  with  the  Neo- 
Catholicism  of  the  Oxford  Movement, 
led  by  Newman,  Pusey  and  Froude. 
Both  were  reactionary  movements 
against  the  extreme  individualism  of  the 
eighteenth  century  philosophy  and  its 
self-confessed  failure  to  grive  knowledg-e 
of  ultimate  reality  or  religious  truth. 
Both  Newman  and  Campbell  took  it  at 
its  word.  Since,  then,  man  cannot  find 
within  himself  the  basis  for  either  cer- 
tainty or  unity  of  religious  belief,  re- 
course   must    be    had    to    an    external 

authority.         Newman      conceives      the 
14  209 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

church  to  be  the  agent  for  transmitting 
the  will  of  God  to  men,  and  what  is 
transmitted  is  the  grace  of  God,  an  up- 
lifting influence  which  makes  it  appeal 
rather  to  man's  emotions  than  to  his  in- 
tellect. With  Campbell,  on  the  other 
hand,  this  external  authority  is  lodged 
in  the  Bible,  which  is  the  repository  for 
a  deposit  of  divine  revelation  in  the 
form  of  ideas  and  commands  to  be  ap- 
prehended by  the  intellect. 

2IO 


Chapter  VI 
Faith  and  Repentance 


FAITH  AND   REPENTANCE. 

I.  Controversy  on  Nature  of  Faith: 

1.  Hervey:    Moravian — Methodism   mysticism. 

2.  Sandeman  and  McLean :  intellectualism. 

3.  Fuller:    a  mediating  position. 

4.  Degenerate  mysticism  of  Campbell's  day. 

II.    Mr.  Campbell's  View: 

1.  Faith — belief  of  testimony. 

2.  Repentance  is  reformation. 

3.  Relation  of  repentance  to  faith. 

III.    Campbell  Transcends  His  Own  Theology: 

1.  Includes  effects  in  causes. 

2.  Conversion  is  an  unbroken  process. 

3.  His     theological    definition    of    faith    was 

Lockian  intellectualism;    his  religious  use 
of  faith  centered  in  person  of  Christ. 

Note. — On  the  relation  of  Alexander  Campbell's 
view  of  faith  to  the  eighteenth  century  controversy, 
many  valuable  suggestions  may  be  found  in  Lon- 
gan's  Origin  of  the  Disciples  of  Christ,  a  volume 
which  is  in  all  respects  the  most  significant  contri- 
bution which  has  yet  been  made  to  the  philosoph- 
ical history  of  the  Disciples. 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE. 

In  the  eighteentli  century  there  arose 
in  England  a  notable  controversy  in  re- 
gard to  the  nature  of  faith.  James 
Hervey,  a  member  of  John  Wesley's 
society  at  Oxford,  which  was  nicknamed 
the  "Godly  Club"  and  which  was  the 
seed  of  Methodism,  wrote  the  "Dia- 
logues between  Theron  and  Aspasio,"  in 
which  he  expounded  the  Methodist- 
Moravian  conception  of  faith.  The  es- 
sential feature  of  this  view  was  its  em- 
phasis upon  that  item  of  Christian  expe- 
rience which  he  called  the  "sense  of 
adoption,''  and  the  identification  of  this 
emotional  condition  with  "saving  faith." 
There  are  two  elements  to  be  noted  in 
this  view:  first ^  it  makes  faith  a  state 
of  feeling,  rather  than  an  act  of  the  in- 
tellect; second^  it  places  faith  at  the  end 
oft  he  process  of  conversion,  rather  than 

at  its  beginning. 

213 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

Hervey's  book  called  forth  many  re- 
plies and  objections,  and  the  opponents 
of  his  view  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes  according  as  they  opposed  one  or 
both  of  the  above  mentioned  positions. 
Robert  Sandeman,  whose  name  is  fa- 
miliar through  his  connection  with  the 
Scotch  sect  known  as  Sandemanians, 
opposed  both  parts  of  Hervey's  thesis. 
He  maintained  that  faith  is  distinctly  an 
act  of  the  intellect,  in  which  it  appre- 
hends truth  through  the  acceptance  of 
testimony;  and  that  the  change  of  heart 
and  feeling,  which  constitutes  the  as- 
surance of  salvation,  is  the  effect  of 
faith.  Faith  is  therefore  given  the  first 
place  in  the  oj^do  salittis.  This  view  was 
also  adopted  by  Mcl^ean,  a  representa- 
tive Scotch  Baptist. 

A  second  protest  against  Hervey's 
view  came  from  Andrew  Fuller,  an  ac- 
knowledged leader  of  the  progressive 
English  Baptists.  In  his  book  entitled 
"The  Gospel  Worthy  of  all  Accepta- 
tion," he  asserts  that  faith  is  simply  be- 
lief of  what  God  has  said  and  that  the 
214 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE 

assurance  of  salvation,  which  comes  as 
an  emotional  experience,  is  something 
quite  distinct  from  faith;  but  he  still 
maintains,  like  Hervey,  that  faith  stands 
at  the  end  of  the  process  and  must  be 
preceded  by  repentance,  which  is  defined 
as  an  emotional  experience,  a  change  of 
heart. 

The  controversy  was  maintained  with 
some  vigor  through  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. Fuller's  mediating  position  found 
few  supporters,  and  the  parties  to  the 
controversy  found  it  easier  to  maintain 
one  or  the  other  of  the  extreme  posi- 
tions. The  much  needed  evangelical 
revival,  which  Wesley anism  was  instru- 
mental in  advancing,  gave  a  distinct 
practical  advantage  for  the  time  to  that 
view  which  emphasized  the  emotional 
element  of  religion,  and  that  portion  of 
the  religious  world  which  considered  it- 
self especially  evangelical  gave  general 
acceptance  to  Hervey's  view  of  both  the 
nature  and  the  place  of  faith. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  America  at 
the  time  when  Mr.  Campbell  began  his 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

work.  In  revolting  against  that  view  of 
religion  whicli  was  cold  and  formal  and 
gave  inadequate  recognition  to  the  im- 
portance of  a  change  of  heart,  there  was 
developed  a  Protestant  mysticism  which 
was,  in  Mr.  Campbell's  opinion,  unrea- 
sonable, untrue  and  confusing.  Instead 
of  presenting  to  the  sinner  certain  facts, 
backed  up  by  testimony  and  supported 
by  evidence,  and  telling  him  first  to  be- 
lieve these  facts,  and  then  to  make  his 
belief  of  them  the  basis  for  a  change  in 
his  manner  of  life,  and  to  let  his  feelings 
take  care  of  themselves,  they  sought 
first  to  arouse  a  sense  of  sinfulness,  then 
a  feeling  of  penitence  which  was  ex- 
pected to  be  accompanied  by  deep 
despondence,  until  there  came  a  demon- 
stration of  divine  forgiving  grace  which 
manifested  itself  in  an  emotional  ''assur- 
ance of  forgiveness," — and  this  was 
"saving  faith."  The  theological  found- 
ation for  this  popular  mysticism  was 
found  in  Hervey's  definition  of  faith. 
The    removal    of    these    abuses,    as  Mr. 

Campbell    considered   them,     demanded 
216 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE 

the  introduction  of  a  different  conception 
of  faith.  lyongan  says  ( Orighi  of  the 
Disciples  of  Christ,  p.  73)  that  Camp- 
bell's view  of  faith  and  the  priority  of 
change  of  heart  to  faith  was  "the  most 
fundamental  conception  of  what  may  be 
called  his  theology.''  We  have  found 
it  necessary  to  consider  his  conception  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  as  lying  at  the 
center  of  his  formulation  of  the  Christian 
system;  but  in  considering  the  process 
of  entering  the  Kingdom  of  God,  un- 
doubtedly the  idea  of  the  nature  of  faith 
and  its  relative  position  was  his  most 
fundamental  conception. 

The  documents  of  this  eighteenth  cen- 
tury controversy  were  carefully  studied 
by  Mr.  Campbell,  and  when  he  under- 
took the  formulation  of  his  views  upon 
faith,  it  was  with  a  full  acquaintance  with 
what  had  already  been  said  on  both  sides 
of  the  subject.  His  teaching  in  regard 
to  faith  may  be  stated  as  follows: 

"Faith  is  the  belief  of  testimony. 
Where    testimony  begins,    faith   begins; 

and  where  testimony  ends,  faith  ends." 

217 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

As  we  get  all  knowledge  of  the  external 
world  through  the  five  senses,  so  we  get 
our  acquaintance  with  all  other  facts 
through  testimony.  Faith,  therefore,  is 
equivalent  to  an  extension  of  sense  per- 
ception. History  and  narrative  are  only 
other  names  for  testimony.  There  is 
only  one  kind  of  faith,  and  that  is  his- 
torical faith,  because  it  is  the  acceptance 
of  an  historical  record.  The  validity  of 
faith  is  tested  by  the  evidences  of  gen- 
uineness which  the  testimony  brings 
with  it.  The  differences  and  degrees  of 
value  which  attach  to  different  beliefs, 
depend  solely  upon  the  facts  which  are 
believed.  The  facts  which  are  the  ob- 
ject of  Christian  faith  are  summed  up  in 
the  proposition  that  '  'Jesus  is  the  Mes- 
siah, the  Son  of  God.''  Faith  in  that 
fact  is  saving  faith,  because  it  is  faith  in 
a  saving  fact.  As  it  is  not  eating  that 
keeps  the  body  alive,  but  the  food  that 
is  eaten;  so  we  are  not  saved  by  the  act 
of  believing,  but  by  the  facts  of  the  Gos- 
pel which  we  are  able,  by  faith,  to  apply 

to  our  own   salvation.      Hence  when  we 
218 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE 

say  we  are  "justified  by  faith,"  faith  is 
not  to  be  understood  as  a  meritorious 
act  in  reward  for  which  salvation  is 
granted,  for  that  would  reduce  justifica- 
tion by  faith  to  a  mere  particular  phase 
of  justification  by  good  works.  On  this 
point  Campbell  differed  radically  from 
Sandeman  and  McLrCan,  who  held  that 
justification  by  faith  excludes  the  efficacy 
of  all  holy  dispositions  after  the  first  act 
of  faith,  and  that  "the  bare  belief  of 
the  bare  truth"  is  imputed  to  us  for 
righteousness. 

As  faith  is  simply  belief  of  testimony, 
it  comes  about  in  a  purely  natural  way 
whenever  sufficient  testimony  is  pre- 
sented. It  is  useless  to  attempt  to  make 
men  believe  by  threats,  persuasion,  ex- 
hortation, or  emotional  excitement. 
"No  person  can  help  believing  when 
sufficient  evidence  is  presented  and  no 
man  can  believe  without  evidence." 
"Such  is  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind  that  a  man  is  as  passive  in  believ- 
ing as  he  was  in  receiving  his  name,  or 

as  the  eye   is  in  receiving  the  rays  of 
219 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

light  that  fall  upon  it  from  the  sun; 
consequently  no  man  can  help  believing 
when  the  evidence  of  truth  arrests  his 
attention/'  (^Christian  Baptist^  ^.  142.) 
This  extreme  statement  was  intended  to 
emphasize  the  naturalness  of  the  origin 
of  faith  when  evidence  is  presented,  and 
to  show  that  no  exercise  of  divine  power 
is  needed  to  create  faith  in  each  indi- 
vidual. It  is  therefore  unnecessary  and 
inappropriate  to  pray  for  faith.  If  a 
man  wants  faith,  all  he  has  to  do  is  to 
lay  aside  his  blinding  prejudices  and  ex- 
amine the  evidence  and  the  testimony. 
Though  the  eye  is  passive  in  receiving 
the  rays  of  light,  yet  a  man  has  the 
power  to  open  his  eyes.  The  human 
will  has  power  over  the  act  of  belief,  be- 
cause it  has  control  of  the  conditions 
which  precede  belief.  Unbelief  is  volun- 
tary blindness;  it  is  sin.  On  this  point 
again  Mr.  Campbell  differed  from  the 
Sandemanians,  who  had  maintained  that 
special  spiritual  influences  were  necessary 
to  produce  in  each  individual  that  belief  of 
divine  testimony  which  constitutes  faith. 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE 

While  Campbell  agreed  with  Sandeman 
in  two  important  points  in  regard  to  faith, 
viz.,  its  nature  and  its  place  in  the  order 
of  events,  it  will  be  seen  that  he  differed 
from  him  on  two  others  equally  impor- 
tant: the  value  of  faith,  and  the  way  in 
which  it  is  produced.  The  last  point 
especially  was  the  one  which  gave  its 
distinctive  character  to  his  method  of 
presenting  the  Gospel. 

Mr.  Campbell's  views  of  faith,  of  re- 
pentance, and  of  the  relation  between 
the  two,  are  so  closely  and  logically  con- 
nected that  it  is  impossible  to  set  forth 
one  apart  from  the  others.  That  view 
of  faith  which  had  considered  it  the  last 
stage  in  the  process  of  conversion  and 
something  for  which  the  sinner  must 
wait  until  it  pleased  God  to  give  it  to 
him,  necessarily  considered  repentance 
as  a  sorrow  which  could  find  no  imme- 
diate issue  in  reformation.  Repentance 
came  before  faith,  and  it  was  separated 
from  reformation  by  a  period  of  waiting 
and  seeking  for  the  assurance  of  pardon. 
But    when    Campbell    put     faith    first, 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

reformation  could  follow  immediately. 
His  own  definition  of  repentance  is  com- 
prehensive and  fully  indicative  of  the 
practical  character  which  he  ascribed 
to  it. 

To  the  Jews  repentance  meant 
* 'change  your  views  of  the  person  and 
character  of  the  Messiah  and  change 
your  behavior  toward  him;  put  your- 
selves under  his  government  and  guid- 
ance, and  obey  him."  To  the  Gentiles 
it  meant  "change  your  views  of  the 
character  of  God  and  of  his  government, 
and  receive  his  Son  as  his  ambassador; 
and  yield  him  the  required  homage  by 
receiving  his  favor  and  honoring  his  in- 
stitutions. This  is  reformation  towards 
God  and  faith  in  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ.'' 

This  statement  indicates  not  only  the 
practical  character  of  repentance,  as  Mr. 
Campbell  conceived  it,  but  the  extreme 
difficulty  which  he  experienced  in  sepa- 
rating the  various  items  in  the  process  of 
salvation  for  purposes  of  definition.  Be- 
ginning with  an  attempt  to  define 
repentance,  he  ends  by  stating  that  what 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE 

he  has  defined  is  both  faith  and  repent- 
ance. And  yet  there  is  no  difficulty  in 
understanding  his  thought;  and  this 
very  tendency  to  unite  the  elements 
even  in  definition,  indicates  how  close 
was  the  union  between  them  in  his 
mind.  The  test  of  faith  is  in  its  fruit- 
age of  reformation.  The  value  of  refor- 
mation is  that  it  springs  from  faith. 
The  change  of  heart  and  the  change  of 
life  are  so  inseparable  that  the  two  are 
united  under  a  single  name, — repent- 
ance. 

It  was  characteristic  of  Mr.  Camp- 
bell's mode  of  thought  to  include  effects 
with  causes  in  a  manner  which  did  not 
conduce  to  clearness  of  definition.  So, 
after  defining  faith  as  simply  the  accept- 
ance of  confirmed  testimony,  he  says 
elsewhere  that  faith  includes  trust  or 
confidence,  because  belief  of  statements 
about  Christ  leads  to  trust  in  him. 
Likewise  repentance  is  made  to  include 
not  only  sorrow  for  sins  and  the  resolu- 
tion to  forsake  sin,  but  also  the  actual 

reformation  of  life,  which  is  the  test  of 
223 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

the  genuineness  of  the  resolution.  In 
any  case,  it  was  his  purpose  to  guard 
against  the  idea  that  repentance  was  a 
mere  feeling.  The  emotional  element 
must  be  kept  in  the  background  to  in- 
sure emphasis  upon  the  practical  out- 
come which  was  desired. 

This  apparent  confusion  of  definitions 
has  the  further  value  of  representing  in 
a  very  life-like  way  the  fact  that  these 
several  acts,  which  analysis  may  isolate 
and  theological  science  may  define  sep- 
arately, are  really  parts  of  one  connected 
and  unbroken  process.  Conversion  is  a 
change  of  the  whole  man.  It  is  a  sec- 
tion of  human  life,  and  life  is  always 
both  a  concrete  and  a  complex  thing. 
No  definitions  of  faith  or  repentance  or 
regeneration,  however  accurate  as  an- 
alyses of  the  psychological  phenomena, 
can  be  adequate,  if  they  represent  these 
several  items  as  so  far  disconnected  that 
they  can  be  defined  without  reference  to 
each  other.  A  picture  of  a  moving 
body,    to   be    accurate,    must    show   the 

motion  as  well  as  the  body  that  moves; 

224 


FAITH  AND  REPENTANCE 

and  a  definition  of  the  elements  of  a 
complex  psychological  process,  such  as 
conversion,  must  exhibit  the  continuity 
of  the  process,  even  at  the  expense  of 
the  clearness  of  some  of  the  details. 

It  was  a  wholesome  realization  of  the 
importance  of  representing  the  whole 
process  of  conversion  as  a  vital  unity, 
that  saved  Mr.  Campbell  from  falling 
into  the  intellectualism  which  was  war- 
ranted by  his  philosophical  presuppo- 
sitions. When  faith  is  isolated  for 
definition,  it  is  conceived  in  a  purely 
intellectual  form  as  the  acquisition  of 
information  through  testimony,  the  ac- 
ceptance of  certain  propositions  as  true. 
Applying  strictly  this  theological  defi- 
nition, the  object  of  faith  is  certainly 
not  a  person  but  statements  about  a  per- 
son. Campbell's  I^ockian  conception  of 
faith  stopped  here.  But  he  saw  at  once 
that,  considering  faith  not  as  an  isolated 
mental  act,  but  as  the  first  step  in  a 
change  of  the  whole  man,  the  accept- 
ance of  a  certain  proposition  about  Jesus 

led  immediately  to  a  certai  n  attitude  of 
15  225 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

the  person  toward  him  as  a  person.  For 
religious  purposes,  the  object  of  faith  is 
the  person  of  Jesus  in  whom  the  believer 
is  to  trust  as  a  Savior.  But  the  theo- 
logical definition  seldom  gets  beyond  the 
assertion  that  faith  in  Jesus  is  accept- 
ance of  a  certain  proposition  about  him. 
It  can  be  said  therefore  that,  as  regards 
the  conception  of  faith,  his  theological 
position  was  a  thorough  intellectualism; 
but  the  practical  application  of  that  in- 
tellectualism was  to  counteract  a  deteri- 
orated Protestant  mysticism,  and  in  its 
highest  religious  uses  it  issues  in  a  lofty 
conception  of  faith  as  trust  in  a  person. 
This  is  not  the  only  case  in  which  Mr. 
Campbell  transcends  the  limits  of  his 
own  theology  and  gives  recognition  to 
truths  which  cannot  easily  be  fitted  into 

his  system  of  thought. 
226 


Chapter  VII 
Baptism 


BAPTISM. 

I.    Development   oe    Campbell's   View  of 
Baptism  : 

1.  Influences  in  Ireland  and  Scotland. 

2.  Declaration  and  Address — its  logical  conse- 

quences, 

3.  Immersion  of  penitent  believers. 

4.  Development  of    design  of    baptism: 

(1)  Walker  Debate,  1820,— ''connected 
with  remission". 

(2)  McCalla  Debate,  1823,— design  of  bap- 
tism clearly  stated,  but  only  as  argu- 
ment for  believers'  baptism. 

(3)  Rice  Debate,  1843,— baptism  for  re- 
mission, a  separate  issue. 

II.     Campbell's  Final  Doctrine  of  Baptism: 

1.  Antecedents — objective  and  subjective. 

2.  Action — immersion. 

3.  Subjects — penitent  believers. 

4.  Design — remission,  a  change  of  state. 

III.  Influence  of  the  Sources. 

228 


BAPTISM. 

Since  Mr.  Campbell's  final  view  of 
the  nature  and  significance  of  the  ordi- 
nance of  baptism  is  in  some  important 
particulars  unlike  that  of  any  system 
current  during  his  formative  period,  cer- 
tainly no  exception  can  be  made  in  this 
case  to  the  assertion  that  his  view  was 
not  borrowed  directly  from  any  source. 
In  the  consideration  of  this  doctrine  and 
the  relation  which  Mr.  Campbell's  view 
bore  to  those  influences  which  we  have 
called  his  sources,  it  will  be  especially 
apparent  that  he  was  indebted  to  those 
sources  for  suggestions  and  principles, 
but  not  for  products. 

In  a  general  way  it  may  be  said  that, 
in  his  final  view,  Mr.  Campbell  agreed 
with  the  Baptists  as  to  the  form  and 
subjects  of  baptism,  while  as  to  its  signif- 
icance he  sought   a  via  media  between 

baptismal  regeneration,  which   as  ordi- 
229 


ALEXAXDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

narily  interpreted  means  a  species  of 
magic,  and  the  Baptist  theory  that  the 
rite  is  a  symbol  of  a  change  which  has 
already  taken  place  in  a  man. 

The  historical  development  of  ]\Ir. 
Campbell's  doctrine  of  baptism  can  be 
traced  with  more  completeness  than 
the  growth  of  any  other  of  his  ideas. 
Thomas  Campbell  was  a  minister  in 
the  Anti-Burgher  branch  of  the  Sece- 
der  section  of  the  Presbyterian  Church, 
and  under  the  influence  of  this  relig- 
ious body  Alexander  grew  to  manhood. 
This  body  held  fast  to  the  view  of 
baptism  which  was  at  that  time  con- 
sidered orthodox  by  all  Protestants  ex- 
cept the  Baptists.  He  was  sprinkled  in 
infancy,  as  a  youth  "fell  under  convic- 
tion" in  the  usual  way,  had  all  the  ordi- 
nary religious  experience  of  the  time, 
with  rather  more  than  the  usual  fervor, 
and  became  an  active  member  of  the 
church.  The  subject  of  baptism  never 
came  up  for  consideration  in  the  early 
days  in  Ireland  before  Thomas  Campbell 
emigrated  to  Pennsylvania. 


BAPTISM 


The  only  disturbing  element  among 
the  religious  influences  of  that  period 
came  from  the  Independents  of  Rich 
Hill,  a  congregation  of  free  and  uncon- 
ventional thinkers  who  had  received  an 
impulse  from  the  eighteenth  century 
Evangelical  Movement  in  England,  and 
whose  zeal  and  love  of  liberty  had  been 
quickened  by  visits  from  such  bold 
spirits  as  the  free-lance  evangelist,  Row- 
land Hill.  The  period  of  sympathetic 
contact  with  this  congregation  assisted 
in  whetting  Alexander  Campbell's  appe- 
tite for  new  truth,  but  the  subject  of 
baptism  was  not  one  which  came  under 
discussion. 

After  the  emigration  of  Thomas  Camp- 
bell to  America,  a  series  of  fortunate 
accidents,  culminating  in  shipwreck  off 
the  west  coast  of  Scotland,  brought 
Alexander  to  Glasgow  for  nearly  a  year. 
It  was  through  his  acquaintance  with 
the  Rich  Hill  Independents  that  he  re- 
ceived a  letter  of  introduction  to  Mr. 
Greville  Ewing  of  Glasgow,  and  it  was 

through    Mr.    Ewing   that    he    came  in 
231 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

touch  with  one  of  the  most  important 
practical  religious  movements  of  the  day 
under  the  leadership  of  the  Haldane 
brothers.  Beginning  with  a  sincere  de- 
sire to  preach  the  Gospel  to  the  heathen, 
in  an  age  when  both  the  established  and 
the  Seceder  churches  in  Scotland  re- 
fused to  countenance  any  foreign  mis- 
sionary enterprise,  these  two  brothers, 
both  men  of  wealth,  themselves  became 
a  missionary  society  and  a  board  or  min- 
isterial education. 

The  religious  condition  of  Scotland 
at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury was  comparable  to  that  of  England 
at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth,  and 
the  remedial  measures  were  not  unlike. 
Wesleyanism  and  the  Evangelical  revi- 
val shook  Anglicanism  from  her  slum- 
ber; the  evangelistic  campaign  sup- 
ported by  the  Haldanes  was  part  of  the 
movement  by  which  religion  in  Scotland 
was  revived  after  the  reign  of  Moderat- 
ism.  It  was  not  a  theological  move- 
ment, and  considerable  discrepancies  in 

theological     opinion      actually     existed 
232 


BAPTISM 

-among  the  several  participants.  It  was 
primarily  a  religious  quickening,  and  it 
issued  in  the  formation  of  several  con- 
gregations which  were  conspicuous  for 
their  zeal  for  evangelization  and  good 
works,  and  for  their  disregard  of  the 
lifeless  formalism  and  dogmatism  which 
characterized  both  the  established  church 
and  the  seceders. 

The  subject  of  baptism  had  come  into 
prominence  among  this  group  of  men 
shortly  after  Mr.  Campbell  reached  Glas- 
gow. James  A.  Haldane  had  been  im- 
mersed the  previous  year  and  his  brother 
Robert  soon  followed  his  example.  The 
Glasites,  a  Scottish  sect  which  arose 
early  in  the  eighteenth  century,  had 
adopted  immersion  some  years  before 
and  were  very  strict  about  it,  as  they 
were  about  all  points  of  their  discipline. 
They  had  come  to  be  called  "Scotch 
Baptists",  though  their  origin  and  their 
tenets  were  different  from  those  of  the 
regular  Baptists.  The  congregation  of 
Independents  in  Glasgow  under  David 
Dale  (the  father-in-law  of  Robert  Owen) 
233 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

had  split  twice  on  the  question  of  im- 
mersion and  some  other  matters.  Mr. 
Ewing,  on  the  other  hand,  though  he 
was  working  with  the  Haldanes,  re- 
mained a  firm  adherent  to  the  old  posi- 
tion, and  there  resulted  a  division  in  the 
Haldane  church  in  Glasgow.  The  im- 
mersionist  wing  was  willing  to  tolerate 
pedobaptists,  but  the  pedobaptists,  head- 
ed by  Mr.  Ewing,  would  not  tolerate  the 
immersionists.  Mr.  Innes,  who  came 
to  preach  for  the  pedobaptist  branch, 
changed  his  views  and  went  over  to  the 
other  party,  and  so  did  William  Stevens, 
who  was  in  charge  of  the  Haldanes^ 
Edinburgh  Seminary. 

Such  were  the  agitations  to  which 
this  question  was  giving  rise  at  this 
time.  But  in  spite  of  this  fact,  there  is 
no  evidence  that  Alexander  Campbell 
seriously  considered  the  question  of  bap- 
tism at  this  time.  His  close  association 
with  Mr.  Greville  Ewing  did  not  pre- 
vent him  from  siding  with  the  Haldanes 
in  some  controversies  on  matters  of 
administration  which  disturbed  their 
234 


BAPTISM 

friendly  relations  at  that  time,  and  it  is 
certain  that  he  did  not  imbibe  from  Mr. 
Ewing  the  latter's  deep-seated  aversion 
to  immersion.  Although  on  some  other 
matters  he  found  himself  out  of  accord 
with  the  denomination  in  which  he  had 
been  [reared,  and  before  leaving  Glasgow 
definitely  renounced  the  communion  of 
the  Seceder  Presbyterian  Church,  it  ap- 
pears that  in  regard  to  baptism  he  held 
to  his  original  view,  while  looking  with 
a  spirit  of  easy-going  toleration  upon 
those  who  adopted  immersion. 

While    Alexander    Campbell   was   in 
Glasgow,  his   father,  in  western    Penn- 
sylvania, wrote  his  Declaration  and  Ad- 
dress, the  primary  aim  of  which  was  to 
promote    union,   and    the    fundamental 
principle  of  which  was  expressed  in  the 
aphorism,  ^ 'Where  the  Scriptures  speak 
we  speak,  where  the  Scriptures  are  silent 
we    are    silent."     When   this    principle 
was  enunciated  by  Thomas  Campbell  for 
the  first  time,  one  of  his  auditors,  An- 
drew  Munro,  a    Presbyterian,   arose   in 
the  congregation  and  said  that  the  prin- 
235 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

■ciple  was  dangerous,  for  it  would  require 
the  giving  up  of  the  practice  of  infant 
baptism.  Mr.  Campbell  said  he  would 
be  willing  to  give  it  up  if  it  was  not  in 
the  Bible,  but  felt  assured  that  it  could 
be  supported  by  Scriptural  authority. 
He  admitted  that  it  was  hard  to  frame  a 
positive  argument  for  it,  but  urged  long 
precedent,  that  there  was  no  reason  to 
be  in  a  hurry  to  abandon  it,  that  it 
should  be  made  a  matter  of  forbearance, 
that  form  was  not  essential  and  that 
baptism  was  not  a  matter  of  prime  im- 
portance like  faith  and  righteousness. 
His  only  positive  argument  for  the  bap- 
tism of  infants  was  the  analogy  with 
circumcision. 

It  was  at  this  point  that  Alexander 
Campbell  arrived  from  Scotland.  On 
reading  the  proof-sheets  of  the  Declara- 
tion and  Address,  he  was  confronted 
with  the  question  of  infant  baptism.  A 
Presbyterian  preacher,  a  Mr.  Riddle, 
with  whom  he  consulted,  warned  him 
that   the   principles   laid   down   in   the 

Address   would    make    him    a    Baptist. 
236 


BAPTISM 

Witti  a  view  to  disproving  this  asser- 
tion for  his  own  peace  of  mind,  Mr. 
Campbell  secured  all  the  books  he  could 
find  on  the  subject  from  the  pedobaptist 
standpoint,  and  gave  them  a  thorough 
study.  Contrary  to  his  expectation  and 
intention,  he  emerged  from  this  study 
convinced  that  there  was  no  scriptural 
authority  for  infant  baptism.  Still  he 
allowed  his  father  to  persuade  him  for  a 
time  that  there  was  no  need  to  make  a 
disturbance  about  it;  that  it  was  not 
worth  while  to  split  the  church  over  the 
question,  or  to  demand  immersion  of 
those  who  had  already  been  sprinkled 
as  infants,  or  to  be  immersed  themselves. 
The  position  was,  of  course,  an  illog- 
ical one,  considering  the  principles  of 
the  Declaration  and  Address,  and  it  could 
not  have  continued  long.  The  events 
which  followed  forced  them  to  assume  a 
more  consistent  attitude.  Thomas  Camp- 
bell was  rejected  by  the  Synod  of  Pitts- 
burg because  he  said  that  infant  baptism 
was  unauthorized.  In  reviewing  this 
action  of  the  Synod,  Alexander  Camp- 
237 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

bell  for  the  first  time  formulated  and 
systematized  his  views  on  the  subject. 
Some  members  of  the  Brush  Run  con- 
gregation, which  had  been  organized  on 
the  principles  of  the  Declaration  and  Ad- 
dress, insisted  on  being  immersed  and 
Thomas  Campbell  reluctantly  consented 
to  act,  but  did  not  go  into  the  water 
himself.  The  birth  of  Alexander  Camp- 
bell's first  child  forced  upon  him  the 
question  as  to  whether  he  should  christ- 
en it.  A  thorough  re-study  of  the 
whole  question  was  made.  A  short  time 
before,  in  a  sermon  on  the  Commission, 
he  had  stated  that  it  was  not  scriptural 
to  make  it  a  term  of  communion,  so  he 
let  it  slip.  Now  he  reached  the  conclu- 
sion that  he  was  an  unbaptized  man  and 
that  it  was  an  important  matter.  The 
child  was  not  christened,  and  Thomas 
and  Alexander  Campbell  were  immersed. 
The  question  of  the  form  of  baptism 
and  its  importance  as  a  scriptural  term 
of  fellowship,  had  now  been  settled.  On 
both  of  these  topics,  the  position  taken 

was  precisely  that  of  the  Baptists,  but 
238 


BAPTISM 

it  will  be  seen  from  the  preceding  sketch 
that  the  direct  influence  of  Baptist  teach- 
ing played  a  very  small  part,  if  any  at 
all,  in  the  development  of  Mr.  Camp- 
belPs  views  on  the  subject  of  baptism. 
It  was  natural  that  the  congregation, 
which  had  advanced  to  this  position  with 
the  Campbells,  should  seek  and  find  fel- 
lowship among  the  Baptists.  The  points 
yet  to  be  worked  out  were  the  pre- 
requisites and  the  design  of  baptism,  and 
it  was  at  these  points  that  there  were 
developed  divergences  from  the  accepted 
Baptist  doctrines,  which  issued  finally  in 
the  separation  of  the  new  movement 
from  that  denomination. 

The  working  out  of  the  design  of  bap- 
tism may  be  said  to  have  been  accom- 
plished in  three  periods,  marked  by  an 
increasing  clearness  in  the  explanation 
of  the  phrase,  ^'baptism  for  the  remis- 
sion of  sins,"  and  by  an  increasing  em- 
phasis upon  the  importance  of  this  con- 
ception in  the  Christian  system.  As  the 
doctrine  was  worked  out  in  debates  for 
polemic  use,  so  the  phases  of  its  devel- 
239 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

opment  are  to  be  traced  in  three  great 
debates:  first,  the  Walker  debate  in 
1820;  second,  the  McCalla  debate  in 
1823;  third,  the  Rice  debate  in  1843. 

(i)  In  the  debate  with  Mr.  Walker, 
in  which  Mr.  Campbell  appeared  as  the 
champion  of  the  Baptist  position  against 
a  Presbyterian,  Walker's  sole  argument 
for  infant  baptism  was  based  on  the 
analogy  between  baptism  and  circum- 
cision, involving  the  presupposition  that 
the  covenant  on  which  the  Christian 
Church  is  built  is  the  same  as  that  on 
which  the  Jewish  Church  was  built. 
Mr.  Campbell  endeavored,  by  making  the 
distinction  between  the  dispensations,  to 
overthrow  the  basis  of  this  argument. 
He  objected  to  the  statement  that  bap- 
tism is  the  seal  of  the  covenant  as  cir- 
cumcision had  been  with  the  Jews.  He 
said:  * 'Baptism  is  connected  with  the 
remission  of  sins  and  the  gift  of  the 
Holy  Spirit."  This  general  statement 
of  the  design  of  the  ordinance  was  not 
in  this  debate  elaborated  or  further  de- 
fined, and  it  is  used  only  as  an  argu- 
240 


BAPTISM 

ment  against  the  baptism  of  infants. 
The  Baptists  were  satisfied  with  the  out- 
come of  the  debate  and  the  virtual  defeat 
of  their  opponent,  but  they  were  not 
altogether  pleased  with  the  arguments 
by  which  the  victory  had  been  won. 

(2)  The  debate  with  Mr.  McCalla 
dealt  with  the  same  questions  as  that 
with  Mr.  Walker  and  in  much  the  same 
way.  We  find  here  a  distinct  affirmation 
that  baptism  is  for  the  remission  of  sins 
and  an  exposition  of  that  doctrine,  in- 
cluding the  distinction  between  real  and 
formal  remission  of  sins.  He  says:  *'I 
know  it  will  be  said  that  I  have  affirmed 
that  baptism  saves  us.  Well,  Peter  and 
Paul  have  said  so  before  me. ' '  (  Richard- 
son's Memoirs^  //.,p.  81.)  Again:  "The 
blood  of  Jesus  Christ  then  really  cleanses 
us  from  all  sin.  Behold  the  goodness  of 
God  in  giving  us  Si  formal  iokQ.n  of  it,  by 
ordaining  baptism  expressly  for  the  re- 
mission of  sins."  "Paul's  sins  were 
really  pardoned  when  he  believed,  yet  he 
had   no   solemn  pledge  of   the  fact,  no 

formal  acquittal,  no  formal  purgation  of 
16  241 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

liis  sins,  till  lie  had  washed  them  away 
in  the  water  of  baptism."  (Richard- 
son's Memoirs^  11.^  p.  82.)  The  remis- 
sion, both  real  and  formal,  has  reference 
to  the  personal  sins  of  the  individual, 
and  does  not  refer  to  inherited  "original 
sin";  hence  it  does  not  apply  to  infants. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  although  the  design 
of  baptism  is  here  fairly  developed,  it  is 
still  used  only  as  an  argument  to  prove 
the  invalidity  of  infant  baptism. 

(3)  The  period  of  the  publication  of 
the  Christian  Baptist  saw  a  further  work- 
ing out  of  the  design  of  baptism,  the 
effect  of  which  was  to  give  greater  promi- 
nence in  Mr.  CampbelPs  system  to  those 
ideas  which  had  been  previously  devel- 
oped. Perhaps  the  most  important  fac- 
tor in  bringing  about  this  increased 
emphasis  on  the  doctrine  of  baptism  for 
the  remission  of  sins,  was  the  influence 
of  Walter  Scott,  who,  in  1827,  gave  sys- 
tem to  a  mass  of  ideas  which  had  been 
previously  worked  out,  by  proclaiming 
the  or  do  salutis — faith,   repentance  and 

baptism — and  the  relation  in  which  these 
242 


BAPTISM 

several  factors  stand  one  to  another. 
Faith  is  the  change  in  mental  attitude; 
repentance  the  change  in  the  ideal  of 
life  and  the  beginning  of  the  change  in 
conduct;  baptism  produces  the  change  in 
state  whereby  the  penitent  believer  re- 
ceives formal  pardon  for  his  sins.  Mr. 
Campbell  at  once  adopted  this  arrange- 
ment, the  separate  elements  of  which  he 
had  already  enunciated,  but  which  he 
had  not  yet  arranged  systematically,  and 
thenceforth  the  teaching  of  baptism  by 
immersion  of  believers  only  becomes 
rather  a  corollary  of  the  doctrine  of  bap- 
tism for  the  remission  of  sins;  instead  of 
the  latter  being,  as  before,  merely  an 
argument  for  the  support  of  the  former. 
This  added  emphasis  upon  the  design  of 
baptism  is  seen  in  the  debate  with  Mr. 
Rice  in  1843,  i^  which  Mr.  Campbell 
maintained  as  a  separate  proposition  that 
"Christian  baptism  is  for  the  remission 
of  past  sins."  And  in  Christian  Bap- 
tism (p.  248)  he  says:  "The  design  of 
this  institution  has  long  been  thrown  in 
the  shade  because  of  the  wordy  and  im- 
243 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

passioned  controversy  about  what  the 
action  is,  and  who  may  be  the  proper 
subject  of  it.  Whatever  importance 
there  may  be  in  settling  these  questions, 
that  importance  is  wholly  to  be  appreci- 
ated by  the  design  of  the  institution. 
This  is  the  only  value  of  it." 

An  understanding  of  Mr.  Campbell's 
final  position  on  the  doctrine  is  to  be 
reached  by  a  study  of  the  Christian 
Syste77i  (1835),  the  debate  with  Rice 
(1843)  ^^^  Christian  Baptism  (1852). 
The  subject  may  conveniently  be  con- 
sidered under  the  divisions  which  are 
employed  in  Christian  Baptism. 

I.  The  antecedeiits  of  baptism  may 
be  classified  as  objective  and  subjective 
antecedents.  The  objective  antecedent 
is  the  Bible,  in  which  baptism  is  enjoined 
as  a  direct  command  of  Christ,  a  ''pecu- 
liar and  positive  ordinance."  The  au- 
thority of  Christ  as  a  lawgiver  and  of  the 
New  Testament  as  his  law-book  is  the 
first  presupposition.  Baptism  is  a  "posi- 
tive," as  distinguished  from  a  "moral," 

requirement;  the  virtue  and  value  of  it 
244 


BAPTISM 

lie,  not  in  any  inherent  fitness  of  tlie 
ordinance,  but  in  the  fact  that  it  is  com- 
manded. The  subjective  antecedents 
represent  the  attitude  of  the  individual 
toward  the  truth  and  toward  his  own 
past  sins  in  the  light  of  the  truth;  they 
are  faith  and  repentance. 

2.  The  action  is  immersion  in  water 
in  the  name  of  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy 
Spirit.  The  arguments  for  this  are 
chiefly  philological,  and  these  are  worked 
out  with  a  degree  of  thoroughness  which 
leaves  little  to  be  added  on  the  subject. 

3.  The  subjects  of  baptism  are  peni- 
tent believers;  i.  e.,  those  who  have  ful- 
filled the  requirements  presented  as  sub- 
jective antecedents. 

4.  The  design  of  baptism,  or  the 
change  which  it  is  intended  to  effect,  is 
"the  remission  of  sins."  The  use  of 
this  Biblical  phrase  in  connection  with 
baptism  has  been  a  cause  of  much 
offense  and  many  accusations.  If  it  were 
meant  that  baptism,  and  baptism  alone, 
produces  the  entire  change  in  man 
whereby  he  passes  from  the  condition  of 

245 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

a  condemned  sinner  to  that  of  a  pardoned 
saint,  lie  would  be  rightly  accused  of 
teaching  baptismal  regeneration,  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  He  is  saved 
from  that  by  making  a  distinction  be- 
tween the  s^a^e  of  a  man  and  the  c/ta7'- 
acter  of  a  man,  and  between  real  and 
formal  remission  of  sins.  These  two 
distinctions  are  closely  connected.  Real 
remission  expresses  God's  attitude  to- 
ward the  past  sins  of  a  man  who  has 
changed  his  character  through  faith  and 
repentance.  Formal  remission  expresses 
God's  attitude  toward  those  sins  when 
the  man  has  changed  also  his  state;  i.  e., 
has  entered  the  state  of  sonship  or  of 
citizenship  in  the  kingdom  of  God, 
through  fulfillment  of  the  positive  re- 
quirements which  are  the  conditions  of 
entrance. 

This  distinction,  which  avoids  bap- 
tismal regeneration,  is  not  to  be  inter- 
preted as  belittling  baptism,  by  making 
it  effect  a  mere  change  of  state,  for  the 
entrance  into  the  new  state  is  a  matter  of 

importance.     It  is   necessary  for  the  en- 
246 


BAPTISM 

joyment  of  its  privileges.  Mr.  Camp- 
bell's standing  illustration  of  this  was 
the  analogy  of  a  foreigner  coining  to 
this  country.  He  may  believe  in  our 
government  and  give  it  the  allegiance  of 
his  heart,  but  he  cannot  enjoy  the  privi- 
leges of  citizenship  until  he  has  changed 
his  state  from  that  of  an  alien  to  that  of 
a  citizen,  by  naturalization  through  the 
process  duly  prescribed  by  law.  Bap- 
tism, like  naturalization,  is  the  formal 
oath  of  allegiance  by  which  an  alien 
becomes  a  citizen.  In  neither  case  does 
the  form  in  itself  effect  any  magical 
change  in  the  subject's  disposition.  In 
both  cases  a  change  of  opinion  and  of 
affections  is  presupposed,  and  the  form  is 
the  culmination  of  a  process. 

With  this  distinction  between  char- 
acter and  state,  compare  the  distinction 
between  positive  and  moral  precepts. 
Remission  of  sins  follows  immersion, 
just  as  the  falling  of  the  walls  of  Jeri- 
cho followed  the  blowing  of  the  rams' 
horns.     In  both  cases  the  fulfillment  of 

the  divine  promise  was  conditioned  upon 

247 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

obedience  to  a  positive  divine  ordinance. 
Although  Mr.  Campbell  points  out  the 
symbolical  meaning  of  the  ordinance  of 
baptism,  lie  lays  the  emphasis  not  upon 
its  spiritual  significance,  but  upon  the 
fact  that  it  has  been  commanded.  The 
erection  of  this  particular  form  into  a 
condition  of  remission  is  sufficiently  ex- 
plained by  saying  that  ''it  is  as  easy  for 
God  to  forgive  us  our  sins  in  the  act  of 
immersion  as  in  any  other  way." 

Although  there  was  a  large  measure  of 
originality  in  Mr.  Campbell's  method  of 
handling  the  question  of  baptism,  yet 
there  may  be  seen  in  it  the  influence  of 
some  of  the  conceptions  which  he  had 
received. 

I.  One  of  his  strongest  arguments 
against  infant  baptism  was  the  denial 
that  baptism  was  the  counterpart  of  cir- 
cumcision and  that  therefore  the  rules 
which  applied  to  the  latter  could  be  ap- 
plied also  to  the  former.  Proper  empha- 
sis upon  the  distinction  between  the 
Jewish  and  Christian  dispensations,  with 

the    consequent    establishment    of    the 
248 


BAPTISM 

principle  that  the  laws  of  the  new  cove- 
nant are  to  be  sought  only  in  the  docu- 
ments pertaining  to  the  period  subse- 
quent to  its  formation,  disposed  of  this 
argument.  And  it  not  only  swept  out 
of  the  way  the  argument  from  the  Old 
Testament  for  the  baptism  of  infants, 
but  it  cleared  the  way  for  a  larger  view 
of  the  significance  of  the  ordinance, 
which  would  not  be  limited  by  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  Jewish  rite.  The  bear- 
ing of  the  Covenant  Theology,  as  orig- 
inated by  Cocceius  and  developed  in 
Holland  and  Scotland,  upon  this  distinc- 
tion between  the  dispensations,  has 
already  been  pointed  out. 

2.  In  his  constant  emphasis  upon 
Christianity  as  a  lawy  and  especially 
upon  the  laws  of  naturalization,  and 
most  especially  upon  the  positive  law  of 
baptism,  there  is,  as  has  been  already 
suggested,  a  reminder  of  the  general  tone 
of  English  thought  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  in  which  law  was  the  highest 
category   of    both   ethics   and   religion. 

Campbell's  teaching  in  regard  to  baptism 
249 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

might  be  brought  under  Paley's  state- 
ment of  the  criterion  and  motive  of  right 
conduct, — to  obey  the  expressed  will  of 
God,  as  a  law,  in  the  hope  of  an  eternal 
reward,  as  a  motive. 

3.  The  distinction  between  moral  and 
positive  precepts,  which  comes  out 
prominently  in  assigning  to  baptism  its 
place  in  relation  to  other  Christian 
duties,  is  a  theological  interpretation  of 
the  old  distinction  between  law  of 
nature  and  law  of  society,  as  stated  by 
Hugo  Grotius  and  as  embodied  in  the 
social  contract  theory  of  the  origin  of 
society.  There  is  no  conceivable  condi- 
tion of  humanity  in  which  men  would 
not  be  amenable  to  the  moral  laws;  they 
are  unconditional  and  unchanging.  But 
the  positive  laws  of  God's  covenants 
with  men  not  only  change  with  the  suc- 
cessive dispensations,  but  they  belong  to 
an  order  of  things  which  is  purely  reme- 
dial and  would  never  have  existed,  had 
man  not  fallen  from  the  original  estate 
in  which  he  existed  only  under  moral 

law.     This  is  closely  analogous  to  that 
250 


BAPTISM 

form  of  the  social  contract  theory  which 
conceives  of  men  as  existing  originally 
only  under  the  natural  law  of  human 
rights,  but  later  forming  governments 
and  coming  under  the  law  of  society,  in 
order  to  escape  the  evils  which  had  fol- 
lowed from  the  abuse  of  natural  riofhts. 
4.  The  ordinances  were  conceived  by 
Mr.  Campbell  to  derive  their  spiritual 
value,  aside  from  what  they  possessed  as 
mere  acts  of  obedience  to  positive  pre- 
cepts, from  the  fact  that  they  presented 
the  facts  of  the  gospel  in  concrete  form 
to  the  senses.  On  a  sensational  theory 
of  knowledge,  any  type  or  symbol  re- 
ceives added  importance  because  of  the 
appeal  which  it  makes  to  the  senses. 
The  connection  of  this  I^ockian  theory 
of  knowledge  with  his  high  estimate  of 
the  ordinances  was  recognized  by  Mr. 
Campbell  hin^elf ,  for,  in  speaking  of  the 
perpetuity  of  the  I^ord's  Supper  and 
baptism,  he  said:  *'So  long  as  the  five 
senses  are  the  five  avenues  to  the  human 
understanding  and  the  medium  of  all 
divine  communication  to  the  spirit  of 
251 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

man,  so  long  will  it  be  necessary  to  use 

them   in   the  cultivation   of    piety  and 

humanity." 

252 


Chapter  VIII 

The  Work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  Con- 
version and  Regeneration 


THE  WORK   OF   THE  HOLY   SPIRIT  IN 
CONVERSION  AND  REGENERATION. 

I.    The  Practicai.  Impui.se: 

1.  Revolt  against  mystical   doctrine   of    Holy 

Spirit. 

2.  Desire  to  make  a  statement  which  would  be 

(a)  practically  satisfactory,  (b)  Biblical, 
(c)  consistent  with  his  view  of  the  nature 
of  man. 

II.    Work  of  the  Spirit  in  Making  Chris- 
tians: 

1.  Negative  statement — points  opposed. 

2.  Positive  statement:    (a)    Spirit  of  Wisdom 

gives  testimony  through  W^ord.  (b)  Spirit 
of  Power  gives  evidence  through  miracles, 
gifts  and  prophecy. 

3.  Consistent  Lockianism  so  far. 

III.  Work  OE  Spirit  ON  Christians: 

1.  Rice  debate — all  work  of    Spirit  is  through 

Word.  Arguments:  (a)  Constitution  of 
man.  (b)  All  spiritual  ideas  come  from 
Bible. 

2.  Different  definitions  of  "regeneration." 

3.  Recognition  of    spiritual  influences  which 

must  be  prayed  for — un-Lockian. 

4.  No  philosophy  of   prayer  in  sensationalism. 

IV.  Summary  of  Lockian  Infi^uences: 

1.  Protest  against  "metaphj^sical  regeneration." 

2.  Influence  of    Spirit   only  through  sensible 

means. 

3.  Emotions  not  a  criterion. 

254 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
IN  CONVERSION  AND  RE- 
GENERATION. 

It  will  be  impossible  to  avoid  repeat- 
ing some  points  here  whicli  have  already 
been  mentioned  in  treating  of  faith  and 
Tepentance  and  baptism,  since,  according 
to  the  definition  by  which  Mr.  Campbell 
most  consistently  abides,  conversion, 
justification,  regeneration  and  sanctifica- 
tion  are  synonymous  names  for  that  total 
process,  of  which  faith  and  repentance 
and  baptism  are  component  parts. 

No  principle  was  more  fundamental  to 
Mr.  Campbell's  religious  thinking  than 
his  opposition  to  that  baneful  form  of 
mysticism  which  was  current  in  his  day. 
Stated  in  barest  outline,  the  situation  was 
this:  The  doctrine  of  the  total  deprav- 
ity of  the  human  race  through  the  sin 
of  Adam — a  doctrine  which  Calvin  had 
inherited  from  Augustine  and  which  the 
255 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

Protestant  world  had  received  and  per- 
petuated— was  interpreted  as  implying 
that  fallen  man  was  in  some  way  inca- 
pacitated for  the  reception  of  the  truth ; 
that  he  could  not  believe  the  truth  of 
the  Gospel  on  the  testimony  of  the 
Scriptures  and  could  not  repent  of  his 
sins,  until  the  Holy  Spirit,  acting  directly 
upon  his  heart,  without  any  sensible 
agency,  had  changed  its  nature  and  re- 
stored to  it  the  lost  power  of  believing. 
This  change  was  called  regeneration,  or 
sometimes  conversion.  Since  this  was 
the  first  step  in  becoming  a  Christian, 
and  since  there  was  no  specified  way  for 
a  man  to  bring  it  about,  and  no  way  of 
knowing  that  it  had  been  brought  about 
except  by  the  way  he  felt,  the  whole 
process  was  necessarily  blocked  in  case  a 
man  did  not  feel  as  he  thouo^ht  a  reg^en- 
crated  pejrson  ought  to  feel.  The  result 
was  an  agonizing  period  of  "seeking," 
and  sometimes  a  dire  despair  of  salvation, 
on  the  part  of  persons  who  had  heard 
and  believed  the  Gospel  and  repented 
of  their  sins. 

256 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

In  opposition  to  this,  Mr.  Campbell 
aimed  to  develop  a  conception  of  the 
work  of  the  Spirit  which  would  be  free 
from  this  practical  danger  to  religion, 
would  be  in  accordance  with  Scripture, 
and  would  harmonize  with  his  view  of 
the  constitution  of  man.  A  doctrine  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  to  meet  the  religious 
requirements  must,  first,  provide  a 
method  by  which  the  individual  may 
become  a  Christian  by  following  a  plain 
and  definite  program  and  without  wait- 
ing until  there  is  performed  upon  him 
some  action  which  he  himself  can  not 
determine;  and  second,  it  must  recog- 
nize the  continual  dependence  of  the 
Christian  upon  God  for  the  grace  to 
enable  him  to  advance  toward  Christian 
perfection.  To  harmonize  with  his  view 
of  the  nature  and  constitution  of  man, 
it  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  psy- 
chology which  is  contained  in  Locke's 
Essay.  We  shall  see  that,  so  far  as  it 
was  possible  to  construct  a  theory  which 
met  both  the  religious  and  the  philo- 
sophical requirements,  Campbell's  view 
17  257 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  logical  and  sys- 
tematic. But  when  lyocke's  philosophy 
proved  inadequate  to  explain  operations 
of  the  Spirit  which  he  considered  nec- 
essary and  scriptural,  the  philosophy 
was  abandoned  (as  L<ocke  himself  had 
abandoned  it  in  emergencies)  and  his 
theology  becomes  illogical  and  incon- 
sistent with  itself.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  he  was  conscious  of  his  tem- 
porary desertion  of  the  lyockian  stand- 
point, but  the  fact  of  the  desertion  is 
obvious.  In  the  consideration  of  this 
doctrine,  therefore,  both  the  extent  and 
the  limitations  of  Mr.  Campbell's  I^ock- 
ianism  will  be  apparent. 

Campbell's  reaction  against  the  mys- 
ticism which  characterized  the  then 
current  religious  systems  received  an 
early  stimulus  from  his  association  with 
the  Haldanes  in  Glasgow.  James  A. 
Haldane  gives  the  following  account  of 
his  own  religious  experience  {^Richard- 
son I.,  p.  156):  ^'Gradually  becoming 
more  dissatisfied  with  myself,  being  con- 
vinced especially  of  the  sin  of  unbelief, 
258 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

I  wearied  myself  with  looking  for  some 
wonderful  change  to  take  place,  some 
inward  feeling  by  which  I  might  know 
that  I  was  born  again.  The  method  of 
resting  simply  on  the  promises  of  God, 
which  are  yea  and  amen  in  Jesus  Christ, 
was  too  plain  and  easy,  and  like  Naa- 
man  the  Syrian,  instead  of  bathing  in 
the  waters  of  Jordan  and  being  clean,  I 
would  have  some  great  work  in  my 
mind  to  substitute  in  place  of  Jesus 
Christ."  The  practical  bent  of  the  Hal- 
dane  movement  and  the  common-sense 
view  of  religion  which  was  encouraged 
by  it,  made  it  natural  that  they 
should  depart  from  the  tenets  of  ortho- 
doxy upon  this  point  first  of  all,  and  it 
was  upon  this  point  that  Campbell, 
while  associating  with  them,  first  came 
to  have  these  doubts  which  issued  in  his 
separation  from  the  Seceder  Church  of 
Scotland. 

Naturally,  too,  this  point  early  came 

up    for  consideration    in    the    Christian 

Baptist.     In   the    first    volume    of    that 

periodical,    a   series  of   articles   by  Mr. 

259 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

Campbell  on  the  Work  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  appeared,  in  which,  pursuing  the 
negative  method  which  characterized 
that  period  of  his  work,  he  states  four 
positions  which  he  opposes: 

(i)  That  "an  invisible,  indescribable 
energy  is  exerted  upon  the  minds  of 
men  to  make  them  Christians,  and  that 
too  independent  of,  or  prior  to,  the  Word 
believed;"  that  is,  that  the  Spirit  is 
poured  out  like  a  sort  of  fluid  and  that 
through  this  agency  the  elect  are  regen- 
erated before  they  have  faith.  A  devout 
preacher  is  quoted  as  saying  that  he 
was  regenerated  about  three  years  before 
he  believed  in  Christ,  during  which 
time  he  was  a  saved  man.  (2)  That 
all  men  are  spiritually  dead  and  help- 
less, unable  to  take  a  single  step  toward 
God,  until  this  supernatural  act  of  re- 
generation has  been  performed  upon 
them.  Here  appears  the  protest  against 
the  Augustinian  and  Calvinistic  anthro- 
pology, w^ith  its  emphasis  upon  the  fall 
of    man   and    the    blighting    effects    of 

original    sin.      (3)    That    sinners   must 
260 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

pass  througli  a  period  of  terror  and 
despair — comparable  to  the  Slough  of 
Despond  in  Pilgrini^ s  Progress — before 
they  can  believe  the  Gospel.  (4)  That 
physical  signs  of  pardon  are  to  be 
sought,  and  that  emotional  conditions 
are  to  be  made  the  criterion  by  which 
one  is  to  judge  whether  he  is  accepted 
by  God.  It  is  not  a  question  of  how 
you  feel,  but  whether  you  have  done 
those  simple  things  which  the  sinner 
is  commanded  to  do  and  is  perfectly  able 
to  do. 

In  the  second  volume  of  the  CJnHstian 
Baptist^  this  negative  statement  is  fol- 
lowed by  a  positive  statement  of  his  own 
position,  under  the  head,  "The  Work  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  Salvation  of 
Man."  The  following  statement  will 
show  the  position  maintained  here  as 
compared  with  that  denied  above: 

(i)  The  Holy  Spirit,  as  the  Spirit  of 
Wisdom,  through  the  Scripture  which  it 
has  dictated,  gives  man  all  the  knowl- 
edge which  he  possesses  about  God  and 

spiritual   things.     Knowledge  of   God's 
261 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

will  is  the  first  step  in  turning  toward 
him;  therefore  the  reading  and  accept- 
ance of  the  testimony  given  by  the 
Spirit  through  the  Word  is  the  first  step 
in  salvation. 

(2)  The  Holy  Spirit  makes  possible 
the  acceptance  of  the  testimony  in  the 
Scriptures,  not  by  a  creative  act  for  each 
individual,  but  by  a  series  of  evidences 
which  have  been  given  once  for  all.  It 
is  as  natural  for  a  man  to  believe  testi- 
mony as  to  see  light  or  hear  sound.  A 
tendency  to  doubt,  acquired  through  fre- 
quent deception,  is  the  only  sort  of  in- 
capacity which  man  has  for  receiving 
God's  revelation;  and  there  is  needed  to 
remove  it,  not  a  mysterious  creative  act 
of  ^^enabling  grace"  giving  a  man  new 
faculties,  but  evidence  which  the  man 
can  grasp  with  the  faculties  which  he 
already  has.  The  Holy  Spirit,  there- 
fore, has  given  not  only  testimony  con- 
cerning-God,  but  evidence  of  the  truth 
of  that  testimony.  Among  the  evi- 
dences, given  by  the  Spirit  to  the  truth 

of    its   testimony,    are :      (a)    Miracles^ 
262 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

or  the  ' '  suspension  of  known  laws  of 
nature,'^  which  prove  the  presence  of 
some  power  superior  to  the  law.  The 
nature  of  the  miracle  and  its  immediate 
purpose  show  the  moral  character  of  the 
miracle-worker.  We  know  that  the 
miracles  of  Jesus  were  done  by  the  Spirit 
of  God  and  not  by  Beelzebub,  because 
they  were  beneficent  works,  (b)  Special 
spiritual  gifts^  by  which  is  meant  the 
miraculous  powers  which  were  given  to 
some  of  the  early  disciples  to  aid  them 
in  proclaiming  the  Gospel,  (c)  Proph- 
ecy is  a  spiritual  gift  and  also  a  particu- 
lar kind  of  miracle  which  had  a  special 
evidencing  power.  It  includes  both  the 
Old  Testament  prophecies  about  Jesus 
and  his  own  prophecies  of  future  events 
in  his  own  life,  e,  g.^  the  fish  with  the 
coin,  the  man  with  the  water-jar,  the 
colt  tied,  his  own  death  and  resurrec- 
tion, the  destruction  of  the  Temple  and 
the  fall  of  Jerusalem. 

The  written  words  describing  the  mir- 
acles, spiritual  gifts  and  prophecies  are 

the  work  of  the  spirit  as  much  as  were 
263 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

the  original  things  themselves,  and  are 
equally  capable  of  giving  evidence  for 
the  support  of  the  testimony.  The  work 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  therefore  perma- 
nently divided  into  two  parts:  as  the 
Spirit  of  Wisdom  it  reveals  the  nature 
and  will  of  God;  as  the  Spirit  of  Power 
it  gives  evidence  of  the  truth  of  this  tes- 
timony. The  "natural  man"  of  i 
Corinthians  is  not  the  Calvinistic  natural 
man,  who  has  the  revelation  and  the 
evidences  but  lacks  "enabling  grace"; 
it  is  man  with  the  natural  human  reason 
but  without  the  revelation  of  the  Spirit 
or  the  evidence  of  its  truth. 

So  far  Mr.  Campbell's  thought  about 
the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  salva- 
tion of  man  presents  a  clear  and  consist- 
ent system,  conforming  to  the  psycholo- 
gy of  sensationalism.  In  his  own  words 
(C/irzs^mn  System^  p.  68):  "We  can- 
not separate  the  Spirit  and  the  Word  of 
God.  Whatever  the  Word  does  the 
Spirit  does,  and  whatever  the  Spirit  does 
in  the  work  of  converting  men  the  Word 

does."     Up  to  this  point  the  reference 
264 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

has  been  to  tlie  Spirit's  relation  to  tlie 
process  by  which  men  become  Chris- 
tians. And  so  far  his  position  is 
thoroughly  in  accord  with  that  view  of 
man  which  considers  him  a  creature  who 
can  be  reached  only  through  the  intellect 
{i.  e.^  only  by  the  impartation  of  ideas), 
and  whose  intellect  can  be  reached  only 
through  the  senses.  The  Spirit  influ- 
ences men  by  revealing  to  them  ideas 
about  God  and  spiritual  things;  these 
ideas  are  couched  in  words,  audible  to 
the  hearer  and  visible  to  the  reader;  and 
this  testimony  is  backed  by  evidence 
which  man  cannot  doubt  without  doubt- 
ing his  senses.  There  is  nothing  mys- 
terious about  the  operation  of  the  Spirit. 
It  creates  no  new  faculties  in  the  mind, 
removes  no  natural  impotence  of  the 
soul,  and  neither  cleanses  nor  quickens 
except  through  the  agency  of  ideas  ex- 
pressed in  words. 

But  when  it  came  to  the  description 
of  the  influence  of  the   Spirit  upon  the 
individual  after  he  has  accepted  the  Gos- 
pel,   it  was   impossible    to    formulate   a 
265 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

statement  which  at  once  met  the  practi- 
cal religious  requirements  and  conformed 
to  the  accepted  view  of  the  constitution 
of  man.  In  this  dilemma,  the  religious 
interest  prevailed  and  the  logical  suf- 
fered. At  the  same  time  there  was  de- 
veloped a  confusing  variabilitv  in  the 
definition  and  use  of  terms. 

In  the  debate  with  Mr.  Rice,  in  1843, 
]\Ir.  Campbell  maintained  the  proposition 
that  "in  conversion  and  sanctification 
the  Spirit  of  God  operates  on  persons 
only  through  the  Word. ' '  From  the  cor- 
respondence which  preceded  this  debate, 
it  is  evident  that  it  was  the  desire  of  both 
parties  to  state  this  proposition  in  such  a 
way  as  to  conimit  Mr.  Campbell  to  the 
defense  of  the  position  that  all  the  oper- 
ations of  the  Spirit  are  through  the 
Word.  The  wording  of  the  proposition 
as  given  above  was  not  altogether  satis- 
factory to  ]\Ir.  Campbell,  not  because  it 
was  too  sweeping  and  inclusive,  but  be- 
cause it  seemed  to  imply  that  conversion 
and  sanctification  vv^ere  different  proc- 
esses. 

266 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

In  his  opening  speech  in  this  debate 
he  clears  up  this  point  as  follows:  "Re- 
generation, conversion,  justification, 
sanctification,  etc.,  are  frequently  repre- 
sented as  component  parts  of  one  proc- 
ess; whereas,  any  one  of  these,  independ- 
ent of  the  others,  gives  a  full  representa- 
tion of  the  subject."  Evidently  he 
means  to  use  the  terms  as  synonymous, 
each  of  them  covering  the  entire  process 
from  the  sinner's  initial  turning  to  God 
until  the  final  perfecting  of  the  Chris- 
tian character.  The  several  terms  rep- 
resent the  process  under  several  distinct 
figures.  A  similar  statement  is  made  in 
the  Christian  System  (p.  276):  "We  are 
not  to  suppose  that  regeneration  is  some- 
thing which  must  be  added  to  the  faith, 
the  feeling  and  the  action  of  the  believer, 
which  are  the  effects  of  the  testimony  of 
God  understood  and  embraced.  It  is 
only  another  name  for  the  same  process 
in  all  its  parts."  Again  {Rice  Debate^ 
p.  613):  "Conversion  is  a  term  denoting 
that  whole  moral  and  spiritual  change 

which  is  sometimes  called  sanctification, 

267 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

sometimes  regeneration.  These  are  not 
three  changes,  but  one  change  indicated 
by  these  three  terms,  regeneration,  con- 
version, sanctification." 

Taking  into  consideration  only  the 
statements  in  the  Campbell-Rice  debate, 
this  position  is  consistently  maintained, 
that  the  Spirit  exerts  no  influence  upon 
man  at  any  time  or  in  any  way,  except 
through  the  agency  of  the  Word.  This 
proposition  is  sustained  by  arguments 
drawn  from  lyocke's  philosophy,  from 
which  it  is  shown  that  the  nature  of  man 
is  such  that  he  can  be  influenced  only 
through  words.  The  first  argument  is 
entitled,  ''From  the  Constitution  of  the 
Human  Mind,"  and  the  substance  of  it 
is  as  follows:  The  human  mind,  like  the 
body,  has  a  specific  and  well-defined  con- 
stitution. The  Spirit  of  God  does  not 
change  any  of  a  man's  faculties,  but 
only  sets  before  them  new  material.  As 
the  body  can  be  nourished  only  by  what 
enters  by  the  ordained  channel,  so  the 
soul  can  receive  nourishment  only  if  it  is 

approached  in  a  manner  conformable  to 
268 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

its  immutable  nature.  All  knowledge  of 
the  sensible  universe  comes  through  sen- 
sation and  reflection.  Knowledge  of  God 
comes  by  faith,  but  "faith  comes  by 
hearing,"  and  hearing  is  sensation.  The 
Word,  spoken  or  written,  must  precede 
the  hearing  or  reading  which  is  neces- 
sary for  faith.  Faith  is  the  first  convert- 
ing, regenerating,  sanctifying  principle, 
and  faith  is  the  acceptance  of  testimony. 
No  faith,  no  conversion  or  sanctification; 
no  hearing,  no  faith;  no  Word,  no  hear- 
ing. Hence  the  Spirit  in  these  activi- 
ties always  acts  through  the  Word. 

The  Lrockianism  of  this  argument  is 
obvious.  First,  it  bases  itself  explicitly 
upon  the  lyockian  doctrine  that  "all 
knowledge  comes  through  sensation  and 
reflection."  Second,  it  embodies  a  pure- 
ly intellectual  view  of  faith.  Third,  it 
contains  implicitly,  a  protest,  elsewhere 
made  explicitly  against  what  he  calls 
"metaphysical  regeneration," — a  pro- 
test which  is  strikingly  parallel  to 
Locke's  turning  away  from  the  realm  of 

metaphysics  and  limiting  philosophy  to 
269 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

the  consideration  of  the  powers  of  the 
human  mind,  with  particular  reference  to 
the  problem  of  knowledge.  Adopting 
this  general  point  of  view,  Campbell  de- 
fined salvation,  not  in  terms  of  myste- 
rious changes  made  by  the  Spirit  in  the 
soul  of  man,  but  in  terms  of  knowledge. 
The  question  of  conversion  and  regener- 
ation is  therefore  solved,  not  by  consid- 
ering how  the  nature  of  man's  soul  may 
be  changed  by  the  removal  of  original 
sin,  etc.,  but  by  considering  how  man, — 
the  natural  man,  with  the  powers  which 
Locke  has  ascribed  to  him  in  his  Essay — 
can  come  to  a  knowledge  of  the  will  of 
God  and  of  the  advantages  which  flow 
from  obedience  to  it. 

The  second  argument  in  support  of 
the  general  proposition  is  that  "there  is 
nowhere  a  single  Christian  or  spiritual 
idea  that  has  not  been  derived  from  the 
Bible.  This  declaration  is  sustained  not 
only  by  a  general  reference  to  "the 
known  facts  of  the  history  of  religion" 
(from  which  it  would  be  obviously  im- 
possible to  establish  such  a  sweeping 
270 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

proposition),  but  also  by  the  use  of  the 
same  lyockian  argument  as  that  involved 
in  the  preceding.  Man  derives  the 
material  for  his  ideas  solely  through  the 
senses.  But  no  sensations  given  by 
objects  of  the  natural  world  could  fur- 
nish the  material  for  Christian  or  spirit- 
ual ideas.  Therefore  the  sensations 
must  come  audibly  or  visibly  through 
revelation.  The  Word  is  the  only  audi- 
ble or  visible  product  of  revelation. 
Therefore  spiritual  ideas  come  only 
through  the  Word. 

In  the  debate  with  Mr.  Rice,  Mr. 
Campbell  is  a  thorough- going  and  con- 
sistent lyockian  in  his  conclusions  and  in 
his  arguments.  He  defines  conversion, 
regeneration  and  sanctification  as  synon- 
ymously denoting  the  entire  process  by 
which  the  sinner  is  transformed  into  the 
perfect  Christian,  and  gives  no  hint  that 
the  Spirit  operates  in  this  whole  process 
otherwise  than  through  the  Word.  A 
study  of  the  Christian  System  will  re- 
veal two  facts:    first,  that  in  that  work 

the  terms  are  sometimes  used  in  a  differ- 
271 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

ent  sense;  and  second,  that  there  are  in- 
dications of  the  recognition  of  an  influ- 
ence of  the  Spirit  in  sanctification  which 
could  not  be  accounted  for  on  strictly 
lyockian  principles. 

In  one  of  his  characteristic  sweeping 
generalizations  in  which  he  schematizes 
the  whole  divine  plan  in  one  brief  out- 
line, he  asserts  (^Cliristiaii  System^  p. 
64)  that  "The  entire  change  effected  in 
man  by  the  Christian  system,  consists  of 
four  things:"  (i)  A  change  of  views 
— faith;  (2)  a  change  of  affections — re- 
pentance and  reconciliation;  (3)  a 
change  of  state, — being  born  again,  a 
change  effected  by  baptism;  and  (4)  a 
change  of  life  or  character — conversion. 
In  expounding  this  arrangement,  Mr. 
Campbell  deplores  and  criticises  the  in- 
discriminate use  of  terms  which  con- 
fuses the  whole  subject,  by  using  the 
term  "regeneration,"  for  example,  in 
reference  to  the  entire  change, — a  usage 
which  he  asserts  is  quite  unscriptural. 
He  continues:     "But  suppose  it  should 

be  conceded  that  the  term  regeneration 
272 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

might  be  just  equivalent  to  'being  born 
again,'  it  could  even  then  represent  only 
so  much  of  this  change  as  respects  mere 
s^afe. ' '  Compare  this  with  the  previous- 
ly quoted  statement  from  the  Campbell- 
Rice  debate,  that  regeneration  is  synony- 
mous with  conversion  and  that  both  rep- 
resent the  entire  change. 

Continuing,  (^Christian  System^  p.  65) 
he  says:  "Being  born  again  is,  or  may 
be,  the  effect  of  a  change  of  views,  of  a 
change  of  affections,  or  it  may  be  the 
cause  of  a  change  of  life;  but  certain  it 
is,  it  is  not  identical  with  any  of  them, 
and  never  can  represent  them  all."  But 
again,  abandoning  the  synonymous  use 
of  the  terms  "regeneration"  and  "being 
born  again,"  and  reverting  to  the  inclu- 
sive definition  of  the  former  which  is 
expressed  in  the  Rice  debate,  he  says, 
(^Christian  System^  p.  280):  "Being 
born  again  is  only  the  last  act  of  regen- 
ation." 

And  yet  again,  to  cite  a  final  variation 

of  usage,  bearing  in  mind  the  definition 

of  regeneration  as  equivalent  to  sancti- 
18  273 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

fication,  note  the  following  {^Christian 
System^  p.  284):  ^'All  that  is  done  in 
us  before  regeneration,  God  our  Father 
effects  through  the  Word,  or  the  Gospel 
as  dictated  and  confirmed  by  His  Holy 
Spirit.  But  after  we  are  thus  begotten 
and  born  by  the  Spirit  of  God — after  our 
new  birth — the  Holy  Spirit  is  shed  on 
us  richly  through  Jesus  Christ  our 
Saviour;  of  Avhich  the  peace  of  mind, 
the  love,  the  joy,  and  the  hope  of  the 
regeneration  are  full  proof;  for  these  are 
among  the  fruits  of  that  Holy  Spirit  of 
promise  of  which  w^e  speak."  In  this 
passage  there  is  clearly  a  use  of  the  term 
"regeneration"  as  signifying  the  pro- 
cesses which  culminate  in  the  beginning 
of  the  Christian  life,  but  certainly  not 
including  the  subsequent  growth  in 
grace  which  is  included  in  the  definition 
of  the  Campbell-Rice  debate. 

We  are  therefore  driven  to  the  conclu- 
sion that,  though  Mr.  Campbell's  type 
of  mind  naturally  inclined  him  to  the 
making  of  schemes  and  outlines  of  the 

process  of  salvation,  he  was  not  consist- 

274 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

ent  in  his  use  of  terms,  and  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  transfer  a  definition  given  in  one 
place  to  an  argument  in  another  without 
doing  injustice  to  his  thought.  For  ex- 
ample: It  has  been  asserted  that  he  be- 
lieved in  baptismal  regeneration,  and  it 
is  not  difficult  to  construct  a  plausible 
argument.  He  connects  baptism  with 
the  new  birth,  defining  the  latter  here 
as  mere  change  of  state;  elsewhere  he 
uses  the  new  birth  as  synonymous  with 
reofeneration;  still  elsewhere  he  defines 
regeneration  as  indicating  the  whole 
change  effected  by  the  Christian  system. 
Therefore,  ba^Dtism  effects  the  whole 
change  by  which  the  sinner  becomes  a 
perfect  Christian.  Such  an  argument  is 
as  fallacious  as  it  is  plausible,  because 
the  middle  terms  are  both  used  in  double 
senses. 

But  there  is  involved  in  the  last  quo- 
tation something  more  than  a  loose  use 
of  terms.  There  is  a  recognition  of  a 
different  kind  of  influence  of  the  Spirit 
from  that  which  he  has  previously  as- 
serted to  be  the  only  possible  method 
275 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

consistent  with  the  constitution  of  the 
human  mind.  Before  regeneration,  he 
says,  the  Spirit  does  its  work  only 
through  the  Word ;  but  after  we  are  born 
anew  the  "Holy  Spirit  is  shed  on  us 
richly  through  Jesus  Christ,  our  Sav- 
iour." The  latter  method,  though  not 
closely  defined,  is  clearly  distinguished 
from  the  influence  through  the  Word. 
In  immediate  connection  with  the  last 
passage  quoted,  Mr.  Campbell  distin- 
guishes between  "the  bath  of  regenera- 
tion," which  is  the  culmination  of  the 
Spirit's  activity  through  the  Word,  and 
"the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Spirit."  He 
continues:  "But  this  pouring  out  of  the 
influences,  this  renewing  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  is  as  necessary  as  the  bath  of  re- 
generation to  the  salvation  of  the  soul 
and  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  hope  of 
heaven  of  which  the  apostle  speaks.  In 
the  kingdom  into  which  we  are  born  of 
water,  the  Holy  Spirit  is  as  the  atmos- 
phere in  the  kingdom  of  nature;  we 
mean   that   the    influences  of  the    Holy 

Spirit  are  as  necessary  to  the  neiv  life  as 
276 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

the  atmosphere  is  to  our  animal  life  in 
the  kingdom  of  nature/' 

How  that  atmosphere-like  influence  of 
the  Spirit  operates  upon  m-an,  when  man 
is  so  organized  that  he  can  receive  ideas 
and  impressions  only  through  the  senses, 
is  nowhere  fully  explained.  There  is  a 
hint  when  he  says  that,  so  long  as  the 
senses  remain  the  only  avenues  to  the 
soul  of  man,  so  long  will  the  ordinances, 
baptism  and  the  Lord's  Supper,  remain 
valid  and  necessary  means  of  grace.  But 
beyond  this  there  is  scarcely  a  sugges- 
tion, and  one  is  forced  to  believe  that  at 
this  point  Mr.  Campbell  found  his  philos- 
ophy inadequate  for  the  explanation  of  a 
truth  which  he  felt  to  be  real  and  actual. 
The  value  of  prayer  for  spiritual*  aid  and 
strength  was  a  fact  which  religion  de- 
manded and  which  he  recognized  and 
expressed.  He  says:  "It  is  the  duty  of 
Christians  to  perfect  holiness  in  the  fear 
of  the  Lord.  This  requires  aid.  Hence, 
assistance  is  to  be  prayed  for,  and  it  is 
promised.    The  Holy  Spirit,  then,  is  the 

author  of  all   our   holiness;  and  in  the 

277 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

struggle  after  victory  over  sin  and  temp- 
tation it  helps  our  infirmities,  and  com- 
forts us  by  seasonably  bringing  to  our 
remembrance  the  promises  of  Christ,  and 
strengthens  us  with  all  might  in  the 
inner  man." 

In  the  philosophy  of  I^ocke  there  is  no 
room  for  a  philosophy  of  prayer,  least  of 
all  of  prayer  for  strength  against  temp- 
tation and  comfort  in  trouble.  There  is 
no  room  for  any  influence  of  the  Spirit 
except  through  channels  which  appeal  to 
the  senses,  i.  <?.,  the  Word  and  the  ordi- 
nances. Mr.  Campbell  recognized  the 
fact  of  such  a  spiritual  influence,  but  he 
had  no  other  philosophy  to  fall  back 
upon.  Consequently,  he  forsook  his  sys- 
tem at  this  point  and  stated  religious 
truth  simply  as  religious  truth,  ignoring 
the  fact  that  it  could  not  be  logically  co- 
ordinated with  his  system. 

A  thinker  is  always  at  his  best  at  the 
point  where  he  finds  his  system  too 
small  to  contain  him.  Mr.  Campbell 
inherited  a  conception  of  God  as  a  tran- 
scendent, extra-mundane  Being,  who 
278 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

could  direct  human  events  only  by 
breaking  through  the  laws  of  nature  in 
sheer  miracle;  and  a  conception  of  man 
as  a  being  who  could  be  moved  only  by 
ideas  (z.  e.^  by  an  appeal  to  the  intel- 
lect) and  could  be  reached  only  through 
the  senses.  These  philosophical  presup- 
positions were  of  the  highest  service  in 
clearing  the  ground  of  certain  baneful 
superstitions  which  had  troubled  the  re- 
ligious world.  The  philosophy  of  the 
Enlightenment  was  a  philosophy  of 
common  sense,  of  clearness  and  distinct- 
ness, and  the  sworn  foe  to  all  forms  of 
mysticism.  But,  based  on  a  psychology 
too  clear  and  simple  to  be  profound,  and 
which  later  thought  has  shown  to  be 
shallow  and  one-sided,  it  could  give  no 
explanation  to  the  richer  depths  of  re- 
ligious experience. 

For  the  theologian  who  had  at  his 
command  no  other  philosophy  than  this, 
there  were  two  courses  open:  he  might 
adhere  rigidly  to  the  philosophy  and 
issue  either  in  the  arid  orthodoxy  which 

characterized    the     latter    part    of    the 
279 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

eighteenth  century  in  England,  or  in 
deism  verging  constantly  toward  com- 
plete negation;  or,  he  might  use  the 
philosophy  as  far  as  possible  consist- 
ently with  the  requirements  of  his  relig- 
ious consciousness,  and  abandon  it  when 
its  limitations  would  force  him  into  un- 
desirable paths.  Mr.  Campbell  chose 
the  latter  alternative.  It  was  this  de- 
sertion of  the  philosophy  which  he  had 
used  in  the  greater  part  of  his  system, 
that  gave  Mr.  Campbell  the  right  to 
repudiate  what  he  calls  the  "word 
alone"  theory  as  "the  parent  of  a  cold, 
lifeless  rationalism  and  formality. ' '  The 
sensational  philosophy  logically  followed 
out  leads  to  the  word-alone  theory  in  its 
baldest  and  most  extreme  form. 

To  summarize,  the  following  points 
may  be  cited  as  evidence  of  the  lyocki- 
anism  of  Mr.  Campbell's  position  in 
regard  to  the  influence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit: 

(i)  He  protests  against  the  idea  of 
metaph^^sical  regeneration  and  states  the 

whole    process    in  terms  of    knowledge; 

280 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 

lyocke  turned  the  attention  of  philoso- 
phers for  a  century  away  from  meta- 
physics to  the  theory  of  knowledge. 

(2)  So  far  as  he  adheres  to  the  logical 
requirements  of  his  system,  he  makes 
the  Word,  a  thing  cognizable  by  the 
senses,  the  only  means  by  which  the 
Spirit  influences  man;  Ivocke  laid  down 
the  principle  that  man  is  so  constituted 
that  he  can  receive  influences  only 
through  the  senses. 

(3)  He  protested  against  making  the 
emotions  a  criterion  in  religion  and  em- 
phasized the  simple  elements  of  sense 
experience  as  the  universal  element  in 
the  Gospel, — not  "how  do  you  feel?" 
but  "what  do  you  believe  and  what  have 
you  done?"  lyocke  considered  the  in- 
tellectual element  of  human  experience 
based  on  the  sensations,  as  the  universal 
element;  emotions  are  purely  individual 
and  incommunicable,  except  when  trans- 
lated into  terms  of  intellectual  concepts. 

281 


Chapter  IX 
The  Idea  of  God 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD. 

I.    Significance  of  the  Idea  of  God: 

1.  Governs  the  conception  of  all  doctrines. 

2.  A  matter  of  emphasis,  not  of  definition. 

II,    The  Inherited  Idea — Transcendence; 

1.  Covenant  Theology. 

2.  Puritanism. 

3.  Orthodox  apologetics. 

4.  Deism. 

III.  Transcendence  in  Campbeli^'s  Theoi^ogy: 

1.  The  Kingdom  of  God. 

2.  Man's  inability  to  know  God  except  through 

Revelation,  emphasizes  God's   extra-mun- 
dane existence. 

3.  All   authority     external — God,    as     seat   of 

authority  is  not  indwelling. 

4.  The  Book  gives  only  hypothetical  impera- 

tive; loyalty  to  Person  of  Christ  gives  cate- 
gorical imperative. 

IV.  An  Eighteenth  or  a  Nineteenth  Cen- 

tury THEOI.OGY? 

1.  Eighteenth  century  in  basis  and  content. 

2.  Nineteenth  century  in  method  of  use. 

3.  The  "return  to  nature." 

2S4 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD. 

The  most  fundamental  conception  in 
any  system  of  theology  is  the  concep- 
tion of  God.  All  particular  doctrines 
are  outgrowths  and  amplifications  of 
this.  But  a  theologian's  idea  of  God  is 
not  to  be  estimated  by  his  formal  defini- 
tions of  the  Divine  Personality,  His  at- 
tributes and  modes  of  existence.  There 
is  little  difference  of  opinion  in  regard 
to  the  attributes  of  Deity.  That  he  is 
One,  Holy,  All-wise,  All-powerful,  that 
he  is  a  righteous  King,  a  loving  Father, 
the  omnipotent  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the 
universe, — these  are  not  points  which 
arouse  discussion  among  Christian  think- 
ers. Even  the  metaphysical  question  as 
to  the  modes  of  the  divine  existence  is 
not  one  of  the  first  importance  in  esti- 
mating   a    theologian's     conception    of 

God. 

285 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

The  question  which  arises  in  connec- 
tion with  every  system  of  theology  is 
rather,  What  idea  of  God  is  most  em- 
phasized in  it?  What  aspect  of  Deity 
is  it  that  appeals  most  strongly  to  the 
author,  and  determines  his  conception 
of  the  doctrines  of  Christianity?  What 
phase  of  the  character  of  God  is  most 
prominent  in  his  statement  of  the  rela- 
tion between  God  and  man.  It  might 
easily  be  that  the  same  definition  of  the 
divine  attributes  would  satisfy  at  once  a 
mystic  and  a  scholastic.  Neither  would 
find  in  it  anything  to  deny;  the  mystic 
would  emphasize  the  immanence  of  God 
and  would  therefore  conceive  of  God's 
relation  to  man  as  one  of  communion, 
while  the  scholastic  would  emphasize 
the  ideas  of  transcendence  and  author- 
ity. Accordingly,  the  consideration  of 
the  idea  of  God  must  be  based  upon  a 
generalization  from  the  entire  system. 
Although  logically  first,  since  it  is  fun- 
damental to  the  system,  it  must  be  con- 
sidered last,  as  a  conclusion  of  the  study 

of  all  the  particular  doctrines. 
286 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

Since  the  estimate  is  largely  a  matter 
of  noting  the  relative  emphasis  upon 
different  phases  of  the  character  of  God, 
it  must  depend  not  upon  isolated  quota- 
tions, but  upon  a  broad  generalization. 
It  will  easily  be  possible  to  cite  passages 
from  Mr.  Campbell's  works,  as  from  the 
writings  of  any  other  theologian,  which 
explicitly  recognize  elements  in  the 
divine  character  which  exercised  little 
influence  in  his  formulation  of  the  doc- 
trines. And  it  may  be,  too,  that  differ- 
ent critics  would  gain  different  impres- 
sions as  to  the  relative  emphasis  upon 
various  attributes.  The  personal  equa- 
tion must  play  a  large  part  in  such  an 
estimate.  The  aim  is  to  feel  the  spirit, 
divine  the  innermost  motive,  and  catch 
the  dominant  note  of  the  system. 

The  conception  of  God  which  ortho- 
dox Protestantism  developed  during  the 
first  three  centuries  of  its  history,  laid 
great  emphasis  upon  His  transcendence, 
practically  to  the  exclusion  of  the  im- 
manence. Of  Calvinism  this  was  pre- 
eminently true,  but  it  was  scarcely  less 
287 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

true  of  the  Covenant  Theology,  which 
laid  special  stress  upon  God's  func- 
tion as  the  organizer  of  a  government 
and  a  giver  of  laws,  which  man  must 
obey  if  he  wishes  to  obtain  the  benefits 
that  the  government  can  confer. 

Puritanism  in  England  developed  an 
idea  of  God  which  has  become  pro- 
verbial for  its  austerity.  God  was  con- 
ceived as  an  essentially  extra-mundane 
Being,  handing  down  a  revelation  of 
himself  to  men  from  the  abyss  of  in- 
finite space  which  was  his  habitation. 
The  laws  of  nature  were  his  commands, 
but  their  uniform  operation  did  not  indi- 
cate his  continued  presence.  But  with 
this  conception  of  a  God  whose  most 
notable  attributes  were  majesty,  power 
and  transcendence,  they  united  a  sublime 
faith  in  the  Providence  which  watched 
over  their  lives  and  fortunes.  The  tran- 
scendent God  honored  his  chosen  people 
by  breaking  over  the  laws  which  he  had 
established,  to  come  to  their  relief  in 
time  of  need.     But  special   Providence, 

so  interpreted,  meant  the  irruption  of  a 

2S8 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

transcendent  God  into  a  sphere  of  activ- 
ity which  was  not  normal  to  him. 

The  orthodox  apologetics  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  proceeded  upon  a  concep- 
tion of  God  not  essentially  dissimilar  to 
that  of  the  Puritans.  The  apologists 
attempted  to  prove,  by  arguments  drawn 
from  the  constitution  of  nature  and  the 
evidences  of  design  and  intelligent 
adaptation  which  it  presents,  that,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  process  which  is 
now  represented  by  the  on-going  of  nat- 
ural laws,  there  stood  a  creative  God. 
This  the  deists  were,  in  general,  inclined 
to  admit.  But  whereas  the  deists  main- 
tained that  the  God  who  created  the 
universe  had  been  a  passive  spectator 
ever  since  the  day  of  creation,  the  ortho- 
dox believed  that  he  had  from  time  to 
time  broken  through  the  shell  of  natural 
law  which  shuts  Him  from  His  world, 
and  had  given  to  men  a  body  of  revealed 
truth  concerning  Himself.  Both  the 
deists  and  the  orthodox  interpreted  reve- 
lation in  the  same  way,  as  an  arbitrary 

and  abnormal  incursion  of  a  transcendent 
289 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

God  into  the  sphere  of  human  activities. 
The  former  held  that  such  an  interrup- 
tion of  the  natural  order  had  never  oc- 
curred; the  latter  believed  that  it  had 
occurred.  The  conception  of  God  and  of 
revelation  was  fundamentally  the  same 
in  both.  Their  dis^Dute  was  primarily 
over  a  question  of  fact,  as  to  whether 
God  had  or  had  not  done  a  certain 
thing. 

Inheriting  the  theological  concepts  of 
the  Covenant  Theology  and  of  the  Eng- 
lish Enlightenment  on  its  orthodox  side, 
it  would  have  been  surprising  if  Mr. 
Campbell  had  not  had  at  the  center  of 
his  system  a  conception  of  God  as  pri- 
marily a  transcendent  Being,  whose 
most  characteristic  function  was  the 
giving  of  laws.  It  is  no  disparagement 
to  him  to  say  that  it  was  so.  It  was  a 
limitation  which  he  shared  with  nearly 
all  of  the  writers  of  his  tim.e.  By  glanc- 
ing at  some  of  his  doctrines,  as  defined 
in  previous  chapters,  some  suggestions 
may  be  derived  for  estimating  his  con- 
ception of  God,  and  some  illustrations 
290 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

may  be  found  of  the  way  in  which  the 
current  conception  was  embodied  in  his 
doctrinal  statements. 

A  suggestion   is  at  once  afforded   by 
the  fact  that,  as   previously  stated,  the 
logical    basis   of    Mr.    Campbell's    con- 
structive theological  thinking  is  his  idea 
of    the    Kingdom    of    God.      In    other 
words,  it  is  the  idea  of  God  as  the  head 
of  a  monarchical  government,  of  which 
men  must  be  subjects  in  order  to  secure 
their  own  highest  welfare.     The  Cove- 
nant  relation    between   God    and    man 
goes  far  toward  softening  the  rigor  of  the 
transcendence,  as  viewed  by  Calvinism. 
God  is  no  longer  conceived  as  an  omnip- 
otent Being   who   seeks  to  show   forth 
His  own  glory  by  arbitrarily  appointing 
some  of  His  subjects  to  enjoy  eternal  life 
and  others  to  endure  eternal  agony.     He 
makes  terms  with  man  and  throws  upon 
him    the  responsibility   of   working  out 
his  own  salvation.     But  the  Kingship  is 
still  the  essential  function  of  the  divine 
character.     God  does  not  arbitrarily  pre- 
destine one  man  to  blessing  and  another 
291 


ALEXANDER   CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

to  eternal  woe,  but  he  lays  down  con- 
ditions, one  of  which  at  least  is  a  com- 
mand arbitrarily  imposed  as  a  test  of 
obedience.  The  division  of  the  divine 
commands  under  the  covenants  into  two 
classes,  moral  and  positive  (which  from 
another  point  of  view  might  be  termed 
reasonable  and  arbitrary),  after  the  an- 
alogy of  the  two  kinds  of  human  laws 
which  exist  under  the  social  contract,  is 
itself  a  suggestive  feature. 

In  treating  of  the  means  of  knowing 
God  and  the  seat  of  religious  authority, 
the  same  general  conception  is  clearly 
present.  The  statement,  often  repeated 
and  much  depended  upon  by  Mr.  Camp- 
bell, that  every  idea  of  God  comes  from 
the  Bible,  virtually  means  that,  so  far  as 
man's  cognitive  powers  are  concerned, 
God  is  not  in  nature  or  history;  He  is  in 
the  world  only  at  those  points  where  he 
has  chosen  to  make  a  special  revelation 
of  himself.  Occasional  statements  to 
the  effect  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  the 
laws  of  God,    that   the   thunder  is  His 

voice  and  that  the  heavens  declare  His 
292 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

glory,  weigh  little  against  the  stead- 
fastly maintained  position  that  man  can 
know  God  only  through  the  revelation  in 
the  Book.  Whether  God  is  metaphysic- 
ally present  in  the  world  or  not,  he  is 
transcendent  so  far  as  man's  knowledge 
of  Him  is  concerned.  The  sensational 
theory  of  knowledge,  by  denying  man's 
power  to  know  God  directly,  even  if  He 
were  in  the  world,  unless  He  were  pres- 
ent as  a  simple  object  of  sense  percep- 
tion, forces  its  adherents  to  conceive  of 
a  God  who  is,  in  so  far  as  He  is  known 
at  all,  transcendent. 

The  Book  not  only  gives  all  the  infor- 
mation which  we  have  about  God,  but  it 
is  the  sole  seat  of  authority  for  religion. 
No  stronger  statement  of  this  principle 
could  be  made  than  these  words  ad- 
dressed by  Mr.  Campbell  to  B.  W.  Stone: 
"The  truths  of  the  Bible  are  to  be  re- 
ceived as  first  principles,  not  to  be  tried 
by  our  reasons  one  by  one,  but  to  be  re- 
ceived as  new  principles  from  which  we 
are  to  reason  as  from  intuitive  principles 
in  any  human  science."  His  reliance 
293 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELLS  THEOLOGY 

Upon  external  authority  was  not  peculiar 
to  Mr.  Campbell.  It  was  present  even 
with  lyocke,  although  the  implications  of 
his  system  which  made  it  necessary  had 
not  yet  been  unfolded.  Speaking  of  the 
impracticability  of  establishing  rules  of 
right  conduct  by  reasoning  and  demon- 
stration, Ivocke  says:  "You  may  as  soon 
hope  to  have  all  the  day-laborers  and 
tradesmen,  the  spinsters  and  dairy- 
maids, perfect  mathematicians,  as  to 
have  them  perfect  in  ethics  this  way. 
Hearing  plain  commands  is  the  sure  and 
only  course  to  bring  them  to  obedience 
and  practice." 

It  seems  paradoxical  that  a  system  so 
thoroughly  individualistic  as  Locke's, 
should,  in  the  hands  of  its  most  earnest 
adherents,  become  the  starting-point  for 
a  new  return  to  authority.  It  was  so 
because  it  exhibited  the  weakness  and 
insufficiency  of  the  human  individual, 
as  well  as  his  worth.  In  its  outcome  it 
showed  that  man,  as  defined  by  it,  could 
not  develop  out  of  himself  the  canons  of 

either  ethics  or  religion.    Hence  a  return 
294 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

to  external  authority  is  necessary.  So 
Locke  recognizes  the  three-fold  law,  the 
law  of  God,  of  the  state  and  of  public 
opinion;  every  ethical  writer  who  fol- 
lowed him  gave  a  prominent  place  to  the 
concepts  of  law  and  authority;  and 
Campbell,  treating  of  the  ground  of  re- 
ligion rather  than  of  ethics,  lays  the 
same  stress  upon  authority  and  law,  and 
refers  to  the  Book  as  the  proximate 
source  of  both. 

The  significance  of  this  entire  return 
to  external  authority,  as  regards  the  idea 
of  God,  lay  in  its  implication  that  divin- 
ity dwells  not  in  man,  nor  in  the  world 
w^here  it  is  accessible  to  man  and  appre- 
hensible by  him,  but  in  some  far  distance 
so  remote  that  He  comes  within  the  cog- 
nizance of  man  only  when  it  pleases 
Him  to  reveal  Himself  in  some  special 
way.  The  Being  who  stands  forth  clear- 
ly in  the  foreground  of  religion,  in  con- 
nection with  this  emphasis  upon  the 
externality  of  religious  authority,  is  a 
transcendent  God  who  stands  above  and 
away  from  the  world  and,  by  sheer 
295 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

authority,  brings  order  and  harmony  out 
of  a  world  which  the  sensational  phi- 
losophy had  shown  to  be  a  mere  disinte- 
grated mass  of  individuals  and  particu- 
lars. That  attitude  of  mind,  represented 
by  both  Locke  and  Campbell,  which 
turned  away  from  questions  of  meta- 
physics and  attached  importance  only  to 
the  problem  of  knowledge,  would  not  be 
deeply  interested  in  the  question  as  to 
whether  or  not  God  is,  in  some  real  sense, 
immanent  in  the  world  and  in  the  soul 
of  man.  It  is  satisfied  with  its  conclu- 
sion that  God  cannot  be  known  as  imma- 
nent, that  the  human  mind  can  grasp 
only  the  verbal  and  sensible  revelation  of 
a  transcendent  God,  and  that  religious 
faith  and  practice  are  therefore  to  be 
governed  solely  by  the  laws  laid  down  in 
the  revealed  Word. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  in  a  previous 
chapter,  there  was  developed  out  of  the 
sensational  theory  of  knowledge  a  theo- 
logical and  an  ethical  utilitarianism 
which,  in  spite  of  its  practical  virtues, 

tended  to  destroy  the  spontaneity  of  both 
296 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

religion  and  ethics,  and  to  reduce  them 
to  the  level  of  egoistic  hedonism  with  a 
veneer  of  piety  and  morality.  Even  the 
Covenant  Theology  had  been  somewhat 
weak  in  its  presentation  of  Christian 
obedience  as  a  duty,  and  unduly  strong 
in  presenting  it  as  a  means  of  gaining 
an  advantage.  According  to  English 
utilitarianism,  stated  in  its  baldest  form, 
the  good  man  is  he  who  takes  account 
not  only  of  the  pleasures  of  sin  for  a 
season,  but  also  of  the  greater  pleasure 
which  will  in  the  future  be  the  reward 
of  virtue. 

But  any  authority  which  operates  on 
this  basis,  can  be,  after  all,  only  a  con- 
ditional authority:  ?/you  desire  to  attain 
a  certain  end,  then  obey  the  command. 
According  to  this  view,  even  the  com- 
mand of  God  is  only  a  hypothetical  im- 
perative^ to  be  obeyed  if  one  wishes  to 
secure  the  benefits  which  accrue  from 
obedience.  But  neither  ethics  nor  re- 
ligion can  be  satisfied  with  anything 
short  of  a  categorical  hnperative — an 
authority,  either  external  or  internal, 
297 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

not  conditioned  upon  the  desirability  of 
some  more  ultimate  end.  An  authority 
v/hich  is  entirely  external  can  never  be 
more  than  conditionally  binding.  When 
Mr.  Campbell  said  that  the  philosophy 
of  the  Bible  is  the  philosophy  of  human 
happiness,  he  gave  recognition  to  this 
principle.  Since  the  Bible  is  a  purely 
external  authority,  its  commands  can 
be  enforced  only  by  an  appeal  to  the 
happiness  which  will  follow  obedience 
and  the  woe  which  is  the  fruit  of  diso- 
bedience. By  making  the  seat  of  relig- 
ious authority  completely  external  to 
man — a  transcendent  God  speaking  only 
through  the  written  Word — Campbell's 
theology,  by  his  own  admission,  dis- 
qualified itself  for  going  farther  than  the 
hypothetical  imperative  of  a  spiritual- 
ized utilitarianism. 

But  religious  fervor  did  what  his  theo- 
logical statement  could  not  do.  The 
authority  of  the  New  Testament,  the 
Christian's  law-book,  reverts  back  to 
the   authority    of    Christ.      Interpreted 

coldly,    according    to    Campbell's    own 

298 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 


theory,  this  means  that  the  commauds 
of  Christ  are  to  be  obeyed  because  of  the 
happiness  which  will  follow.  But  the 
introduction  of  the  Person  of  Christ 
brings  in  a  new  element  which  had  no 
place  in  the  formal  theory,  but  had  a 
most  vitalizing  effect  on  the  system. 
However  selfishly  utilitarian  might  be 
the  thought  of  obeying  the  commands  of 
the  Bible  for  the  sake  of  its  rewards, 
the  bringing  to  light  of  the  Person  in 
and  behind  the  Book,  introduces  an  ele- 
ment of  personal  loyalty  and  devotion 
which  banishes  every  thought  of  obedi- 
ence from  a  selfish  motive. 

Shaftesbury's  ethical  system,  though 
theoretically  utilitarian,  was  warmed 
and  quickened  by  a  splendid  ''enthusi- 
asm for  society,"  which  saved  it  from 
degenerating  into  a  mercenary  exchange 
of  obedience  for  pleasure.  So  with 
Campbell,  the  idea  of  divine  authority 
was  kept  on  a  high  plane  by  personal 
loyalty  to  Christ,  though  his  theology 
was  based,  as  he  himself  says,  on  the 
philosophy  of   happiness.     An  enthusi- 


299 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL'S  THEOLOGY 

asm  for  the  person  of  Christ  furnished 
the  key  to  the  religious  categorical 
imperative. 

On  the  basis  of  the  foregoing  consid- 
erations, may  it  not  be  said  that  Alex- 
ander Campbell's  religion  was  more 
Christocentric  than  his  theology? 

In  many  respects,  Mr.  Campbell's  the- 
ology was  a  typical  product  of  the  Eng- 
lish Enlightenment.  The  idea  of  God 
which  it  embodies  and  the  philo- 
sophical instruments,  which  were  used 
in  the  formation  of  -the  system  of  doc- 
trine, belonged  to  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. In  a  limited  sense  it  may  be  truly 
said  that  it  is  an  eighteenth  century 
theology.  But  in  a  more  important  re- 
spect, his  thought  was  thoroughly  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  In  his  doc- 
trinal formulations,  he  looked  toward 
the  eighteenth  century;  in  the  compara- 
tively inconspicuous  place  which  he 
gave  to  all  doctrinal  statements  in  the 
movement  which  he  led,  he  belonged  to 
the  nineteenth. 

Among   the   most    significant    move- 
300 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ments  of  thouglit  at  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century  was  that  which 
was  represented  by  Wordsworth  and 
Tennyson  in  English  letters, — casting 
off  the  fetters  of  classicism  and  seeking 
a  freer  and  a  truer  view  of  life  and  art, 
by  a  "return  to  nature."  Simplicity 
and  naturalness  were  the  watchwords  of 
the  new  school,  and  its  only  rule  was  to 
be  free  from  rules. 

To  pass  from  Pope  to  Wordsworth  is 
like  passing  from  the  tiresome  formalism 
of  a  royal  court  to  an  open  meadow  full 
of  wild  flowers  and  wild  birds.  It  is 
like  passing  from  the  heavy  air  of  tradi- 
tional sectarianism  out  under  the  free 
heaven  of  religious  liberty  and  charity. 

Parallel  with  this  literary  movement 
with  its  cry,  "Back  to  Nature,"  came  a 
religious  movement  with  the  cry,  "Back 
to  Christ  and  the  Christianity  of  the  New 
Testament."  Both  sought  freedom  and 
simplicity, — freedom  by  setting  aside  the 
rules  and  restrictions  which  w^re^  prer 
scribed  by  tradition  alone,  and  simplicity 
by  putting  off  all  those,  attiAcial'  ^itibeii 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELUS  THEOLOGY 

lishments,  whether  literary  or  religious, 
which  obscured  the  very  essence  of  the 
naked  truth.  As  the  religious  parallel 
and  contemj)orary  of  this  literary  move- 
ment, Mr.  Campbell's  religious  reforma- 
tion may  rightfully  claim  to  be  a  dis- 
tinctly nineteenth  century  movement. 

The  theology  taught  by  Mr.  Campbell 
lias  come  into  more  or  less  general  ac- 
ceptance among  the  Disciples  of  Christ. 
If  it  shall  be  shown  that  it  is  an  eight- 
eenth century  theology,  and  that  there 
is  therefore  a  presumption  that  it  is  not 
the  best  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  pres- 
ent, it  need  cause  them  no  embarrass- 
ment. By  their  elastic  constitution  they 
are  free  to  change  and  develop  their  the- 
ology in  the  light  of  the  best  thought  of 
each  succeeding  generation. 

And,  after  all,  the  most  important  and 
significant  point  about  Alexander  Camp- 
bell's theology  was  the  use  which  he 
made  of  it.  It  was  not  a  creed.  It  was 
ii'Qt'  <:;laimed'  io:  be;  a  statement  of  all 
truth.  It  was  not  the  theology  of  a 
church., :  It*    wasv   simply   Alexander 

Campbeli^'s  Theology. 

302 


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